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ART. I.—CAUSES OF UNSUCCESSFULNESS IN THE MINISTRY.

THE christian ministry is an institution of God. Its object is the salvation of lost men; and for the attainment of this object, it is clothed with mighty energies. It is intrusted with the dispensation of a gospel, which is declared to be the wisdom and the power of God to salvation. Whatever is great and venerable in the character of the infinite God; whatever is imperative and binding in his moral government over men; whatever is tender and winning in his boundless love in Christ Jesus, or momentous and solemn in the realities of eternity, 'the immortality of the soul, the felicities of heaven, and the punishments of hell;' all is committed to the ministry of reconciliation, as means of accomplishing the great end of its institution,—the recovery of ruined man to the image and favor of his God. Yet this ministry, in the hands of men at the present day, seems, in many cases, strangely divested of its life-giving power. Its practical results, in the conversion and spiritual improvement of mankind, are far less than might be expected from the nature and design of the institution,—far less than they were in the early days of christianity, and far less, we may be sure, than they will be before the arrival of the latter-day glory of the church.

The evidences of this lamentable want of ministerial success, are many and decisive. Look at the state of religion in our churches. Is it such as might be expected from the ample means of grace furnished in the gospel of Christ? The number, indeed, is not small, of those who, on the whole, appear to be christians; but how very imperfectly is the image of Christ drawn upon their hearts, or exemplified in their lives! Of the greater part of the members of our churches, it may, with the strictest truth, be said, "that when for the time they ought to be teachers, they have need that one teach them again which be the first principles of

the oracles of God, and are such as have need of milk, and not of strong meat."

How too is it, that so many under the preaching of the present day, are deceiving themselves with a false hope? The fact cannot be questioned. No one who forms his views of christian character from the bible, can avoid the painful conviction, that there are many in our churches who have a name to live, while they are dead, and are going down to ruin with a lie in their right hand. Would it be so, if the gospel, in its discriminating and exposing power, were duly pressed on the heart and conscience?

Look, too, at the multitude of impenitent persons, who sit from year to year under the preaching of the present day, entirely secure in their sins. They come to and go from the house of God, from sabbath to sabbath, and that too, perhaps, for a long life, and yet remain wholly ignorant of their character and destiny, and receive their first conviction of guilt and condemnation on opening their eyes in a miserable eternity.

Notice also, the infrequency and short continuance of revivals of religion. These precious visitations of mercy generally come at far distant intervals, last but a little while, and are too often greatly marred and injured by a large mixture of deception and false religion,—a fact which has long appeared to us to indicate something wrong in the mode of conducting revivals of religion,—something deficient, unskillful and erroneous, in the manner of presenting God's truth, and using the other means of carrying on a work of grace.

But we need not enlarge on the evidences of a want of success in the ministry. The fact is as obvious as it is melancholy. The question now arises, To what causes is this want of success to be attributed? Why is it, that the gospel, as preached at the present day, so often fails of its end? Why is it not more generally proved, by actual results, to be the power of God unto the salvation of them that hear it? Is it said, that the heart of man is desperately wicked, and that the Holy Spirit only can change the heart and bring men to repentance? Nothing is more true. But the gospel, it should be remembered, is God's own ordinance,—his own appointed instrument for effecting this great spiritual change; and the divine influence, which is admitted to be indispensable to the conversion of a sinner, instead of rendering this instrument powerless, is the very thing which invests it with the high character claimed for it, of being the power of God and the wisdom of God unto salvation.

The question then returns,—What are the causes of unsuccessfulness in the ministry? Why are the preaching of the gospel, and the influence of the Holy Spirit to render it effectual, so often found in *separation and at distance*, one from the other? Is the

cause, every minister should seriously inquire, in no degree identified with *myself*? Is there nothing in the spirit and manner of my ministrations, which deprives them of the co-operating influences of God's spirit, and prevents their appropriate fruits from being more abundantly realized among the people of my charge?

In pursuing the question before us, we shall spend no time in remarks upon that sort of preaching, which denies or conceals the great doctrines of the gospel,—which substitutes the inventions of men for the verities of God, and aims only to deceive its hearers with the sophistries of error, or to amuse them with 'prettinesses of style and manner.' There is much of this kind of preaching in our land, and the cause of its utter unfruitfulness is too plain to need pointing out. The question relates to preaching which is essentially correct in doctrine, and evangelical in spirit and aim.

1. One cause, then, we apprehend, why preaching of this character is not more generally successful, is found in *a faulty method of presenting the doctrine of God's sovereignty and man's dependence.*

These doctrines we hold to be true and important, and a scriptural exhibition of them is of eminent use in bringing sinners to repentance and salvation. The exhibition which we regard as scriptural, is that which brings the greatest amount of moral influence to bear on the heart and conscience; which, while it cuts off self-confidence on the one hand, prevents self-justification and sloth on the other, and impels the subject, under a persuasion, that it is "God who worketh in him to will and to do," to "work out his own salvation with fear and trembling." This is the true, practical effect of the doctrine of God's sovereignty and man's dependence, as taught in the bible.

But the doctrine may be so stated, and if we mistake not, often has been so stated, as to weaken or destroy a sense of obligation, and lay the conscience asleep. Why is it, that so many are to be found sitting under the ministry of the present day, who constantly assert their dependence on God, as an excuse for continuance in sin,—who are wont to meet every call to repentance, with the plea, that they *cannot*, but must wait God's time; and are actually quieting themselves in a state of condemnation, under an impression, that they have nothing to do, and can do nothing, in the great business of securing salvation? Why is it, too, that there are in our churches so many professors of religion, who, whenever summoned to prayer and effort, as the appointed and hopeful means of a revival of religion, fold their arms in sloth, and excuse themselves on the ground, that this is the work of God, and they must wait his time to accomplish it? Here is a practical perversion of the doctrine of God's sovereignty and man's dependence,—a perversion of wide-

spread and most pernicious influence; and whatever other causes may be assigned for its prevalence, it must, we think, in no small part, be traced to a faulty method of stating the doctrine in question.

There is a theology, quite too prevalent in some parts of our country, which is wont to present the sovereignty of God in such a light, as to make it little else than the mere dictation of arbitrary will and power,—binding men in the chains of an inexorable fate; which denies to man all proper ability to obey God, and makes his dependence on divine grace such, as renders it physically impossible for him to perform spiritual duties. And even where this crude theology is not carried to the extent here represented, where, indeed, it is discarded as false, language is sometimes heard from the pulpit, respecting the doctrine now under consideration, which can hardly fail to make a wrong impression on the minds of sinners, ready as they always are to seize upon any thing as an excuse for neglect of duty. If, for example, the doctrine of divine sovereignty and human dependence is so presented, as to infringe on free agency, or set aside the connection between means and ends; if men are told, that they have no power to repent or do their duty; that they are directly dependent on God for all their exercises, and are so under the dominion of a depraved nature, inherited from Adam, or born with them and making a part of them, that they can do nothing to help, but only to hinder, their salvation; they will always receive the impression, that they cannot “be to blame” for being what and where they are,—that sin is their misfortune, and not their crime, and that any attempt to escape from their condition and turn unto God, is absurd and useless. The preacher who uses this language, may perhaps *mean* by it, what is true and important; but there is a great deal of the most hurtful error involved in it, and if he does not carefully guard his statements on this subject, he is sure to be misunderstood. While he seriously aims, it may be, to awaken and save his hearers, he is in fact administering to them a deadly opiate, and quieting them in the repose of undisturbed impenitence and sin.

Against this false and ruinous impression, every minister, who would be successful in winning souls to Christ, must direct his most strenuous efforts. While it remains, the case of the sinner is hopeless. Instruction and warning, exhortation and intreaty, can do him no good. The delusion, that he has nothing to do, and can do nothing, to secure salvation, is a triple shield to his conscience, and stupid continuance in sin is the inevitable consequence.

The great aim of the preacher should be, so to present the doctrine of the bible, as to lay upon the conscience of the sinner the full weight of his obligations, and to make him feel, that whatever may be true respecting the sovereignty of God and man's dependence, there is nothing in either, which in the least militates against

free agency and accountability, or allows the slightest hope of salvation in a state of carelessness and sloth. It should be made to appear, as it certainly may be, that the sinner's dependence on God for repentance, is a dependence of his own creating, growing out of his love of sin and voluntary aversion to duty, and which, while it suspends his salvation on the good pleasure of God, renders him altogether inexcusable and guilty for continuing a moment longer in his sins. This view of the subject cuts off excuse, and fixes the blame where it ought to rest. It leaves the whole weight of the sinner's obligation pressing on the conscience, and is well fitted to make him feel, that if he perishes, his blood will be upon his own head.

We close this topic with the remark, that if a minister entertains any such views of the doctrine just considered, or of any other doctrines of the bible, as in the least embarrass him, in urging upon sinners an *immediate* compliance with the terms of salvation, or which, when duly presented, would diminish in the transgressor a sense of obligation, and of guilt for neglect of duty; such views, he may be sure, are radically false, and of pernicious tendency. This is a practical test, by which every minister would do well to try his theological views.

2. Ministers are not enough in the habit of presenting the gospel to the minds of their hearers, *as a cause fitted and designed to bring them to immediate repentance and submission to God.* In its nature and design, the gospel is such a cause. While it comes with the offer of pardon and life to lost men, its authoritative demand is, that they repent and accept the offer, *and that they do it now.* In this character it was uniformly presented by the apostles; and thus urged, it wrought wonders in the hearts and lives of men. They met their hearers in the most free, unembarrassed manner, just as if they intended and expected to persuade them to become christians on the spot. In pressing home the claims of duty, they appear not to have felt the least difficulty from any doctrinal views of the atonement, or of man's dependence, or of God's sovereignty and purposes. They addressed men as free moral agents, every way capacitated to hear and obey the voice of God: they addressed them as guilty, perishing sinners, standing in infinite need of the mercy offered them in the gospel; and having made known to them the way of salvation by Christ, they urged home the duty of an immediate acceptance of him, as the only and all-sufficient Savior of lost men.

In their manner of delivering God's message, we see no protracted process of using the means of grace pointed out; no analysis of difficulties to be gotten over; no philosophical explanation of the origin and nature of sin, or of the mode of the change effected in regeneration; no allowance of any future time to repent,

or of any delay of duty in the attitude of passively waiting God's time to give repentance. All was plain matter of fact,—direct summons to duty. And was it not this straight-forward, direct way of preaching the gospel, with the fixed design and earnest expectation of its being immediately and powerfully efficacious, which in primitive times produced such great and sudden results in the conviction and conversion of sinners? Repentance and faith are indeed preached at the present day, as duties of immediate obligation; but frequently, it is believed, in connection with other statements which break the force of these duties, and quiet the conscience in sin: and instead of looking for effects in accordance with such preaching, nothing, perhaps, would strike the preacher himself with greater astonishment, than to see his hearers actually repenting, as did those of Peter, while he was yet announcing to them the message of God. The most he expects, even from his best efforts, is, that possibly some of his hearers may be induced to attend to the subject; or, to use a common illustration, that the seed sown may, perchance, spring up and bear fruit at some future day. Of any thing beyond this, neither preacher nor hearer scarcely ever dreams. The consequence is, that the gospel is in a great measure deprived of its power, and comparatively few immediate effects are realized from its ministrations.

The preacher too often expects little from the publication of God's message; and this expectation is, ordinarily, the cause of its own fulfillment. It paralyzes effort, and prayer, and hope,—makes his discourses from the pulpit abstract, cold, and distant, and renders the sword of the Spirit an ineffective, powerless weapon. For if ministers *preach*, or people *hear*, under an impression, that no immediate effects are to be produced, what more can be expected, than that they should preach in vain, and the people hear in vain? The gospel, ministered and heard in this manner, is not brought to bear on the heart and conscience. It does not so much as touch the main-springs of feeling and action in the soul. A wide space is created between *it* and the mind,—a region of vacancy, over which no influence can pass, to awaken fear or impel to effort. No sinner ever repents, till he is made to feel, that submission to God can be delayed no longer,—that the surrendry of the soul is a duty binding *now*, and to be done *now*. To produce this impression, should be the great aim of a minister in all his preaching, conversation and prayers. Let him regard the gospel of Christ as an instrument of heavenly temper, adapted and intended to produce present results; let him, in reliance upon the promised aids of the Spirit, prepare and deliver his discourses under the inspiring expectation of realizing such results; and who can doubt, whether new life and power would be imparted to his ministry, and new and more abundant fruits be gathered therefrom? It is

said of Whitefield, that he always entered the pulpit with an expectation, that the message he had to deliver would be blessed to the salvation of some of his hearers. This is the true principle of faith,—the vitality and power of the ministry: it honors God, and honors his truth; and to a defect of this principle may be traced, in no small degree, the want of success in the ministry.

3. And the cause of this is, *the want of skill in adapting divine truth to the particular state and character of those who attend upon the preaching of the gospel.* There is an exact correspondence between the truths of the bible and the principles of the human mind; and when these truths are clearly presented, and faithfully applied, they never fail to produce impression and feeling. The skill thus to present and apply the truth of God, is the perfection of preaching. It was this which gave the preaching of Christ such amazing pungency and power. He always aimed at the heart: and as he knew what was in man, he was always able to apply to each one of his hearers, the truth best adapted to meet his particular state and character. Hence it is worthy of special notice, that our Savior rarely preached a sermon which did not produce very visible and marked effect,—which did not confirm and comfort his friends, and disturb and distress his enemies. We know some preachers at the present day, who possess, in a very high degree, this divine skill of dissecting the heart, and adapting the truths of God's word to the principles of the human mind; and such preachers are always impressive and powerful. While christians are edified and established in the faith, under their clear and discriminating applications of truth; sinners are distressed and alarmed, and are compelled to feel the guilt and misery of their condition. Such a preacher was Edwards. With almost no aid from voice, or gesture and manner, he could fix an audience in breathless silence and deep solemnity of feeling. His profound knowledge of the bible, and of the human heart, enabled him to speak to the consciousness of every one who heard him; so that each one was obliged to reflect, in language like that of the woman of Sychar: 'Here is a man revealing to me the secrets of my own heart and life: is not this man from God?'

In no respect, perhaps, are sermons more apt to fail than in this. We hear a great deal of preaching which is entirely powerless, because it is not true to nature,—not exact in its delineation of character, nor discriminating in its applications of truth. It is vague, declamatory, and pointless; proving what needs no proof; explaining what needs no explanations; keeping always at a distance from the heart and conscience, 'forever going round and round, but never coming directly to the point.' It speaks of depravity and wickedness, of guilt and danger, of repentance and

salvation, of heaven and hell; but all in such an indefinite, indiscriminate manner, that no one feels himself described, or personally interested in what is said. Such preaching may have many attractive qualities; it may be learned, and elegant, and popular; but it altogether fails of the great end of preaching. It robs divine truth of its power to sanctify and save, and leaves the hearer to slumber on in his sins, utterly ignorant of himself and his future destiny. Such is the stupidity and blindness of man, that *general* truths do not affect him. To rouse him from his slumbers, and excite him to action, the preacher must come nearer, and speak so as to meet his particular case. He should aim to set every hearer by himself, and to make him feel, that the truth uttered is the very truth meant for him. This rarely fails to produce effect. It brings the gospel of God in direct contact with the conscience; and when this is done, its power to awaken and impress must be felt.

4. Preaching often fails of success, for *want of boldness and directness in its exhibitions of God's truth*. We do not mean, by these qualities, any harshness of language or manner, or calling sinners by hard and irritating names; as if to do them good, it were necessary to make them angry. Nothing like this should ever be uttered from the sacred desk. There, all should be respectful, kind, and winning. We mean, by boldness, an undisguised, honest declaration of the whole counsel of God; and by directness, such an application of the truths of his word, as will make an audience feel, that the preacher means them. There is in the preaching of the present day, a great want of this plain, faithful dealing with the consciences of men. There is too much of what one very properly calls '*pulpit exhibition*,'—'a mere flourish of fine language and brilliant images,' or what is quite as bad, of useless disquisition, consisting in the discussion of topics foreign to the great business of salvation,—'in making nice and intricate distinctions, which, like the lines of the spider, are invisible, except to an eye of peculiar acuteness, and which, when seen, are like the same lines, of no possible use to man.' All ministers are apt to think, that they are plain preachers; and it may be admitted, that no preachers on earth have a juster claim to this character, than the evangelical ministers of this country. But when we look into the new testament, and see how Christ and his apostles dealt with their hearers; when we consider the nature of the case, and reflect, that ministers are ambassadors for Christ to guilty men,—that they stand daily in the midst of the dead and the dying, and are going, with the immortal beings committed to their charge, to the bar of Christ, to meet the joyous or dread awards of his judgment-seat; we cannot but feel, that the most faithful need much more boldness and directness in the discharge of their

ministerial duties. They are in danger of destroying their people, through fear of offending them. The case is desperate. Sinners must be awakened, or lost; they must be converted, or damned. This is the only alternative. The malady with which they are affected, is so obstinate, that no slight remedies will avail. The discussion of abstract principles, soft and distant hints of danger, cold and unimpassioned calls to repentance, meet not the exigency of the case. Such treatment serves rather to delude and destroy, than to awaken and save. The whole truth of God must be told,—told, too, in plain and direct application to the hearers, and pressed on the conscience so closely, that each one shall feel, that he has a personal interest in the message delivered. Thus did Christ preach; thus did the apostles preach; and all history and observation go to show, that it is the preaching which, in every age, has been crowned with the greatest success. There is, also, in the preaching of the present day, too much of a dry, cold, analytical method,—less indeed than formerly,—but still too much. Instead of *expressing* strong feeling in delivering the messages of God, many go about to analyze it. Instead of throwing themselves upon their hearers by a bold, fervid, direct annunciation of the great facts, and duties, and promises, and threatenings of the bible, they proceed too much with the reserve and caution of a special pleader, as if they expected every position to be assailed, and every argument controverted. Hence their sermons have more of the character of a dissertation, or a theological lecture, than of a warm, solemn, persuasive address to the heart and conscience. The train of thought, the illustration and language, though perhaps very ingenious, and adjusted with the greatest precision and taste, are entirely above the mass of hearers, and consequently convey no instruction, and make no impression.

Discourses from the pulpit, too, are often greatly deficient in a straight-forward, business-like character. They are formed too much according to *rule*, and not enough under the impulse of feeling and prayer, and with direct reference to impression and effect. They do not come home sufficiently to the bosoms and business of men; meeting them in their every day character and wants, and appealing directly to known and common principles of action. Religion is treated too much as a strange, anomalous concern,—as something that is to be taught, acquired, and acted upon, in a manner entirely foreign to all that belongs to the common business and pursuits of men; whereas it ought to be presented as the plainest and most important concern of every man,—as a thing that addresses itself to every principle and feeling of the human mind, and as connected with all the relations and duties of life. Sermons often fail of effect, because *they teach nothing*,—are mere

essays or fancy pieces,—have no method, no point, no weight; are composed without object and without aim; are as applicable to one audience as to another, and to the inhabitants of the planets, as to sinners on earth.

All this tends directly to obstruct and defeat the great end of preaching. Every sermon ought to be made with reference to a particular object; and every illustration and argument should have a direct bearing on the attainment of that object. In treating with men on the high concerns of judgment and mercy, there is no time for playing with the imagination and passions; none for metaphysical subtilities, or curious speculations, or vague and general reasonings, which have no reference to the case in hand. This is never done by the successful advocate at the bar; it is never done by any man whose soul is set upon great objects, and who is deeply in earnest to accomplish them. Here, all is plain, direct, and glowing. So it should be with the preacher. He should come directly to the point,—should feel, that his business is with the immortal beings now before him; and, rejecting every thing that is foreign to his object, he should aim, by a fearless, direct, earnest application of God's truth to their particular state and character, to rouse them from their slumbers and bring them to Christ for salvation. So he would preach, if he knew it were his last sermon; and no minister knows, when he meets his people in the house of God, but that it is the last time he shall meet them, till he meets them before the bar of judgment.

5. It deserves to be inquired, in this connection, whether, in the discourses of the present day, sufficient prominence is given to what is appropriately called *preaching Christ*. That in many of the pulpits of our land, there is a lamentable deficiency in this respect, admits of no question. Christ, in his appropriate character and work, is entirely lost sight of; and his gospel, of course, is wholly deprived of its power to renovate and save. But, may not the deficiency extend farther than is generally supposed? May it not reach even the pulpits of our evangelical ministers, and operate, in some cases at least, to prevent the success of their ministrations? Any one who has attentively observed the style of preaching most prevalent at the present day, must, we think, have noticed, that the most common topics of pulpit discussion have been, the moral law and government of God; the fall and depravity of man; the nature and necessity of regeneration; natural and moral ability; the entire capacity and full obligation of sinners to obey God, together with their just and certain condemnation if they neglect to do this. Now, we are not saying, that these topics are unimportant. They are plainly of immense importance. Without a distinct and full exhibition of them, the gospel cannot be preached intelligibly, or with the least hope of

success. But then, they may fill too large a place in a minister's time and attention, and be exhibited by him too much in the form of dry, philosophical speculations, with no suitable reference to Christ, and the great purpose of his mediation. Whenever this is the case, the effect, we cannot doubt, must be eminently unhappy. It is a remark of the excellent Cecil, that "men who lean toward the extreme of evangelical privileges in their ministry, do much more for the conversion of their hearers, than those who lean toward the extreme of requirement." A proper union of the two, is the happy medium. The preaching that leaves Christ out of view, and dwells unduly upon what may be called the severer parts of religion, tends to produce insensibility and hardness. It spreads over a congregation the frost and the snows of a moral winter. All is dark, and cold, and cheerless, till warm and vivifying beams from the sun of righteousness penetrate and melt the ice, and quicken into life and fruitfulness the seed of the word.

"Christ is God's great ordinance,"—the grand expedient of infinite wisdom to subdue the enmity of the heart, and reclaim an alienated world to holiness and heaven. Nothing ever has been or can be done to any good purpose, in saving sinners, and especially in perfecting the saints in holiness and love, any further than Christ is held forth in the true glory of his character and excellence of his work. In this view, it may safely be affirmed, that the preaching which has in it most of Christ,—of Christ in the divine dignity of his person, in his mediation; of Christ in his atonement, in his exaltation and intercession; of Christ reigning in glory, and coming hereafter in judgment,—is the preaching which will be most successful in winning souls to him; in forming them into a divine resemblance to himself, and in fitting them for his holy kingdom. There is a softening, subduing influence thrown over the ministry, that is deeply imbued with the spirit and doctrine of Christ, which turns into feebleness all the efforts of mere learning, and talents, and genius. Of this, the apostle was aware, and therefore determined to know nothing among his hearers, save Christ and him crucified. Every minister who would see the work of the Lord prosper in his hands, must come to the same determination. He must not rest satisfied with making the doctrine of the cross,—of Christ crucified, a topic of occasional exhibition. He must dwell upon it much and often, and with affectionate earnestness and interest,—making it the very basis and burden of his ministry, and the life of all his services. He must have his heart and mind so filled with the spirit and meaning of this doctrine, that, on whatever subject he preaches, or whatever duties he performs, Christ crucified to atone, and reigning to save, shall support all, illustrate all, enforce all, pervade all, with its heavenly light and quickening power. All his instructions must

tend toward Christ; all his exhortations point to Christ; all the lines of his ministry, and labors of his life, meet and center in Christ, and be made subservient to the one grand purpose of displaying his glory, and extending the triumphs of his cross. This is the preaching which wrought such wonders in primitive times; which caused the temples and the altars of idolatry to crumble into dust, and darkness to flee away from a thousand lands; the preaching which kindled the light and extended the glory of the reformation; the preaching in which Brainerd was engaged, when the Holy Spirit, like a mighty rushing wind, pervaded his assembly of Indians, and melted and subdued them unto the obedience of faith; the preaching which the Moravian missionaries found so efficacious in the salvation of the poor benighted Greenlanders, after all other modes of instruction had been tried and proved ineffectual; and the nearer we approximate to this kind of preaching, the more abundantly will the Holy Spirit shed down his influence, to crown our doctrine with success.

6. Another cause of the unsuccessfulness of preaching, is *the want of obvious entire devotedness on the part of ministers, to the great business of their calling*. Far be it from us to intimate, that the great body of the ministers of the present day are not pious men. We only mean to say, that if they were more eminently pious and devoted, they would be more eminently successful in winning souls to Christ. Of this, who can entertain a doubt? Nothing gave such power to the ministrations of the apostles, as their obvious, unreserved consecration to the service of God, and the good of their fellow-men. It was a standing miracle in the eyes of the heathen, and did more than all arguments, to convince them of the truth and importance of religion. They saw in the men who spake to them the word of God, a living illustration of the gospel which they were called to embrace, and the effect was great. So it must be from the nature of the case. Nothing will preach like a holy life; nothing come home to the heart and conscience, like that disinterested, self-consecrating benevolence, which, while it speaks the truth in love, shows itself ready to spend and be spent for the good of its object. Brainerd, in his last sickness, often spoke of the great need which ministers have of much of the spirit of Christ in their work, and how little good they are likely to do without it. "When ministers," he said, "were under the special influences of the Spirit of God, it assisted them to come at the consciences of men, and, as he expressed it, to handle them with hands: whereas, without the Spirit of God, said he, whatever reason and oratory we employ, we do but make use of *stumps*, instead of hands."--*Life of Brainerd, by Dwight*, p. 504.

When we read the life of Baxter, and witness his burning zeal, his untiring diligence, his supreme devotion to the cause of his

Savior, we are not surprised at the great and almost unequalled success of his ministry. When he settled in Kidderminster, the whole place was overrun with ignorance and profaneness; but in a short time, under his wise and faithful labors, it became as the garden of God,—having a church of more than six hundred members, of whom there were not twelve, as he tells us, concerning whose piety he did not entertain good hopes. Always in earnest, always alive and engaged in his Master's work, he conversed, and preached, and prayed, as if he saw the great white throne before him, and expected soon to be called to give up his account. So when we read the life of Shepard, and learn from his writings, particularly his "Parable of the Ten Virgins," the holy emotions of his spirit, his deep acquaintance with the heart, and his wonderful skill in opening and applying the truths of God's word, we are prepared to hear it stated of him, that he rarely preached a sermon without marked and visible effect; so that it was common for those who had been detained from the services of the sanctuary, to ask of them who had been present, "On whom has the word wrought to-day?"

A minister who has a deep, habitual sense of divine things,—who is seen to be devoted in body, soul and spirit, to the great duties of his calling, possesses a power of awakening the conscience and impressing the heart, which no acquisition of talents or learning can bestow. The spirit of holiness which dwells and reigns within, throws around his ministry a healthful, life-giving influence. It causes all his studies and attainments,—all his public and private services, to be instinct with life and feeling; and under the influence of this inward, heart-felt conviction of eternal things, he will choose his subjects, not for show, but for profit; he will handle them, not to set off himself, but to honor his Savior; he will preach, not to please, but to save his hearers; he will deliver his message, "not coldly," as if he did not believe it; but with the sincerity and earnestness of a man bent upon great efforts, and who feels, in the very depths of his soul, the momentous realities of religion and eternity. In the same spirit, he will move among his people as an angel of light. He is seen to be a man of God in the pulpit, and he is seen to be a man of God out of the pulpit. Every day, and on all occasions, his great governing purpose is manifest,—the salvation of those for whom God has appointed him to watch. For this purpose, he is early and late in his study, that he may bring out of his treasure things new and old. For this purpose, he will throw himself ahead of his people, in zeal and efforts to do good,—manifesting among them the spirit of a reformer, and leading them on to higher attainments in piety and usefulness. For this purpose, he gathers around him the children and youth of his charge, in the sabbath-school and bible-class,—appoints and main-

tains stated meetings for conference and prayer,—visits from house to house, that he may learn the character and wants of his people, and know how to give to each a portion in due season. To crown all, he daily and humbly waits on God for his blessing, knowing, that without this all means are unavailing. He waits not in the way of indolence, as if he had nothing to do; nor in the way of presumption, as if God in his sovereignty would interpose, without regard to the connection between means and ends; but he waits in humble, believing prayer, followed with corresponding exertions,—praying with a fervency and simplicity of reliance on God, as if all depended on him; and at the same time, studying, preaching and laboring, as if all depended on himself. This is the true spirit of the ministry; and is it not to a deficiency of this spirit,—to a want of this entire devotedness to the duties of the sacred office, that we are to trace the frequent, the lamentable unsuccessfulness of ministerial labors? We mean not here to reprove or accuse. Rather would we confess and mourn over our own unfruitfulness in the vineyard of our Lord. But when or where, we ask, was it ever known, that a minister, giving himself wholly to his work, and conducting his ministrations in the spirit and manner here sketched, has been left to labor without manifest and most encouraging tokens of success? True, God is a sovereign, and when the best means are used, it is he who giveth the increase. But he is a sovereign in no such sense as to invalidate his promises, or break the connection between means and ends. In dispensing the blessings of his grace, he acts in the line of second causes; and all facts, as well as all scripture, go to prove, that the ministry which is most deeply imbued with the spirit of Christ, and labors most *assiduously and wisely* in his cause, is the ministry which he will crown with the greatest success. How weighty and solemn, then, are the motives, which urge the ministry to high and untiring effort in the great work to which God has called them! They watch for souls, as those who must give account; and the destiny of many, for eternal ages, depends, in no small degree, on the manner in which they perform the duties of their high calling. O what manner of persons, then, ought they to be, in all holy conversation and godliness! What simplicity of purpose, what purity of motive, what piety and devotedness, that they may save both themselves and those who hear them! “Two things that are exceeding needful in ministers,” says Edwards, “as they would do any great matters to advance the kingdom of Christ, *are zeal and resolution*. The influence and power of these things, to bring to pass great effects, is greater than can well be imagined. A man of an ordinary capacity will do more with them, than one of ten times the parts and learning can do without them. The very sight of a thoroughly engaged spirit, with a fearless courage and

unyielding resolution, in any person that has undertaken the managing of any affair among mankind, goes a great way toward accomplishing the effect aimed at. When the people see these things apparently in a person, and to a great degree, it *awes* them, and has a commanding influence upon their minds: it seems to them, they must yield, without standing to contest or dispute the matter. But, while we are cold and heartless, and only go on in a dull manner, in an old formal round, we shall never do any great matters. Our attempts, connected with the appearance of such coldness and irresolution, will not so much as make persons think of yielding; they will hardly be sufficient to put it into their minds." He adds, "our misery is want of zeal and courage; for not only through want of these, does all fail, that we seem to attempt, but it prevents our attempting any thing very remarkable for the kingdom of Christ." O, for larger measures of spiritual influence to be shed down upon the ministry, to awaken in the heralds of salvation a warmer zeal, and a more entire devotedness to the great work to which God has called them!

ART. II.—WATSON'S THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTES.

Theological Institutes; or, a view of the evidences, doctrines, morals and institutions of christianity. By RICHARD WATSON. Stereotype edition. Complete in one volume. New-York, 1832. 8vo. pp. 663.

MR. WATSON was a Methodist, and one of the most able and popular preachers of that denomination in England. The work, the title of which is placed at the head of this article, was written, professedly "for the use of young ministers, and students in divinity;" and was designed to "supply the *desideratum* of a body of divinity, adapted to the present state of theological literature; neither Calvinistic on the one hand, nor Pelagian on the other." Mr. Watson's reputation stands very high in his own communion, both in England and America. His "Institutes" have passed through several editions in this country, and we presume, that they are in the hands of every intelligent Methodist. His high reputation among his American brethren was evinced, by an invitation given him to come to the United States, and officiate as professor of moral science in the Wesleyan University, recently established at Middletown. He was unwilling, however, to break away from a wide sphere of usefulness at home, and perhaps, too, reflected, that the magic spell of a great name often dissolves, when placed in a situation to be more thoroughly examined and proved. Still, we cannot but believe,—and this we say, without meaning any disparagement to the worthy gentleman who presides over that institution,—that the presence and influence of such a man as Mr. Wat-

son, would have aided materially in carrying forward the plans which American Methodists are beginning to adopt, for the promotion of education and intelligence in their ministry, and would have proved an invaluable blessing to that denomination in this country. He died in London, on the 8th of January, 1833, at the age of fifty-two.

Methodism, although it has been adorned with many eminently pious and fervent preachers, has produced few able theological writers, and has devoted very little attention to classical and theological literature. This, indeed, is precisely what might be expected from a church which has always rather frowned upon than fostered education of every kind, and especially the cultivation of theology as a science. The prevailing sentiment in this denomination has ever been decidedly hostile to a regular theological education, as a necessary requisite in candidates for the ministry. "Away with books and education, and let the Lord send us ministers who have graduated in the third heaven," has long been their watch-cry. In the mind of many a Methodist, the study of theology is too often so intimately associated with the idea of "*men-made ministers*," that he looks upon it as an abomination, —a viper in the church,—and regards a theological seminary as any thing rather than a means of advancing the kingdom of Christ. Hence the *theological* attainments of the Methodist ministry have generally been meager. In this respect, however, there appears a marked difference between English and American Methodists. Among the former, the standard of education is much higher: no young man can be admitted as a member of the English conference, without much more theological knowledge than their preachers in this country generally possess. Methodist theological writers of much eminence, as Wesley, Fletcher, Adam Clarke, and Watson, are all Englishmen; and Methodist periodicals are conducted with far greater ability in England than in this country. Nothing affords stronger proof of this assertion, than the fact, that the ablest and most spirited articles in the Methodist Magazine and Quarterly Review, are selected from the Wesleyan Methodist Magazine, published in London. But there is a new spirit abroad in that denomination here: the whole Methodist church is arousing itself to the work of education; and, although some are dismayed, and others oppose, the signs of the times fully indicate, that it will ere long have not only its academies and colleges, but also its *theological seminaries*. Some of their leading men are beginning to aim at such a result. They will indeed meet with violent opposition, since all the prejudices of their people are against them; but their aim is a noble one, and no doubt will ultimately be crowned with success. We bid them God speed, and hope, that the day is not far distant, when they will surpass their brethren on

the other side of the Atlantic, both in a better educated ministry and a purer theology.

It is not enough to say of Mr. Watson, that he stands at the head of Methodist writers on theology. He has not only attained a superiority over his brethren in this department; he stands upon an eminence to which even Clarke and Wesley have made but distant approaches. Wesley received a liberal education at the University of Oxford; Clarke, as a biblical critic, was skilled in the languages and in research; but Watson is superior to either of them, as a theologian, as well as in his ability as a writer. His work possesses many excellences for which we search their writings in vain. He indulges less in capricious and extravagant speculations; he treats his subjects with more sobriety and dignity; and above all, he comes to his task with a better defined and more carefully studied theological system. The publication of his *Institutes* may well be regarded as forming an era in the history of doctrinal Methodism, and is obviously doing much to promote a taste for the study of theology as a science, among those for whom it is especially designed. The work is written with ability, and furnishes a full and clear exhibition of the theological system of our Wesleyan brethren, freed from some of its objectionable peculiarities. We are inclined to believe, that English Methodists have a much more sober theology than those in this country; and our principal reason for this belief, is the fact, that in England, Watson is held in much higher estimation as a theologian, than Clarke; while in America, though the former is highly esteemed, the latter reigns "sovereign of the ascendant." It is aside from our present purpose, to enter into a full examination of this volume. There is much in it which deserves commendation. From his frequent mention of the old writers, John Howe and others, he is evidently well acquainted with their works, and the system which he has given may be read with profit.

The *Institutes*, however, pure as they are from certain obnoxious peculiarities of Methodism, contain enough that is exceptionable; and in glancing at them, we design to notice some of the most prominent particulars in their theology, and to point out one or two Methodist peculiarities, from which Mr. W. departs. He professes to be an Arminian,—and on almost every doctrinal point does in fact occupy precisely the same ground with Arminius, whose language, in the statement and defense of his views, he frequently quotes. We mention this fact thus distinctly, as we intend what follows for the particular edification of those who have suspected us of leaning toward Arminianism.

1. We will glance, in the first place, at the view of *human depravity*, presented in this work. On this subject, Mr. W. is full and explicit. He describes "the doctrine of scripture to be

that of the natural and universal corruption of man's nature," and makes human depravity consist in "the fault or corruption of every man's nature,"—in "a moral corruptness of human nature, which has been transmitted to all men;" so that "we are born sinners." The principle upon which he reasons to sustain this position, may be seen in the following paragraph:

'If it be said, that these natural propensities to various evils in children, are not sinful before they have the consent of the will, all that can be maintained, is, that they are not *actual* sins, which no one asserts; but as a universal choice of evil, when accountableness takes place, proves a universal pravity of will previous to the actual choice, then it follows, that, though infants do not commit sin, yet theirs is a sinful nature.' p. 360.

The great fallacy here lies in the two assumptions, that there must be sin before the first sin, and that there can be sin before accountableness. We think it far more scriptural, as well as more philosophical, to account for this "universal choice of evil," not by asserting the previous existence of sin in human nature, but by supposing, that the descendants of fallen Adam come to moral action with an increased and prevailing tendency to evil, which, however, in the nature of things, cannot be considered a state of guilt, and obnoxious to punishment, until it receives the consent of the will; and it is to us passing strange, that any man of common acuteness, who reflects with his bible open, can think differently. But into what absurdity will not blind contention for party opinions plunge men! Sin before accountableness! Sin before there is sin actually! The world may be challenged to tell what kind of existence that is, which is not *actual* existence,—sin, which is not *actual*! Mr. W. might as well talk of propensities which are not *actual*, or of human nature which is not *actual*. Such a distinction does not exist: it has no support, either from the scriptures or common sense, and is grossly absurd. What is sin? It is not our calamity or misfortune, but our crime. It is a transgression of the divine law, for which men, as moral agents, are punishable, as their own act of choice.

In accounting for this "corruption of human nature," Mr. W. assumes, that our first parents, previous to their fall, were not and could not be holy, without the "gift of the Holy Spirit,"—that holiness is "not an effect which would or could follow from their mere creation, independent of the vouchsafed influence of the Spirit of God;" and then accounts for the "whole case of man's corruption," as follows:

'The Spirit's influence in him did not prevent the possibility of his sinning, though it afforded sufficient security to him, as long as he looked to that source of strength. He did sin, and the Spirit retired;

and, the tide of sin once turned in, the mound of resistance being removed, it overflowed his whole nature.' p. 344.

Again:—

'But the whole of this sin is not peculiar to our first parents, but is common to the whole race, who, at the time when the first sin was committed, were in their loins, and who afterwards descended from them in the natural mode of propagation.' p. 362.

This last extract he adopts from Arminius. Notwithstanding such broad and sweeping statements, he undertakes to vindicate his theory from the charge of making God the author of sin; and on the principle, that this sinfulness of human nature is produced, not by "*direct and positive* infusion," but indirectly, through the withdrawal from human nature of "the only controlling and sanctifying power, the presence of the Spirit."

'For as in the death of the body, the mere privation of the principle of life, produces inflexibility of the muscles, the extinction of heat, and sense, and motion, and surrenders the body to the operation of an agency, which life, as long as it continued, resisted; namely, that of chymical decomposition; so from the loss of spiritual life,' [or, which in his view is the same thing, the withdrawal of the Divine Spirit,] 'followed estrangement from God, moral inability, the dominion of irregular passions, and the rule of appetite; aversion, in consequence, to restraint; and enmity to God.' p. 361.

This reasoning, however, by no means relieves the difficulty. It can make no difference, whether God has made our nature sinful directly by his own positive agency, or indirectly done so, provided we have *inevitably* been made sinners by what he has done. In either case, he is the author of sin; and no reasoning, sophistry or illustration whatever, can redeem Mr. Watson's theory from this dilemma. It makes no difference, as to the fact of murder, whether, in killing a man, we shoot him outright, or confine him to an air-tight room, and extract the air. Nor is the difficulty avoided by saying, as Mr. W. does, that God inflicts spiritual death upon the human race, as a part of the punishment denounced against the sin of our first parents: for, even conceding it to be a principle of God's government, to punish sin with sin, or with that which necessarily and unavoidably produces it,—a notion too absurd and monstrous to require even to be "puffed away with sarcasm,"—what does this theory gain by the concession? If it is true, that for Adam's sin God has punished his race with spiritual death, or moral corruption, still he is the author of this punishment, and of course the difficulty in question remains in all its force.

In regard to Mr. W's assumption, that our first parents, before they fell, were entirely dependent on the Holy Spirit for ability to avoid sin and remain holy, we have a few remarks to make.

We say *assumption*, because he has made no attempt to sustain it by proof and argument, and because it cannot be supported, since it is no less without foundation in the scriptures, than it is at variance with the dictates of common sense and sound philosophy. It is a notion to which no man in his senses would resort, unless he is under the influence of affection to some darling theory. This, however, is one of the principal hinges on which the whole Arminian system turns.

We have several objections to make to this assumption. (1.) It involves a denial that God created Adam a free moral agent. It does this, by denying him an inherent ability to obey his Maker and avoid sin, when first created, and by resolving his power to obey and continue holy, into the "gift of the Divine Spirit." In order to moral agency, there must be an *inherent* ability to obey or disobey,—to choose or refuse; and where this ability is wholly extraneous, or entirely dependent on *ab extra* influence, there is no such agency. Even in the opinion of Mr. W. himself, expressed in another part of his work, there is no "moral freedom," where there is "no power to choose either right or wrong." Now if our first parents, previous to their fall, were entirely dependent on God's Spirit for power to obey him; if, as Mr. W. asserts, they could not be holy without the gift of this Spirit; and if their moral liberty was such, that the withdrawal of this "gift" inevitably resulted in their moral corruption; then they never possessed, *in themselves*, the ability to do right, and of course were not created free moral agents. (2.) Again: this assumption denies, that sinful men are now more dependent on the Spirit of God for holiness, than Adam was immediately after his creation. Nothing is more constantly taught in the scriptures, than the dependence of our fallen race on the Spirit of God for holiness; and that this dependence arises solely from the fact, that sin has entered the world; or, that men remain wilfully opposed to God. But if Mr. W's theory is correct, it is not true, that man's dependence arises from this fact: this is not the ground of it; it arises from his not being created a moral agent, and there is no difference, in this respect, between man before and since the fall; for Adam, just after his creation, was as dependent as are his sinful descendants, and as truly in need of a "gracious ability." (3.) Another objection to Mr. W's. view, is, that it depreciates the gospel of Christ, and essentially lessens its glory. The gospel is a glorious dispensation of mercy to sinners,—a harmonious and mighty system of grace; and one of its principal characteristics is the mission of the Holy Ghost. The reason of this mission is declared to be, the existence of sin, or man's continued opposition of will to God. The Divine Spirit comes to convince the world of sin, to carry the claims of obligation into the depths

of every impenitent spirit, to curb and destroy that bias toward evil, with which every child of Adam enters on moral action, and to convert men to God. But, if Mr. W's view is correct, the mission of the Holy Spirit is not peculiar to the gospel,—is not a mighty effort of heaven to rescue fallen, self-destroying man,—but an endowment bestowed upon man at his creation, and though “forfeited” when he fell, yet far more peculiar to him than moral freedom. How greatly, then, is the gospel depreciated by this assumption, which robs it of so principal a characteristic of its glory, as the dispensation of the Holy Spirit!

In treating of the mode in which sin is transmitted from parents to children, Mr. Watson takes the ground, that the soul is *ex traduce*, and that depravity is propagated. To prove this, he several times quotes the words, “Adam begat a son in his own likeness.” In another place, he has the following language: “The children of Adam were not born until after the repentance of our first parents, and their restoration to divine favor. They appear to have been devout worshipers, and to have had access to his ‘presence,’—the visible glory of the shekinah.” Now we wish to “put that and that together.” If, as he believes, moral character is hereditary; if Adam propagated the moral state of his soul to his children; what, according to his own showing, must have been their moral character? Not unholy,—else they could not have been born in their parent's likeness,—for Adam was a regenerated man, a child of God, and, as our Methodist brethren will doubtless contend, in the full enjoyment of sinless perfection. They must have been born, therefore, in a state of perfect holiness. Is it said, “this is impossible, for holiness cannot be propagated?” We ask, why not? Why is not the doctrine of propagated holiness every way as credible as that of propagated sin? It is full as scriptural, as philosophical, as amiable, and far more consistent with the character of our Maker. Why reject it then? If the principle be a correct and sound one, why should it apply in one case, and not in the other? But, a truce to all speculation upon such absurdities: we willingly leave them to the management of those who delight in them. We prefer to follow truth, though she lead us away from our accustomed track, and even scatter our favorite prepossessions or prejudices to the four winds of heaven.

2. We pass on to another topic, *the doctrine of imputation*. Our readers need not be surprised to find this doctrine occupying a conspicuous place in Methodist theology. With all their fear of making the Judge of the earth do wrong; with all their vehement declamation against Calvin, and the “horrible decrees,” Methodists are among the most strenuous asserters of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. Says Mr. Watson:

‘This has been a point greatly debated. In the language of theologians, it is considered as *mediate* or *immediate*. Our mortality of body, and the corruption of our moral nature, in virtue of our derivation from him, is what is meant by the *mediate* imputation of his sin to us ; by *immediate* imputation is meant, that the *actual commission* of Adam’s sin is imputed to his descendants, and accounted theirs by virtue of their federal relation.’ p. 348.

He proceeds to assert, that the latter theory goes too far, while the former, “does not, however, appear to go the length of scripture.” He then states, that there is another theory, which, in his view, is scriptural, and which he affirms to be the imputation, not of the particular act “of Adam’s sin,” but of its ‘legal results ;’ so that we are “made, constituted, accounted and treated,” as though we “had actually committed that sin.” Thus he quotes and adopts the following language :

‘Sin is taken either for an act of disobedience to a law, or for the legal result of such an act,—that is, guilt and liability to punishment. Now when we say the sin of a traitor is imputed to his children, we do not mean that the *act* of the father is charged upon the child, but that *the guilt* or *liability to punishment* is so transferred to him, that he suffers banishment or poverty on account of it. In this sense, we may safely contend for the imputation of Adam’s sin.’ pp. 348, 349.

Whether our author avoids the “shocking and repulsive” principle recognized in what he calls the theory of immediate imputation, we leave our readers to judge. It is true he replies to the objection, that his theory makes God unjust, by saying, that “this objection springs from regarding the legal part of the whole transaction, separately from the evangelical provision of mercy, which was concurrent with it.” But this reply does not avail ; for, in another part of his work, he fully concedes, that “this does not affect the state in which men are born.” In his view, Adam’s sin is in such a sense imputed to his descendants, that “the full penalty of it has passed upon them ;” that they are born not only “guilty and punishable,” but actually punished with that spiritual death, of which the “natural,” “inevitable” concomitant, is the entire sinfulness of human nature. What does it avail them to say, that this “legal part” of the whole transaction, is attended with a concurrent provision of mercy ? Suppose a man cruelly wounds and bruises his unoffending and helpless neighbor : does it vindicate him from the charge of having done wrong, to say, that he has immediately provided a surgeon ? We deny this principle, as one abhorrent to the whole character and feelings of God. “What mean ye,” says he, “to use this proverb, the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge ?” It is revolting to the common sense of mankind. Under no equitable human government,

are the "legal results" of a traitor's crime, so imputed to his children, that they are "made, constituted, accounted, and dealt with," as *traitors*. No where has human legislation decided, that the crime of a parent makes his child guilty and punishable; neither could all the cool assertions of the most positive dogmatist, nor all the guises of the most finely woven sophistry, vindicate such a principle from the charge of injustice, or screen its inherent and hideous deformity.

Another fallacy in Mr. Watson's reasoning on this subject, lies in his assumption, that the sufferings of man in his present state are *penal*. This assumption is opposed, as well to the great principles of moral government, as to the idea of our being under an economy of grace. It is one of the great pillars of Universalism, which teaches, as Mr. W. does, that the present is a state of damnation, or penal suffering, and only differs from him on this point, in carrying out the principle to its legitimate consequences, and denying that punishment extends to a future state. Now this principle tends to undermine and render void the whole system of redemption. Here commence those loose and imperfect views of the sanctions of the divine law, and the nature of sin, and that lax and erring system of speculation upon the divine government, which lead to a rejection of the atonement, and to a denial of the doctrine of future punishment. But God's government proceeds upon no such principle: his law is supported by no such penalty as is here supposed. The legal penalty is not designed, as Universalists tell us, to correct and reform sinners, but to mark the law-giver's view of the evil of sin, and to sustain his authority before the universe; and according to the scriptures, it consists in nothing but *endless and unmitigated perdition*. This life is not a period of final retribution, but a day of mercy, when the execution of this penalty is stayed, and sinful men are called upon to be reconciled to God, through the atonement, and avail themselves of the blessings of redemption. The sufferings of our present state, result from that state of corrective discipline, which God, in wisdom and goodness, has connected with his economy of grace. That they are not strictly penal, follows not only from the nature of penal sanctions, but is clearly seen in the fact, that they are endured by christians, who, as all agree, are saved from the legal penalty. Let the distinction between penal sanctions, and that system of moral discipline under which God has in mercy conditioned fallen man, be accurately marked and constantly kept up, and the dogma of imputed guilt, together with the Universalist's notion of present retribution, will forever disappear.

3. But, dismissing this topic, we proceed to glance at that favorite point with our Methodist brethren, and leading dogma of

Arminianism,—the doctrine of “gracious ability.” We have already shown, that they hold to the natural impotence of man with respect to holiness, in the most literal sense; since it is a tenet of Arminianism, that man was not created with an inherent ability to obey his Maker, and previous to the fall, could not obey without the aid of the Divine Spirit. To this theory of the will, so peculiar to itself, and so purely Arminian, we once more call the attention of our readers. In relation to man’s natural impotence *since the fall*, Mr. Watson adopts the following language from Arminius:

‘The will of man, with respect to true good, is not only wounded, bruised, inferior, crooked, and attenuated, but it is likewise captivated, destroyed, and lost; and has no powers whatever, except such as are excited by grace.’

He repeatedly speaks of the power of the will, by which he intends, of course, its “gracious ability” before the fall, as being lost by Adam, “for himself and for his descendants.” No doctrine do Methodists maintain more strenuously and dogmatically than this. To show that it is philosophically correct, Dr. Fisk, in a communication in the *Christian Advocate and Journal*, argues, that the consent of the will to sin deprives it of some of its power to holiness; and as Adam in Eden could not have more power to love God than was just requisite for that purpose, when he sinned and lost some of his power to choose good, he was no longer an accountable moral agent. By *power* to choose good, we suppose Dr. Fisk to mean, as Mr. W. does, not something naturally belonging to man, but the “gift of the Holy Spirit.” If this supposition is correct, we are at a loss to discover the application of his argument. But, waiving this point, and admitting it to be true, in Adam’s case, that by sinning he was shorn of his power to obey God, what has this to do with his posterity? The principle assumed in the argument, renders it impossible, that their moral agency should be unhinged, until they exist and sin; therefore Adam’s sin could have no more tendency to destroy their power to choose good, or to set their teeth on edge, than it had to produce the same effects upon Satan and his apostate host. We are not, however, sufficiently tinctured with Arminianism, to concede this principle. We deny, that it can have the remotest application to the moral agency of man. That it consists with the Arminian theory of free moral agency, is very possible; but it does not consist with free moral agency, as it really exists. Were this theory of the will correct, then, upon the same principle, that one inclination or choice is as liable to destroy its equilibrium as another;—its consent to holiness must operate as strongly to annihilate its power to sin, as its consent to sin to destroy its power

to holiness. It is inconceivable, therefore, that holy Adam and holy angels should ever fall: and it follows, that the devil who tempts us, and who "goes about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour," as well as the angels and archangels, who, with ceaseless praises and songs of rapture, worship in the heavenly temple, are not free, voluntary agents. If the nature of moral freedom be such as this theory makes it, Adam never was a moral agent,—at best, he was nothing but a well-balanced machine, of a peculiar kind, doomed by an irreversible law of his nature, to follow forever the first inclination of his will to evil, unless God in mercy should interpose to balance him again with "a gracious ability." We should like to know, whether the admirers of Mr. Watson believe it impossible for God to create a being, possessing *in himself* the ability to choose good and be holy, without the "gift of the Spirit;" and if so, where is his omnipotence? If it is admitted, that he *can* create such a being, we ask whether the principles of divine government do not fully demonstrate, that man is such a being? If he is not, is God's government adapted to him? What notion can be formed of a subject of moral government, who is destitute of moral liberty? or, in other words, who, in every instance of obedience or disobedience, does not act with inherent power to the contrary choice? In short, is not the doctrine of "gracious ability," as held by Methodists, something which defies conception,—a mockery, an absurdity, inconsistent with the character of God, and unapproachable by all clear and definite apprehension?

4. We will next touch upon Mr. Watson's views of the *divine law*. It is a peculiarity of Methodism, from which he dissents, that the moral law is in such a sense abrogated, that it has ceased to be man's rule of life, and that the gospel is in such a sense a law, as to be our standard of holiness and rule of judgment, which condescends to our weakness and imperfection. "No man," says Wesley, "is able to perform the service which the Adamic law requires. And as no man is obliged to perform it, God does not require it of any man." Fletcher held the same opinion; and one argument by which he undertakes to establish the proposition, that the gospel is a law, is in substance as follows. "The Adamic law being abolished, to deny that the gospel is a law, is to say we are under no law, and cannot sin." In this view agree most Methodist writers of note; and this representation of the moral law, so rank with antinomianism, constitutes the foundation of the Wesleyan doctrine of sinless perfection. Where it is rejected, that doctrine, as taught by Wesley and the early Methodists, cannot be maintained with any degree of consistency. This notion, by putting the gospel in the place of the law, as an accommodated rule of life for christians, exalts to perfect holiness the imper-

fections of a certain class of believers, who, according to Wesley himself, if measured by the unbending law of Jehovah, would fall into the condemnation of coming short of duty. Hence we frequently hear Methodists exclaim,—“we do not mean that those who are perfect, are as holy as Adam before he fell,—we do not contend for Adamic perfection!”

This view of the divine law, however, has of late been rejected by several leading men in that communion, among whom is Dr. Fisk. In a sermon on this subject, published in the *Methodist Preacher*, for January, 1830, he distinctly maintains, that the gospel is not a law,—that the moral law is not abrogated, but established as the believer's rule of life. This sermon, as was to be expected, produced much excitement, and was followed by another, from a presiding elder of the New-England Conference, of which Dr. F. is a member, designed to counteract its influence, by exhibiting the views of their standard writers on this point. The subject was, in consequence, brought up in that body; but the popularity and influence, and, we may add, strength of reasoning, of Dr. F., giving him a decided advantage over his opponent, the excitement was hushed, the spirit of controversy was chained, and truth gained the victory. We are uncertain, however, whether the matter is yet fully settled. The following are Mr. Watson's views of this subject:

‘When our Lord says, in his sermon on the mount, “I am not come to destroy the law, but to fulfill,” that is, to confirm, or establish, the entire scope of his discourse shows, that he is speaking exclusively of the moral precepts of THE LAW, eminently so called,—and in so solemn a manner does he enforce this, that he adds, doubtless as foreseeing, that attempts would be made by deceiving or deceived men, professing his religion, to lessen the authority of the moral law,—“Whosoever, therefore, shall break one of these least commandments, and teach men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven.”’ p. 554.

Nothing can be more pernicious in its influence upon our views of moral government, and upon our feelings of moral obligation, than this idea of an accommodated rule of life, which so completely embodies the genius of antinomianism. We rejoice to see indications, that some of our Methodist brethren are forsaking this delusion. We sincerely long and pray, that they may soberly inquire, and steadily follow truth, until they see every shadow dispelled, and stand amid the brightness and splendor of her fullest beams. We are not saying, however, that Dr. Fisk or Mr. Watson has renounced that indispensable badge of Methodism,—a belief in the doctrine of perfection. They have not done so. But with their views of the moral law, as the measure of the christian character, their notion of the “*entire* holiness of believers,” to be

consistent with themselves, must be something altogether different from that of Wesley and Fletcher.

5. We will advert to but one more topic, and then leave the book. We allude to the doctrine of *moral necessity*; or, the actual certainty of all events under the government of God. We call a denial of this doctrine a peculiarity of Methodism; and our warrant for so doing, is the fact, that such a denial holds a most conspicuous place in that flood of "checks," "sermons," "doctrinal tracts," etc. etc. etc., with which, in the "torrent, tempest and whirlwind of their passion" to annihilate Calvinism, our Methodist brethren have inundated every corner of their church, and graced every shelf in their "book-room." Many of them, indeed, to be consistent with themselves, formally deny, not only the certainty of all events, but the actual foreknowledge of God. This is true of Dr. Adam Clarke, who resolves God's omniscience into *power*,—power to know all things, which he exercises at his pleasure; knowing some things, but where his knowledge would interfere with Arminianism, choosing to remain ignorant! We do not intend to deny, however, that some of our Wesleyan brethren—in those calm moments when Calvinism, with all its fancied images of terror, are out of mind, and when, instead of collecting their thunders, and gathering up their energies to "burn, fire, kill and slay," their man of straw, they have acquired a temperance which gives their passion smoothness,—have not, incidentally at least, admitted this doctrine. Wesley did so; we have understood Dr. Fisk to do so; and Mr. Watson concedes and *advocates* it in the fullest terms.

He states and confutes several Arminian theories of the divine foreknowledge and counsels, with peculiar ability. In arguing against those theories, he has the following language:

'The prescience, counsels and plans of God, are prescience, counsels and plans which respect free agents, as far as men are concerned; and unless we superadd influence to necessitate, or plans to *entice irresistibly*, or to *entrap inevitably* into some given course of conduct, *there is clearly no incongruity between these and human freedom*. There is a difficulty in conceiving *how* foreknowledge should be absolute, as there is a difficulty in conceiving how God's present knowledge should penetrate the heart of man. But neither party argues from the incomprehensibility of the mode to the impossibility of the thing. The great difficulty does not lie here. It seems to be planted precisely in this, that God should prohibit many things which he nevertheless knows will occur, and in the prescience of which he regulates his dispensations, to bring out of these circumstances various results, which he makes subservient to the displays of his justice and his mercy. This forms the difficulty. But if the perplexity arises from this, nothing can be more clear, than that the question is not, how to reconcile God's prescience

with the freedom of man, but how to reconcile the conduct of God toward man, as a moral agent, with his own prescience,—how to assign a congruity to warnings, exhortations, and other means adopted to prevent destruction, as to certain individuals, with a certain foresight of that terrible result. In this, however, no attribute of God is impugned. On the contrary, both justice and mercy require such divine conduct. The difficulty, then, resolves itself into a *mere matter of feeling*, which, of course,—as we cannot be judges of a nature infinite in perfection, nor of proceedings which, in the unlimited range of God's government, may have bearings and connections, beyond all our apprehensions,—we cannot reduce to a human standard. Is it then to adjust a mere matter of feeling, that we make these outrageous interpretations of the word of God in what he hath spoken of himself?' p. 201.

In this part of his work, Mr. W. abundantly maintains, that, in point of fact, there can be no question as to the previous certainty of moral actions; and concludes his reasoning on this subject by quoting, with high approbation, the arguments of Edwards, to show the irrational and unscriptural consequences which follow a denial of the certainty of all events. We commend this portion of the volume to the faithful study of every Methodist, and of those in particular, who have imbibed the absurd and almost impious notion, borrowed by Dr. A. Clarke from the philosophy of Chevalier Ramsay, that God does not choose to know all he can know.

Notwithstanding these admissions, it is true, that, in another part of this book, Mr. Watson deals out his anathemas, and pours forth his strong reasons against what he calls Calvinism, though with a good degree of coolness, yet with all the resolution of a decided follower of Wesley and Fletcher. It turns out to be a fact, however, that he battles chiefly with difficulties of his own creating, and with theories, which, though they have been held by some Calvinists, yet, properly speaking, form no part of the Calvinistic system. With him, as with our Wesleyan brethren generally, it is too much the case, that, at the very mention of Calvinism, all frank inquiry quits its sway over his judgment, his power of just discrimination is suspended, a dark cloud settles down upon his sober reason, his imagination fills with horrid spectres, his soul swells with loathing, and he spurns and detests, rather than discriminates and reasons. With respect to God's counsels or purposes, Calvinism contends for nothing which he has not conceded. It contends for the doctrine of moral necessity; or, which is the same thing, the previous certainty in the divine mind of "whatsoever comes to pass,"—a denial of which we regard as constituting a peculiarity of Arminianism,—at the same time it contends for man's moral freedom, as ardently, and far more consistently than Mr. Watson or any of his admirers. To reconcile certainty with human liberty, different Calvinists have adopted different theories;

but many prefer to rest in the conclusion of our author. There is a difficulty in conceiving *how* foreknowledge should be absolute, and man remain free. Such knowledge lies beyond our comprehension, and is too wonderful for us. It is better to abstain from such speculations; we willingly give them up; they cause us to tread irreverently upon holy ground; we would not break through and gaze. But no Calvinist, while maintaining the certainty of all events, has ever professedly denied man's freedom. The annals of the church furnish no such instance. We ask, when was there, where is there such a Calvinist? It may, perhaps, be said, that some have adopted *theories* which involve such a denial. This may be so; but theories are not doctrines. Have they ever admitted such a consequence? Have they formally made such a denial? Did Augustine, Calvin, Beza, Gomarus, or Edwards, deny, that man is a free moral agent? We repeat it, that theories adopted to show the harmony between the different parts of a theological system, are not doctrines. And if in any case they are shown to be irrational and monstrous, they prove nothing against the system itself. Suppose some Calvinists, in attempting to reconcile the two doctrines in question, have adopted unhappy theories, which have tended to "darken counsel by words without knowledge:" this by no means proves Calvinism to be a dreadful heresy. Why will not such men as Mr. Watson see this, and make the proper distinctions? Why should any man, who admits, that whatever comes to pass is previously certain in the divine mind, immediately and peremptorily deny this fact, and recoil from it, as from a serpent, whenever he hears it uttered by a Calvinist?

It is not from a spirit of ill-will towards our Methodist brethren, that we have made these remarks. We are not conscious of cherishing such feelings toward any denomination of christians. On the contrary, we sincerely desire to see the walls of partition broken down, and all those who are at heart evangelical in their views, brought to regard each other as brethren, belonging to the same great family, ready to proffer and to receive the hand of christian fellowship. To accomplish such a result, we feel it necessary, so far as we can, to disabuse the minds of those who have imbibed, as we conceive, incorrect views of the leading doctrines of the bible, as maintained by either side of the Calvinistic and Arminian controversy. Neither are wholly right; neither are altogether wrong; and a spirit of mutual concession is indispensable. The advocates of both have resorted, in many cases unintentionally, no doubt, to weak argumentation, to invidious appeals, and to mutual misrepresentation, to attain success. We are confident, that nothing more is necessary than a fair statement of what is meant by either party, to secure a union adequate for all useful purposes,

in such a system of truth, as is self-consistent and scriptural, and such as commends itself at once to the common-sense of all. It is in the hope of aiding in so desirable an end, that we have now endeavored to point out some mistaken statements and erroneous arguments in the volume before us. We have not intended to say any thing at variance with such a purpose; and should we have so erred, we commend ourselves to that charity which "is kind" and "hopeth all things." At the same time, however, we do not mean to disguise our conviction, that the effect of certain views, and modes of stating them, adopted by our Methodist brethren, especially in their practical bearing, are calculated to retard the progress of the kingdom of Christ. We have not time to specify particulars; but our foregoing remarks on Watson, and the general tenor of various articles which have appeared in our pages, will enable any one to understand our meaning. We now take our leave of the work. No formal review has been intended, and we have glanced at some of its contents farther than we at first designed. If our notice of it shall aid in making our readers more fully acquainted with the state of theology in the Methodist communion, to which Mr. Watson belonged, our object will be attained.

ART. III.—A TRANSLATION AND EXPOSITION OF ROMANS IX.
22, 23, 24.

IN the common version of the scriptures, this passage is translated in the following manner:

"What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory, even us, whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles?"

The translation which the writer would propose, is the following:

Now if God, willing to show his wrath, and make his power known, endures with much long-suffering, vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, and *endures them*, in order that he may make known the riches of his glory on vessels of mercy, which he prepares beforehand unto glory, even us, whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles; *hath he not the right?*

This translation varies from the common version in the following respects:

1. "What," which in the common version is supplied by the translators at the beginning of the passage, is here omitted.
2. $\Delta\epsilon$, the translation of which is omitted in the common version, is here rendered as a particle of transition, "Now."

3. "Vessels of wrath and mercy," to which the definite article is prefixed in the common translation, are here rendered as they stand in the original, without the article.

4. The verbs in the aorist tense, (which tense is designed to represent an action either as customary, or as without a precise limitation affixed to it in the past or by the present,) translated in the common version in different tenses, are here placed in the indefinite present. The writer would not object, however, to the use of the imperfect tense, were it employed without reference to any precise time in the past: as, God endured, and prepared beforehand.

5. The common version does not supply, in any manner, the omissions which must be supplied, in order to render the sense complete. This may be said to belong to the interpreter of the sacred writings, rather than the translator. Yet the authors of the common version have not deemed this wholly beyond their province, as will be seen, (to mention no other cases,) by recurring to Heb. vii. 8, 20. It seems to be required in the present case, because the passage, unless something be added to fill up the vacuities in the language, conveys no definite sense whatever. The translation proposed, endeavors to supply the ellipses in the manner indicated by the words printed in italics.

Yet, as a determination of the manner in which we shall supply the manifest deficiencies of the language, amounts, in the present case, to an exposition of the sense of the whole passage, the question arises, whether the writer has here suggested a correct mode of supplying them; and to this question his remarks shall now be directed.

The passage is obviously elliptical in two respects. First, the whole passage is a question, commencing with the hypothetical conjunction, "εἰ," "if"; and should be followed, therefore, before the sense can be complete, with some result or conclusion. On the condition or supposition, that certain things are true,—what then? Why, the previous question of the apostle will tell us what follows. He had just asked, 'Hath not the potter power,' *ἐξουσίαν*, right, etc.? Now *if* God,—on the condition or supposition, that God has been and is acting in the manner which I now state,—*"has he not the right?"*

But, secondly: The question itself, or the supposition, is not fully stated. "And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy," etc. Did what, for such a purpose? The apostle does not state. He leaves it to the sense of his readers to supply. Now there are only two methods in which we can supply the omission, which are at all plausible, and between these our choice lies. One method is, to supply the words "hath called them," at the close of verse 23. Thus: if God, willing to

make known his wrath, endured the vessels of wrath, and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, etc., called them. This mode of supplying the ellipses divides the question into two implied assertions: God, to make known wrath, has endured,—to make known mercy, has called. The other method is that which the writer has suggested in the translation above, repeating the declaration, “endured them,” after the conjunction *καί*, at the beginning of verse 23. Thus: If God, willing to show wrath, endured vessels of wrath with much long-suffering, and—endured them—for the purpose, that he might, etc., has he not the power?

I will now, before advancing the proofs which sustain the latter reading, and the exposition which grows out of it, place the two expositions of the text, between which the decision is to be made, side by side, that the question to be decided may be more obvious, and the reasons advanced in the argument be seen more clearly in their application.

One reading gives this sense.

God endures with long-suffering those who are vessels of wrath for the sake of showing wrath, and calls those who are vessels of mercy for the sake of showing mercy.

The reading which I propose gives this sense.

God, while willing to show wrath, still endures those who are fit vessels of wrath, with much long-suffering, and endures them for the sake of showing mercy in preparing from them vessels of mercy.

For rejecting the first and adopting the second reading, I present the following reasons.

1. The second reading only, seems consistent with the language. The article is omitted before *σκεύη* in both cases, and its insertion would seem necessary, if a definite number were intended. But, if all mankind are originally vessels of wrath, fit for destruction, and God endures them to carry on a work of redemption among them, and to prepare from them vessels of mercy; and if the apostle intended to express this fact; he could not have adopted phraseology essentially different from that he has done; he must have used *σκεύη* indefinitely, without the article. Besides, if, as the first reading implies, the apostle intended to assert that forbearance is designed for showing wrath, and that calling is designed for showing mercy, and he were desirous of placing these two purposes side by side, why does he adopt phraseology so very different in the two cases, to express the same idea of purpose,—*θέλων ἐνδείξασθαι—ἵνα γνωρίσῃ*? Again: The first reading requires the whole clause, *ἵνα γνωρίσῃ*, etc., to be understood as expressing merely the final end which God would secure, and not the means. But I ask, whether the clause itself does not fully suggest the means, as well as the end? In order to make known the riches of

his glory is the end secured,—and how? on vessels of mercy which he before prepares for glory. Preparing vessels for glory, surely, is the very way of making known the riches of his glory. The clause, therefore, clearly implies, that in order to such an end as making known his glory, by such an act as previously preparing vessels of mercy for eternal glory,—that in order both to the means and end,—he does something else. And what is that? The first reading suggests, that he *calls* them. But that is *preparing* them. The clause implies, that he does something else besides preparing them, in order that he may carry forward the whole system of preparation itself. And what is this, but the act of which Paul had just spoken,—the only act about which he makes any direct assertion,—that God *endures*, with much long-suffering, vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, *καὶ—ἰνα* etc., and does this for the sake of carrying forward the system of preparation. Besides: the whole clause expressly *includes calling*, in the very preparation of the vessels of mercy. In order to make known the riches of his glory on vessels of mercy, prepared beforehand for glory, whom he hath *called*, etc. In order to *all this*, God does something. What is it? The first reading says, He calls them. But that would be as much as to assert, that in order to prepare and call them, he calls them. The whole clause, therefore, throws us back on something asserted as done, or, by ellipsis, implied to be done, preparatory and subservient to the whole work of showing mercy, and preparing and calling vessels of mercy. And what is that, but the act suggested in the second reading,—the only act of which Paul had made any direct assertion,—God endured vessels of wrath fitted to destruction?

2. The next reason which I alledge, is, that the second reading only is consistent with the purpose Paul had in view at the time. He was meeting an objector, who replied to his statement of divine sovereignty,—that sinners could not be blamed,—that God, in thus disposing of sinners, could not find fault. The design of Paul, therefore, was to meet the objector on this very point,—the conduct of God in his disposal of sinners. After rebuking the objector for his presumption in replying against God,—a creature refusing to be at the disposal of God his creator,—he then seeks to commend the truth to his conscience. You concede to a potter the right to dispose of his clay, and mold from it vessels for honor or dishonor. Will you not concede to God the right to dispose of sinners, if, while willing to show wrath, he endures them, though fitted for wrath, with much long-suffering; and does it purely for the sake of carrying forward a system of recovering mercy? The design of the apostle, therefore, could not have been to assert, that God was engaged in two works,—in making mere creatures into sinners, and making mere creatures into

saints. To meet the case and conscience of the objector, he could have spoken only of those who by sin were already fitted for wrath, and of the disposal God makes of them in his providence,—among them hardening whom he will, and having mercy on whom he will. What other way, then, could he adopt, to commend such a truth to the conscience, than to assert, that though some sinners were hardened under the providence of God, yet the process of providence itself, under which their hardening took place, was designed only for good,—that God was bearing, with great long-suffering, the sin of a world, that deserved death; and, that he was exercising this forbearance in order to redeem many unto glory? Does not this commend itself to the conscience of the objector,—that if any sinners are hardened yet more under this process, this hardening took place on their abuse of a system of forbearance and mercy designed for good; that God is good in carrying forward such a system of forbearance notwithstanding; and that the mere *aggravation* of ruin, that will be consequent upon it, to those who are finally lost, is to be chosen of God, rather than the ruin of the whole?

3. The next reason which I alledge, is, that the second reading only agrees with the history of the times. For, Paul makes this statement apply to the very case of Israel and the Gentiles, as it existed at that time. The rejection of Israel and the call of the Gentiles, is the very subject with reference to which he introduced the whole section about God's sovereignty; and he closes the section and this very reply to the objector, with referring expressly to the case of Israel and the Gentiles,—preparing beforehand for glory, vessels “whom he hath called, even us, not only of the Jews, but also of the Gentiles.” Now at the time Paul wrote this, if we adopt the first reading, we shall make him assert, that all those who had rejected Christ up to that time, God was enduring in order to punish; and, that the ones then called, were all that would be called from that generation. For the vessels of mercy then existing, were those who were called from the Jews and Gentiles, and all but the vessels of mercy were, of course, the vessels of wrath. These, says the first reading, were endured only for punishment. These, says the second reading, were endured by a God who was willing to punish for the sake of carrying forward his work of mercy, and preparing from among them vessels of mercy. Now, which agrees with the history of the times? Were none but those who were called at the time Paul wrote this epistle, ever called from that generation? Were none of the unbelieving Jews or the ignorant Gentiles then living, afterwards ingrafted, by faith, into the true olive?

4. The next reason which I alledge, is, that the second reading only agrees with the manifest design of God's forbearance. The

first reading asserts, that God, in order to *punish* vessels of wrath, *endures* them with long-suffering; and makes the very end and design of forbearance terminate on sin and punishment. The second reading asserts, that God, though willing to punish sinners fit for wrath, nevertheless forbears, with great patience, and to many lengths of their sin, in order to promote his work of salvation, and prepare from them vessels of mercy. Now, the forbearance of God cannot have the first end in view: it evidently has the last. Is forbearance a means to secure punishment? But forbearance implies the subjects of it to be already deserving of punishment: and if God is represented as wishing for the existence of a case of punishment, he evidently must have it before he exercises any forbearance; otherwise, there would be no room for forbearance itself. Why, then, should he be represented as forbearing in order to punish? But reason shows, that forbearance has only mercy in view. For, forbearance is an appeal of goodness to the heart, in its very nature favoring the repentance of sinners; and if all are not actually recovered by its appeals, the excepted cases arise from abuses of it, and become, in their greater guilt and punishment, warnings to others to comply with the end of forbearing goodness.

The scripture asserts, that the forbearance of God is exercised only in favor of salvation. Paul, in this very epistle, says, that this is the end of God in forbearance. “Despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, *not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance*; but after *thy* hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up to *thyself* wrath.” Would Paul, after thus chiding opposers for their disregard of the reclaiming intention of God’s forbearance, turn round in the very same epistle, and assert, point blank, that this goodness was designed only for their destruction, and not to promote salvation; and thus bring down upon himself the very rebuke he had just administered to others?

Nor is it to be seen, how God could carry on a system of redemption from sin, that should be effectual to the recovery of a part, without forbearing punishment. For either he must forbear in no case whatever, and then all are punished and none redeemed; or, he must forbear only in case of those who will be redeemed. But that would break up the very existence of families and nations, and thus render a system of redemption impossible; and it would destroy the very system of redemption itself. For all that lived would be infallibly assured, from that very fact, that they were to be redeemed; and some of the most powerful motives which are used in a system of redemption, and grow out of the moral government of God, would be necessarily destroyed. If, therefore, any are borne with who will not be redeemed, it is a

necessary accompaniment of the system; and if any are borne with after they are given over to a reprobate mind, their case may be used as a solemn admonition and warning, to enforce compliance with offered salvation, and thus to promote the end of God's mercy.

5. Finally, the apostle Peter has, I think, settled the reading of this very passage. After representing scoffers as taking occasion, from the delay of judgment, to deny the intention of God to fulfill his engagements, Peter gives his brethren an exposition of the delay of God,—that it did not take place because God was slack to his engagement, and absolutely unwilling ever to punish sinners; but that it originated in his will, under a system of salvation, that none should perish, but that all should come to repentance. To close this exposition, he says, “account that the long-suffering of our Lord is salvation: even as our beloved brother Paul also, according to the wisdom given unto him, hath written unto you. As also in all his epistles, speaking in them of these things, in which are some things hard to be understood.”

Now, if I look over the epistles of Paul, I can find no place in any of them where the design of forbearance so directly comes up in its real aspects and relations, as in this, *δυσνόητον* epistle, and in this, *δυσνόητον* passage.

The passage on which the above comment is offered, was intended by the apostle to vindicate the character of God, with respect to his diverse treatment of mankind, and his sovereign decisions of wrath and mercy. The appeal is made by the apostle to the conscience and common-sense of mankind. For he puts it even to the sturdiest objector to decide: if the conduct of God, in the concerns of wrath and mercy, is so and so, based on such and such elementary principles, has he not the right? Is there any thing in such conduct, that does not commend it as right to the conscience and common apprehensions of mankind? With this view of the passage, I offer the following remarks.

1. The will of God is not arbitrary, but wise in its sovereign decisions.

The simple attribute of sovereignty is represented by some, as swallowing up all considerations of wisdom, righteousness or goodness. Enough, say they, that a sovereign God wills. True: reverential piety will say amen to all his decisions, even in its own utmost darkness and ignorance; yet always, be it understood, with unquestioning confidence, that his decisions are based on the everlasting rock of righteousness and wisdom.

The attribute of sovereignty belongs to the divine will, because his will is supreme over all, and takes counsel of no others. His will is thus exalted: so that all good results in his kingdom shall be ascribed to the deep and well-laid schemes of his own wisdom and goodness, and not to mere willers and runners in his kingdom.

But in his sovereign will, though supreme over creatures, and uncounseled by them, he is not supreme over wisdom and goodness, and uncounseled by them.

For a testimony to this, hear Paul speaking in vindication of the sovereign will of God, in the passage now commented on. He had declared the sovereign will of God in this manner: "He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." How now does he vindicate God? Does he rest the vindication on the simple fact, that God wills? If we stop at the mere commencement of his reply to the objector, it might seem so; but he goes on to show, that God's will terminates on good alone, and combines the elements of authority, righteousness, forbearance, mercy, into one system of wisdom for securing the end. This all might be shown to be contained in the passage which we have considered, and with which he closes the reply.

2. The sovereign decisions of God are formed in subservience to his moral government. Or, his moral government being the indispensable means of gaining the ends he would secure in his moral kingdom, his sovereignty decides on the particular mode of dispensing and carrying forward the measures of that government, in a way best to secure those ends.

Thus the whole world, Jews and Gentiles, having by their own sin fallen under the penalty of the divine law, as the apostle had shown in a previous part of the chapter, and being utterly without excuse, there was opportunity, under the moral government of God, to introduce a system of grace, which should be carried on by moral means and influences, congruous and consonant to such a moral government: and in his decisions, as to the particular mode of carrying forward, in such a world, the measures of grace, his sovereign will is manifested in regard to the particular results,—the calling of some, and ultimate hardening of others,—as being the results he chooses, rather than depart from a system leading to the best possible results on the whole.

Is it not so? According to the passage, there are those who are fitted to wrath. Now, if you will allow the apostle to speak as he has done through the whole epistle till he comes to this passage, the whole world are originally fitted to wrath, and in no other way than by their own voluntary disobedience of God's law and government. "They have all gone astray." Again: "God is willing to show wrath." This is a necessary element in the constitution and influence of his moral government. Not a desire to show wrath for wrath's sake, but θέλων, a *willingness* to show it, that will not shrink from upholding the authority of his law and government, by inflicting the penalty when it is requisite. Again: "He endures with much long-suffering, and for the sake of calling a people to salvation." Could a moral governor, if he would re-

gain any of the disobedient and rebellious to submission in such a world, decide otherwise, than to present a 'call' to them to repent, to submit, to accept his terms of reconciliation? Or could he, with any congruity with his moral government, present such a call in our world, without a sovereign act of forbearance towards the race? And if the measures which he pursues, do not render the call effectual in all cases, and if multitudes who do not accept the call, abuse the divine forbearance to their greater hardness, do these results prove at all, that he could have adopted any system of measures, congruous with his moral government, that would secure any better results in this world, or at least in the whole universe?

A writer in this country has broached a very peculiar theory, which divides God into two distinct actors, having different ends in view, and different means at command; the sovereign efficient, and the moral governor. Just as if God, the moral governor, did not employ his own efficiency, and wisdom, and goodness, to carry forward, in the best possible manner, his moral government over his kingdom, and to secure the best possible results, on the whole, among his subjects. Just as if he did not will, that his creatures should obey his laws, and decide to take the best measures to secure such a result, to the greatest extent possible, in his whole kingdom.

According to that writer, when God, the moral governor, came before Adam with the requirement of love, the sovereign efficient behind the throne, dried up the fountain of love in Adam's heart, by direct annihilation! So has he ever done by all his creatures who have defected from his authority. He has called upon them as a father, to abide in his law and love; but a hand from the efficient behind the throne, has dried up the fountain of love in their hearts, by direct annihilation! Is this the sincerity of the holy and blessed potentate, the God of truth and love?

3. The scheme of redemption in Christ is *infra-lapsarian*.

According to the apostle, sinners are not represented as existing for the sake of redemption, but redemption is represented as introduced among sinners for the sake of salvation, and advancing the moral government of God.

What if God uses forbearance toward a race of sinners, for the sake of calling to glory multitudes, all whom he can, consistently with maintaining his willingness to punish, and consistently with the highest influence of his moral government on the whole? The very idea is, that there is a gain to his kingdom, from *that state in which it is, when this world is viewed as having sinned and come short of the glory of God*. From this stand-point of a world already in rebellion and perishing, are the intelligent universe to take their view and estimate of the work of mercy.

Nor if we take this view of the relation of redemption, as a remedy for an evil unavoidably incident on the creation and government of moral beings, do we destroy, at all, those high and interesting relations which redemption sustains to the eternal counsels of God, to the development of his character, and to the good of his universal kingdom.

His counsel was taken in eternity with reference to all his works. And if it were a truth, that the occurrence of sin originates in the nature of his moral kingdom, unavoidably somewhere, he might have in wisdom counseled, that this world should be the scene, and that the means of redemption should be used in this world, as the remedy for reducing the evil, on the whole, to the narrowest limits congruous with his moral government. Even thus he counseled in Christ before the world began, that this world should be created as the scene for such a redemption.

His character, too, shines more conspicuously in this, than in any of his works ; because here, in order to extend a remedy for an evil, that he could not otherwise reduce, he consents to the greatest possible sacrifice on his own part, and for the sake of those who voluntarily transgressed the laws of their safety. On the very condition, that the evil itself were in its nature to him unavoidable, and that such a sacrifice were necessary, in order to reduce it in the least, it becomes an act of regard for the welfare of his creatures, more deep, strong and impressive, than any other, and more deserves the praise of his kingdom.

Nor can his universal kingdom fail to reap the results of all his acts of goodness. Principalities and powers in heavenly places, see the extent of his goodness in redemption. And herein is his wisdom in redemption, that an act of restorative goodness toward the otherwise lost, should so be managed, in consistency with the righteousness of his moral government, as to redound to his praise through his whole holy kingdom.

4. The hardening of sinners is an unavoidable attendant on a scheme of redemption.

For, as the scheme of redemption itself is not effectual to the salvation of all, the forbearance of God, which is necessary to the scheme, is abused by some to their greater hardness of heart. This influence to harden the heart, which comes from forbearance abused, is strikingly manifest in the instance of Pharaoh, whom Paul cites in this very paragraph. It is asserted also, by the inspired writer, in this strong language : " Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil."

Forbearance, therefore, at the very time it is the necessary foundation for pursuing a scheme of recovering grace, and attests a goodness in God, that should attract sinners to return to him, in

repentance and submission, unavoidably presents to the heart resolved on sin, greater temptations to keep on in its course ; or rather, lessens the force of those motives which should alarm and arouse it to instant repentance.

This is an unavoidable concomitant on a scheme of redemption, if that scheme is not universal in its efficacy. And they who assert, that a scheme of redemption could, in full congruity with the moral government of God, be universal in its efficacy, will do well to prove their own assertion, before they make it the representative of truth, or the foundation of just inferences.

5. The hardening of sinners under a scheme of redemption, is preferable to the non-existence of the scheme itself.

For all would have been lost forever, but for this scheme. And if some increase their hardness, and consequent righteous punishment in eternity, by abusing the forbearance attendant on a scheme of redemption, the simple aggravation of their ruin is not a thing to be set off, as any counterpart or equivalent at all, against the eternal rescue of multitudes from ruin itself, and their exaltation to eternal holiness and blessedness. They who are hardened, are to be put down as originally lost, independently of the scheme of redemption ; and they who are saved, are to be put down as wholly gained by the scheme of redemption.

Therefore, there is a vast reduction of evil and increase of good arising from the system, which well exhibits a foundation for divine love to have desired and designed it from eternity, and for a holy universe, when the harvest is reaped, to praise God, for having reared it, through eternity to come.

O. F.

ART. IV.—WARDLAW'S CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

Christian Ethics ; or, Moral Philosophy, on the Principles of Divine Revelation.
By RALPH WARDLAW, D. D. *With an Introductory Essay.* By LEONARD WOODS, D. D. New-York, D. Appleton & Co.: Boston, William Peirce.
pp. 380.

It was with feelings of awakened interest and expectation, that we read the announcement of "Wardlaw's Christian Ethics." Books of this sort, as they relate to the foundation of every truth which affects man's permanent welfare, are among the most important that are given to the public. They deserve, therefore, the attention and the serious consideration of every thinking man, as he values correct sentiments on such subjects. The table of contents, published in the religious newspapers before the work itself came to hand, prepared us for the ground which it occupies. We concluded at once, that it was an exhibition of a particular

set of sentiments, in regard to "Moral Science," which are rapidly gaining favor among a certain class in the christian community. These opinions and modes of thinking, (for we choose to call them thus, rather than to dignify them with the name of principles,) are indeed plausible, because they assume the garb of piety, and peculiar reverence for divine revelation. If they are erroneous, therefore, they are the more carefully to be guarded against, and the more strenuously resisted. Our own principles in respect to them, we have chosen to present in the first place, before we particularly notice the contents of the work itself. We commend them to all such of our readers as can say with Baxter, that in the theological and moral science their intellects *abhor confusion*.

It is a fact which need not be disguised, that, as to ethical science and natural religion, and their relation to revealed truth, the opinions of theologians have been as diverse as possible.

Certain of them have contended, and with no deficiency of zeal, that they who receive the scriptures as revealed from God, after having once settled the question of there being in fact such a revelation, should make them the only field in which to search for truth. If moral philosophy or natural religion are treated of as independent sciences, upon principles peculiar to themselves, an outcry is at once raised against them by such men, as *unchristian* intruders; and they who study them thus independently, in the eyes of this class of persons, do little better than deny the faith. There have been philosophers who have ever held, that the veriest elements of these sciences were never discovered, and, from the nature of the case, never could have been discovered, before they were spoken out in an audible voice from heaven. This whole class, however, has included but a small portion of the sound thinkers among men.

To a second class it is difficult to assign a character, and for the obvious reason, that, though they may have held opinions upon this subject, they can hardly be said to have adopted principles. Unwilling to discard all independent philosophic reasoning, they are yet afraid to receive and trust it, on the only terms on which it can satisfy the mind, with that confidence in the truth which gives joy, or plants the feet on the firm standing-place so few ever reach. When Reason is in their favor, none are more glad of her aid, or more eager to set her forth as their fellow-combatant, fair and terrible as "Pallas Minerva" of old. But if for a moment she seems to them to favor their adversary, she is thrust forth at once, as a faithless and a treacherous ally,—always false, and never to be trusted. Instead of disproving the logic which is arrayed against them, *as logic*, and by the force of sound reasoning, and instead of showing how weak and pitiful it is as argument, the ground is at once shifted, and the appeal is made to the *authority*

of revelation, and this is sometimes enforced by not a little authority of their own.

The third class includes all those persons who adopt, with cheerful confidence, the maxim, that the truth can never contradict itself. This maxim they receive, in its fullest extent, as a true one, and upon the strength of their faith in it, they go forth, not knowing whither it will lead them, or rather assured, that it will never mislead or betray. They believe, that He who has arched the broad heavens above them, and spread out the fair earth beneath their feet, and given them the wondrous world within, in which to look, is the same God who has opened the volume of his word; and that on every one of these varied pages the same truth is written, on one with greater, on another with less distinctness. They are not afraid of attempting to read any one of these pages by itself, and of translating its words according to their just and full import. Whether they wish to learn the nature of man, as he came from the hand of his Creator, or the character which God has given to himself, or as he can be known in his power and goodness, from his works alone; they are not afraid to proceed upon independent principles of inquiry. Instead of waiting to settle the question,—what if the written word and the voice of nature should contradict each other?—they fearlessly assert, that such a case can never happen. If the one appears for a moment at variance with the other, they act as wise men act in all similar cases; they suspend their judgment. They re-examine their reasoning, and turn the eye more keenly and intently upon the language that seems irreconcilable. If this returns the same answer, and their logic is not to appearance unsound, (which case will not occur so frequently, it may be, as is often thought,) they conclude, that they have not all the facts before them, and wait with minds still open to conviction, till these facts present themselves, relying the mean while on their present interpretation of God's word. This they do with the conviction, that their own fallible intellects are less likely to be deceived in interpreting this word, than in setting up against their present views of it an independent judgment of their own.

It will not be denied, we are confident, by those who are willing to look at facts as they are, and to breathe an atmosphere in reasoning, as free and as liberal as that of the bible, that certain things are in the scriptures supposed true of man, before he is met by their heavenly message. Not only is it supposed, that man is a moral being, with relations which extend out far beyond all that is visible, and with sympathies which vibrate in unison, or in harsh discord, with those of beings whom mortal eye can never see; but it is also supposed, that man may himself know this truth. If he cannot, why is it, that when the voice sounds in his ears, claiming

to be from the heaven where God is, and from the God who dwells there, he starts up, as though it were a concern of his? What is heaven or God to the pagan who has never before heard these words distinctly uttered, except that his heart and his inmost sympathies testify to him, that this heaven may be his home, and that this God may be his Father, though from the one he is now an exile, and with the other he is at fearful odds? What means the opposition of his feelings to the gospel, for the first time proclaimed, now manifesting itself in proud scorn and brutal indifference, or again bursting forth in mad and fiendish rage, if it does not testify, that there is now sounded loud in his ears the same truth which his better judgment has always whispered to him? ("their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another.") How can the bearer of these glad tidings from above, hope, "by manifestation of the truth," to commend himself "to every man's conscience in the sight of God," unless the same conscience had before given a testimony, which this *new witness* now comes forward more fully to substantiate and confirm, as well as to render more definite and particular? How could an apostle speak of those who, "having not the law, are a law to themselves," if it were not true, that wherever man is, even though no word of authority is spoken to him by another on earth or from heaven, yet he cannot, if he would, avoid regarding every action of his own either with self-approbation or self-reproof?

But we need not rest the truth of our position upon what is pre-supposed in revelation, and appealed to in its pages, in the most free and unqualified terms. Look at man as he is, without any light from heaven. As he utters so frequently those strange words, *right* and *wrong*, it cannot be supposed, that he is merely repeating certain sounds which have been handed down from generation to generation, ever since our common parent, to which he attaches no meaning. Nothing like this can for a moment be supposed to be true. They give utterance to feelings which live as freshly in his bosom, and assert an authority there as vigorously, as when these words first fell from the lips of man. We find it true in heathen countries, that the invisible world, and its close neighborhood to the world which we see, is recognized,—falsely conceived of, we admit, but still recognized with far greater frequency, and controls the minds of the people with a sway far more extensive and unquestioned, than where the truth concerning this world is more clearly known. If we look to the literature of these nations, the knowledge of a serious concern in these weighty realities, will appear every where animating and giving life to the language. Was not Socrates a martyr to the truth, and of the truth too which may be known of man, from a contemplation of himself and the works of God? It may, we think, be

reasonably doubted, whether the conversation recorded by Xenophon, as having occurred between Socrates and Aristodemus, does not leave on the mind a belief of the being and attributes of God, as convincing as the more detailed argument in Paley's *Natural Theology*. We have not a doubt, that the dying speech of Cyrus is far better fitted to raise the tone of moral feeling in the breast of a young man, and to confirm his faith in the reality of moral distinctions, than the treatise on Moral Philosophy by Paley, though he was an arch-deacon.

But it is not here our design to show *how much* may be known by man, whenever he honestly consults his own conscience ; but to establish the position, that, according to the declarations of revelation, and undoubted facts, *something* may be thus known. With this granted, we proceed to observe, that, if moral science has any important office of its own to perform, this science must be prosecuted on *independent grounds*. We say it boldly, not fearing the interpretation which any honest man will give to our words, that, to accomplish any thing for his own science, or to aid the cause of revealed truth, the chair of the moral philosopher must be separate from that of the theologian. What is his object? It is to draw out in scientific form, all that man *may* know of himself as a moral being, and of God as his moral governor, *before* he is met by a revelation. To accomplish this object, he must, for the time being, lay aside his faith in revelation, and look at man with the eyes only of a philosophic inquirer. In this attitude, he must attempt to state to himself, in accurate and well-defined propositions, all that a mind unbiased by pride or passion would see from its own resources to be true. Whatever such a mind might thus know as certainly true, to this he should give his assent ; not with a wavering faith, because it is an article in the creed of nature, or because other men have thought they honored God's word by contending, that for the knowledge of this truth we are indebted to revelation alone. On such ground as he finds sure, he should plant his foot with a firm and determined step. Whenever the voice within and around him is dubious and equivocal, he should observe that it is so ; but still, without forgetting to give his faith as an inquirer, into all truth which may be discerned in nature, no less than to what is uttered in revelation. Every line of light which he can trace out through its whole course, he should follow with a steady eye, nor neglect to pursue every one that is in part only visible, as far as it can be followed with certainty.

With the truth of which he has in this way become master, and with the many glimpses and probable indications which are sufficiently clear to awaken inquiry and to excite conjecture, but not so certain as to satisfy either, he is prepared to meet the message which claims to be from heaven. He meets it as a moral being,

with all his feelings as such a being fully awake. As he thus brings it home to himself, without waiting for the credentials of the messenger who bears it, he feels, from the bottom of his heart, that it recognizes and re-proclaims all that he before knew to be true, and that it lengthens out and supplies all that was before abruptly broken off; as the cloud which has rested upon a part of the landscape, rises so slowly and so insensibly, that we cannot easily say where is the exact limit which shuts out a portion of its beauties. The man who will present himself as he is before God, with the light of nature only to shine on both, and will look with an honest eye on himself, as he there stands, may be sure, that enough may be seen, certainly that enough may be guessed at, to make him tremble with fearful apprehension. The wholesome fear thus excited, prepares him to welcome the gospel as indeed glad tidings to such a one as he counts himself to be. These views of the gospel and of man, enter largely into every close and powerful exhibition of the evidence for its truth. The preacher may not indeed know it, while it is not the less true, that the course of thought which he prosecutes with so great success, involved the elements of an independent moral science with its true relations to revealed theology. It is, in short, the course of reasoning which leads sinful and degraded man to see, that it is not the gospel which *makes* him a sinner, but that it *finds* him already one, and is to him, self-destroyed as he is, an undeserved gift, a blessed boon. It leads man to see, that the gospel has no ground to beg of him, but that, however much in pity it may stoop to his brutish and ignorant stupidity, yet it stands alone in conscious dignity, and waits for him to come forward and secure to himself the blessings which it has in its gift.

There are modes of presenting the evidence for the truth of the gospel, which, instead of settling any moral truth beforehand, place an exclusive reliance upon the argument from miracles. The result of such a procedure, if the thoughts of those who are in this way addressed by the gospel were honestly told, would be something like this: "Here is a system which is sent forth with signs and wonders, proclaiming not deliverance merely, but establishing by its testimony, the fact, that men are sinners. If I reject it as a remedy, I rid myself of the belief that I need one." Under any view, it is at least true, that to believe that one is a sinner, on the strength of the evidence of miracles, as well as the fact, that there is a deliverance, requires *double* the faith which the other method demands. The unbeliever, when addressed by the "historical evidence" only, reasons, that if a single flaw can be detected in the chain of the argument, there will be a relief not merely from the obligation to accept its offers of mercy, but from the burden of guilt which it is imagined the gospel imposes on the conscience. Is the gospel

when thus presented, nothing else than "glad tidings of great joy?" Does the fact, that it is offered to man, make him a moral being? If it does not, then moral science, or the investigation into what it is to be a moral being, should not commence with the proof of the truth of the gospel history.

There is one other consideration, which we think of the highest importance in the decision of this question. It is not merely true, that the course of reasoning by which the gospel is best set home on the heart of sinful man, is that which involves a just recognition of moral philosophy as an independent science; but it is also true, that it depends on right reasoning of this sort for its hold on the mind of the believer. Go to the unlettered christian, and ask him what it is that commends the gospel as true to his better judgment, to his purest and his best affections? He may not be able to analyze the process of reasoning which gives support to his faith, and to which it ever turns, in the hour of his weakness, to gather fresh strength; but it will invariably be true, that he has a deep and unshaken conviction in the fact, that he is a moral being, and in the serious and weighty import of all those relations which are involved in such a fact. He also knows what the gospel is in its fitness to such a being as he is, and feeling his necessities as one responsible, guilty, weak, and therefore wretched, and looking up to the glory and perfection of the offered remedy, the faith which appropriates it to himself, springs forth unbidden, and fastens with a grasp stronger than death on the "glorious gospel of the Son of God." But to possess just views of myself, as a moral being, before the gospel is received by me, and while the question of its truth, and of my obligation to accept it, is yet undecided, is to have correct, though, it may be, inadequate views of morals, as an independent science. We quote a sentiment from Baxter, which, though not uttered by him in exactly the connection in which we present it, may yet be fairly quoted to our purpose:

"I do more of late than ever," says he, "discern a necessity of a *methodical procedure* in maintaining the doctrine of christianity, and of beginning at *natural verities as presupposed fundamentally* to supernatural truths."

We have chosen to present these considerations at length, both because we believe them to be the true views of the noblest of all sciences, and that our readers may bear them in mind as principles by which to test the main object and leading features of the work before us. Were authority needed, by which to confirm their correctness, we would refer any one who feels the need of such support to strengthen his convictions, to Dr. Chalmers. We refer to his testimony on this point the more readily, as his opinions of the intrinsic importance of ethical science, and the

place which it should assert to itself in commending christianity to man, have, as it would seem, experienced an important revolution. Some years since, a work from his pen appeared, on "*The Evidence and Authority of the Christian Religion*," in which he asserts of the internal evidence for christianity, that, in his opinion, "no effectual argument can be founded on this consideration." We have been favored with the perusal of two lectures of his, introductory to his theological course, which were delivered some time after the treatise spoken of was published, from which it would seem, that his estimate of the *moral evidence* for the truth of christianity has been greatly enhanced. We quote the following passage from one of these lectures :

' With no other support than that of the bible and of the conscience, there can be made to merge a conclusive argument on behalf of christianity ; a most satisfying view may be struck out from the direct testimony of the one, and the reflex testimony of the other. Such is our conviction of the might and efficacy of the internal evidence, that, on the strength of it alone, we hold the unlettered peasant, ignorant though he is of all the intermediate history between the apostolic and the present age, to be afforded sufficient evidence for becoming a right believer ; and all destitute as he is of scholarship, to weigh and estimate the doctrines of antiquity, he can discern the consistency of its various parts with each other. He can recognize in all its announcements, the voice of one who speaks with heavenly authority ; and *this* is an internal evidence. He can take upon him the impression of that deep and dignified sacredness, by which, from beginning to end, it is so thoroughly invested ; and *this* is an internal evidence. He can come into contact with that moral honesty with which it speaks to him, and announces that it is worthy of all acceptation ; and *this*, too, is an internal evidence. He can feel the suitableness of its doctrines to the wants of nature ; and *this*, too, is an evidence struck internally. He can observe a marvelous accordance between its statements and the statements of his own heart ; and *this* forms that internal evidence which the bible itself calls the manifestation of truth in the conscience.' *Pulpit*, No. 479, p. 328.

Very recently he has published a treatise "*On the adaptation of external nature to the Moral and Intellectual constitution of Man*." To this work we would refer those of our readers who interest themselves in thorough investigations of this sort, as one which maintains the views of moral science which we have advanced, and which appear to us more worthy of attention, from the fact, that they differ so widely from the views which are implied in the former treatise on the evidence of christianity. In that volume he contended, that no argument could be made out of its internal evidence, because we can know nothing of God, except as he reveals himself to us in his word. The object of

this last treatise, in common with that of several others, as formerly proposed, is to establish "the power, wisdom and goodness of God, *as manifested in the creation.*"

The work before us is entitled, "*Christian Ethics, or Moral Philosophy, on the principles of Divine Revelation.*" It is comprehended in nine lectures, which were delivered as the first series of the "Congregational Lecture," recently instituted by the Congregational dissenters of Great Britain, to answer ends similar to those aimed at in the institution of the "Boylean Lecture," and others of inferior note in the established church. In the preface, the author makes the following statement. "There are two things which the title presupposes or considers as assumed: *the existence of God, and the authority of the scriptures, as a revelation from him.*" The first question which suggests itself to us at this point, is this: Is the work before us a treatise on ethics, properly so termed, by which should be intended a statement of the moral duties "which are binding on christians?" If so, we wish to know it at the outset, that we may open our bible at the fifth of Matthew, and compare the work with the code of ethics which is there recorded as having fallen from the lips of the Savior. Or is it a work of moral science,—an inquiry into man's constitution as a moral being, and his relations to God, as they have existed from the time when he sprung from the creating hand of that God, and as they would have continued, had no gospel ever been announced by the song of the angels? The former it certainly is not; nor can it be the latter, for it sets out with assuming, that which is yet in question with this science, namely, the truth of a revelation. With this the moral philosopher, as such, has nothing to do. The reader, however, will find in the preface the following assent to the truths which we have endeavored to establish; and how consistent he may deem this passage to be with the general spirit of the work, we will not attempt to say. "I conceive the just exhibition of the moral principles of the sacred volume, to form an important and interesting branch of the *internal evidence* of its truth." Of course, then, a period is supposed in the inquiries of every philosopher, when the truth of the sacred volume is questioned, and at that period we are allowed to judge of its truth by an examination of its moral principles. Such an examination implies a comparison of these moral principles with some other truth, either assumed, or already proved to be true. We cannot conjecture what this other truth can be, if it is not that which, as we have contended, is the appropriate subject of ethical science. It follows, then, from the ground assumed by Dr. Wardlaw in the sentence quoted, that there must be, or at least that there may be, such a thing as ethical science conducted upon independent grounds. If, now, the reader will turn to note P, p. 367,

he will see, that the objection at which we have hinted, as lying against all that is claimed to be peculiar in the work, has been distinctly stated by a writer in "the Imperial Magazine." The objection, in the words of that writer, is, that "the science of pure ethics has been left untouched,"—that it has no place assigned to it "among pure and separate sciences." In answer to this objection of the reviewer, Dr. W. says: "It is my very object to show, that the science of morals has *no province at all*, independently of theology, and that it cannot be *philosophically* discussed except on theological principles." "I avow, without reserve, that I own no such science as the 'distinct and independent' science of 'pure ethics,' that is, of ethics independent of theology,—of morals independent of religion." We only ask, How is this consistent with the possibility of deriving any proof of the truth of revelation, from its moral principles. These moral principles must first be received as true, by a comparison with some other truth, for the same reason that a staple must be firmly driven, before we attach to it a chain.

We might dwell at great length on what we deem the strange incongruities of Dr. Wardlaw's statements. If we have not entirely misapprehended the bearing of his treatise, it is, to impress the mind of the reader with the utter impracticability of arriving at just conclusions in moral science, independently of the authority of revelation. If this be so, then indeed an atheistic and infidel world would wish for no surer or firmer ground of triumph. Nothing of morality and duty,—nothing of moral obligation,—not even the distinction between right and wrong, can be known or understood, except from the authoritative decisions of revelation!! What consolation this, for the dark and guilty spirit of atheism and infidelity! what a joyous emancipation from the manacles of moral obligation, forged by bigotry, fanaticism, and priestcraft! Is it then even so? Is the human mind, prior to the reception of revelation, and independently of its authority, in that state of necessary and profound ignorance which emancipates from all obligation, even to inquire whether there is a God, or whether he has given the world a revelation or not? Will Dr. Wardlaw admit this? If not, then at the expense of his own consistency, he must also admit, in a most important respect, that a system of ethics is revealed by the light of nature. If the being and perfections of God, and the fact of a revelation, are not innate ideas, or at least, if they are not intuitive truths; in other words, if they are truths founded in evidence, then there is a prior moral obligation, to search for and to discover that evidence, and to admit its legitimate conclusions. Here are duties, here is moral obligation, of the most momentous character. This moral obligation, irrespective of the authority of revelation, can be shown clearly to the apprehension, and press-

ed powerfully on the conscience of the darkest mind. Nor, if we look carefully at the subject, shall we fail to see, that in admitting these things, we have in fact admitted a system of ethics, irrespective of the authority of a revelation, sufficiently comprehensive to tax the greatest minds for its consistent and complete development. There is one grand comprehensive principle of moral action, from which, as from a fountain, all specific action must proceed, and which imparts its own quality to all the streams. We mean the principle of *benevolence*,—that “love” which christianity itself recognizes as “the fulfilling of the law;” and which every human being, sustaining moral relations, may, from the knowledge of these relations, and of the human mind, perfectly understand in its nature and in its obligation. Who that is a man, cannot, we may say does not know, that he is bound to love, and to prefer to all things else, the highest happiness of the universe,—to act from this principle, and to carry it out in all specific action? Who does not see, that involved in this principle is the duty to inquire after, and implied in its obligation is the ability to ascertain, to a vast extent, the specific and appropriate forms in which the principle must express itself in action? Who does not see, that with the knowledge of the nature and the obligation of the great principle of benevolence, nearly all the specific duties of man, as he exists in the society of his fellow-men, can be surely and clearly developed? Who does not see, that out of this great principle, also arises the duty to inquire, what is truth, whether there is a God, what is his character, what are his relations, and whether he has given a revelation to man? Who does not see, that when these truths are discovered, still other duties result; the duty of supreme love to God, with all its various modifications of reverence, gratitude, confidence, etc.; the duty to ascertain his will, and to yield to it an unqualified submission? Here, too, we might ask, what can the expounder and defender of revelation accomplish, without the knowledge of this system, as it is unfolded by human consciousness, in the nature, the operations, and the relations of the mind? Who that reflects on the popular language of the sacred writers, and on the philosophic form of nearly all the objections to their doctrines and precepts, can fail to see how absolutely indispensable is philosophic knowledge, in order to elicit with clearness and precision the import of the inspired volume, and thus to vindicate its truths? With these facts in view, who can fail to see the indispensable necessity of ethical science, as derived from the nature of the mind, to the accomplished theologian? Even Dr. Wardlaw, (and how could he help it,) in all his attempts to correct what he deems the errors of other philosophers, and to establish opposite truths, constantly resorts to the light of nature; that is, to mental facts evinced in human consciousness, as the

basis of his reasoning. Indeed, what is plainer, than that, if man knows nothing of the nature and relations of the mental operations and mental states, the bible must be to him, in every important respect, a sealed book? There must then be a system of ethics, the knowledge of which is attainable independently of the authority and instructions of a revelation.

We cannot well express the regret we feel, that the advocates of christianity should give up this ground to her enemies, as it seems to us that Dr. Wardlaw has done. We admit, and most fully believe, the universal depravity of the human heart; but we maintain the universal capacity of the human intellect and conscience, to distinguish right from wrong, in respect to the one comprehensive duty, and, to a great extent, in respect to the specific duties of man. We admit the necessity of a revelation; but we place this necessity, not on the ground, that man could know nothing of right and wrong from the light of nature, but on these grounds, viz., that while there are some things, and very important things, revealed, which man could not know without a revelation; there are yet other things which without it he could know, but would not; and still others, which he could and would know, the knowledge of which would only leave him without excuse, and under a just condemnation. We are satisfied, that if the infidelity of Europe and of our own country is ever overthrown by fair and legitimate argument, that argument must be placed on other grounds than those on which the principles of Dr. Wardlaw place it. Infidels must be made to see, that reason,—sound philosophy, does not contradict, but does fully support the revelation of God,—that the moral system of christianity is truth, IMMUTABLE TRUTH, whether christianity be received or rejected: they must be shown the grand and awful fact of human responsibility to conscience; what moral obligation is, as it is revealed and enforced by this inward monitor, even the necessity of perfection in character to perfection in happiness, and what self-reproach and anguish are the penalty of violating its dictates in the work of self-destruction; how great is the difficulty in human experience of silencing its voice, and avoiding its retributive inflictions, even in this world; and that the only rational anticipation to a guilty mind, when in a disembodied state, and forced to reflect on itself, is, that this terrible avenger within will execute the intolerable retribution of a wounded spirit. They must also be shown, that besides these things, and in accordance with them, a system of moral government over man has been most obviously begun in this world, by a Being who can, and who will, carry it onward to a complete consummation in another;* and that the perfection of such a system in its

* The providence of God over this world, must clearly exhibit God as administering a moral government over men, if christianity be true; and if this

high, inviolable and eternal influence over a moral creation, involves in its very nature the sanctions of endless retribution in good and evil. They must be further shown, that the law of this government is the law of benevolent action,—that conformity to this law is the design of their Maker,—the only design worthy of a God, and evinced no less clearly from the nature of mind, than vision is evinced to be his design, from the structure of the eye; that they have always lived and acted under this system, in direct, deliberate, voluntary contravention of this design, and are in character the enemies of that great Being, in whose presence they must shortly appear; that they are rebels against that government, and that the punishment of rebels is the necessary and certain vindication of its authority; that they must meet the God of eternity not in friendship and favor, but in a fearful and unsheltered state of condemnation; that if there be any way of escape from the dark frown of his indignation and wrath, it cannot be one which shall subvert the law, and dethrone the lawgiver, and bring down the economy of the universe, and of its King, to suit the wishes of individual rebellion; but it must be one which shall vindicate that economy from the contempt thrown upon it by the transgressor, exalt God, and give even a brighter glory to his high attributes: that there can be no stability or warrant for hope to disloyalty, which is not based on the substantial facts of christianity, and that, accordingly, the only alternative is, either sincere, cordial discipleship to the author of this system, in the moral excellence and celestial hopes of such a character, or the ruin, the self-ruin of an immortal mind, made after the similitude of God. Thus must every rejecter of christianity be shut up to the faith, by being shown, that he is a sinner, without God and without hope, having brought a destruction on himself, as a moral, accountable, and never-dying spirit, absolutely remediless, except from the influence of a redemptive system; and in this way must he be prepared to welcome christianity in its glorious provisions of grace and salvation. And this is to be done by a system of “pure ethics,” and a system of theology, as these are unfolded to the human mind by the light of nature.

Are we asked, how these views comport with the necessity of revelation? In addition to what we have already said on this topic, we would inquire, what other views comport with the grace and mercy of such a gift? If revelation was necessary, because man could know nothing of right and wrong,—of duty,—of his moral relations to his fellow-men, or to his God; then, indeed, it found at least an innocent race, and was even necessary to their moral accountability. And what or where is the *grace* of such a gift,—a

fact is exhibited in his providence, it can be shown to be a fact, without assuming the authority of christianity.

gift to men not as sinners, but which was necessary to their becoming sinners? It is only when we contemplate man as competent under the mere light of nature, to know, in some degree, his moral relations, and the nature of right and wrong, and willfully refusing to act up to his real knowledge, that we see the riches of that grace which brings in the brighter light and higher influences of the blessed gospel. Such only is a provision for guilty and lost beings, and herein is grace in its beaming splendors. On Dr. Wardlaw's principles, we feel obliged to say, 'Grace is no more grace.'

The first lecture contains an inquiry concerning the "respective provinces of philosophy and theology." The opinion of the author will appear from the following quotation:

'But it is not with natural philosophy, it is with moral science, that theology chiefly interferes. It is of these two that I have pronounced the provinces inseparable by any definite and mutually exclusive line of demarcation. There can be no boundary drawn for the philosophical moralists, that does not inclose a portion, far from inconsiderable, of the territory of the theologian. Their ground, on many points, is unavoidably common. Their lines of partition, therefore, are not so much determined by the subjects which they respectively embrace, as by their principles of argumentation, their sources of evidence, and the authorities to which each appeals and pays deference. The theologian exhibits the proofs of divine revelation; and, having established its authority, settles all questions in religion and morals by a direct appeal to its sacred lessons:—the philosopher carries on his own researches in his own way, in the spirit of independence of all such authority, and arrives at his own conclusions.' pp. 19, 20.

Against the "spirit of independence," as he terms it, which, in his opinion, characterizes the whole of the English moral philosophy, he inveighs in no measured terms. If by this is intended the spirit of pride, and of manifest dislike of christianity, which has ruled in the minds of many of the English moralists, we are as ready as Dr. Wardlaw can be, to admit the fact, and to pronounce the spirit unphilosophical, unworthy, and wicked. But this is not all which he does intend by it. It is not merely that they have not been governed in their researches by christian feelings, and directed by christian principles, that he complains of them. A broader charge than this is entered against them, and the sweeping dogma is distinctly advanced, that to ethical science there belongs no principles of its own, no independent inquiries or fearless investigation. The total impression which is intended to be left on the mind of the reader, if we understand it, is this: that the first duty of the moral philosopher is, to establish the evidence of revelation, and by its authority to give support and per-

fection to his reasonings. It is, in Dr. W.'s own language, his "very object to show, that the science of morals has 'no province at all,' independently of theology."

We can only say of this lecture, that throughout the whole of it, the aim of every writer on morals in the English language, and the object of all that is properly denominated moral science, seem to have been entirely misapprehended. Or, if this aim and object have not been misapprehended, the knowledge of both has been strangely perverted. That to reason thus on this subject, should have fallen to the lot of Dr. Wardlaw, is to us a matter of astonishment. Had he clearly seen and duly reflected on the facts which we have endeavored to establish in the former part of this article, he would have directed his powers to that which was really at fault, and his word of reproof would have fallen with weight, and for a crime actually committed. As it is now, the teachers and students of ethical science will look with wonder at so strange a misconstruction of all their aims, and the object of all their labors. Should we deem it our duty at any time to meet them with reproof for their unchristian spirit, and the dubious aid which at best they have furnished to the christian cause, we would, at the outset, give them full credit for the principles according to which their investigations have been conducted. The grand difficulty which Dr. Wardlaw seems to find, is, how to dispose of the decisions of philosophers, when, as it not unfrequently happens, they are at variance with those of the scriptures. He is indeed perfectly aware of the folly of supposing, "that a thing can be true on one ground and false on another; theologically right and philosophically wrong, or theologically wrong and philosophically right." What, then, is to be done? Are we to rely on philosophy and give up the scriptures, or are we to rely on the scriptures and give up philosophy? Dr. Wardlaw says, give up your philosophy. We say, give up neither. *His* answer is, "if the authority of the document be established, then it becomes *the only philosophy*." *Our* answer is, if the authority of the document be established, it is indeed a *decisive* authority, while that of philosophy is still *real*, and in no respect to be despised. Now, who answers right in this matter, Dr. Wardlaw or we? Dr. Wardlaw, undoubtedly, provided true philosophy is to be supposed, in any case whatever, to contradict the divine testimony. But what if there is, as Dr. Wardlaw admits, no such case? Then philosophy has a right to speak and to be heard. If her decisions are at variance with the inspired document, let them be rejected, not because they are philosophical, but because they are philosophically wrong. Let such decisions be shown to be wrong on philosophical grounds, and philosophy be compelled to give a right decision; and thus without bringing philosophy into contempt, let all her light

and all her power be made subservient to truth. Truth, when derived from philosophy, that is, from what God has done, is ever the same as when found in what God has said. We know, indeed, that by human hands either fountain may be corrupted, and the streams be contaminated. Shall we therefore acquiesce in the corruption of either? or, when one is corrupted, shall it be our work to purify it, and cause it to send forth the water of life? Let the friends of truth never assume or concede, that philosophy and the word of God must be at variance. Let them never suffer a false philosophy to pass unexposed, and to triumph in the concession, that it can be met only with contempt. It is an easy homage we pay to truth, when we content ourselves with despising her adversaries. The duty we owe her and the God of truth, is of a more manly kind. We must gird ourselves for the conflict, and be prepared to overcome her adversaries, take whatever position, or use whatever arms, they may. Truth, whether taught by the works or by the word of God, is ever the same, and can be defended; and mournful will be the day when her friends shall concede, that what God does, contradicts what he says.

Nor would we stop here. But, taking the philosophers on their own ground, which we believe to be the only ground which is tenable, we would show how weak and how pitiful their reasonings were, as ethical philosophers, if on their eyes no other than the light of nature had dawned. But more weak and more pitiful ought they to be esteemed, as coming from those on whose minds have shone a law of perfection, and a gospel most wonderful for its adaptation to the moral necessities of man. As their assertion of, or rather their assent to, the reality of God's claims on man, and the serious and solemn character of man's relations to God, passed before our eye, we would reprove them for the air of doubt which they seem to evince, whether this were all a reality. We would show them, that on these topics, pagan sages reasoned more profoundly than they have done, and certainly set forth their opinions with a more honest earnestness, and a more vigorous tone of sincerity. We would then urge on them considerations like these: You must know, if all this be true, for which you contend in your books of first principles, that man is a being full of moral imperfections, not a being who is ignorant and weak merely, but one who is deeply wicked; and so much so, that it may be doubted whether he is not clad with this ignorance and weakness in pity, that he might not destroy himself and his race, as he would have done with weapons of greater strength and keenness. The science which you teach, should have been so studied by you, as to have led you to the foot of the cross, and of this cross you should have been the last men to be ashamed, seeing it is "the power of God unto salvation," to those whom you know so well to stand in

need of salvation. The truths with which you have been so conversant through your lives, condemn you ; and, if on no other grounds, you here stand convicted as shallow moralists before your fellow-men. We extract a sentence or two to the same purport, from Dr. Chalmers' Bridgewater Treatise. "The great error of our academic theism, as commonly treated, is, that it expresses no want,—that it reposes on its own fancied sufficiency ; and that all its landing-places are within itself, and along the uttermost limits of its own territory. *It is no reproach against our philosophical moralists, that they have not stepped beyond the threshold of that peculium which is strictly and appropriately theirs ; or not made incursion into another department than their own.* The legitimate complaint is, that on taking leave of their disciples, they warn them not of their being only yet in the outset, or in the prosecution of a journey, instead of having reached the termination of it." "Moral philosophy is at best but a science *in transitu*, and its lessons are those of a preparatory school."

The second and third lectures bear the following general title : "On mistakes in the method of pursuing our inquiries on the subject of morals ; and especially on the attempt to deduce a scheme of virtue from the present character of human nature." The views which give a distinct character to the work, and to maintain which it was planned and executed, were intimated in the first lecture, and are here explicitly avowed and strenuously maintained. They are stated in the following language :

"In by much the larger proportion of these theories there is an entire, or almost entire, overlooking of a fundamental article in the statements of fact and of doctrine contained in divine revelation, relative to the character and condition of man as a subject of God's moral government :—I refer to the *innate depravity of human nature*. It has long been my conviction,—a conviction which has been progressively confirmed by observation and reflection,—that a large proportion of theological errors,—of heretical departures from evangelical truth,—may be traced to mistaken or defective views of this great point. It is reasonable to expect that it should be so. The point is obviously and essentially fundamental ; so that any material error respecting it cannot fail to affect the entire system of a man's opinions on divine subjects ; and especially, in regard to that which it is the grand design of revelation to make known,—the scheme of the Redeemer's mediation. Of that scheme man is the object ; and therefore our views of its nature, provisions, and ends, must of necessity be essentially modified by the conceptions we entertain of his actual character and condition. To these the scheme must of course be adapted ; and an erroneous estimate of the disorder to be remedied, will unavoidably produce a false conception of the remedy provided for it ; a light impression of the nature and extent of the apostasy, a correspondingly light impression of the means of restoration ; and a denial of the one a consequent denial of

the other. While these things are sufficiently evident as to the bearing of our views of human nature on our conceptions of the remedial part of the evangelical system,—the observation is, with equal truth, applicable to the speculations of philosophers on the principles and laws of moral obligation.

Let me not, however, be misunderstood. I am very far from intending to convey the sentiment, that the fallen and sinful state of human nature has produced any alteration whatever on the principles of obligation, and the essential elements of virtue. No sentiment could be more preposterous, or more pregnant with mischievous results. Whatever these principles were before man fell, they continued the same after he had fallen; and they now remain, and must remain forever, unaltered, and unalterable,—like the Divine Being himself, in whose nature we shall find them originating, “without variableness or shadow of turning.” The harmony of man’s nature with those principles, was what constituted its original rectitude; and in its contrariety to those principles consists its present depravity. So far from the principles having undergone any change, it is from their very permanence and immutability that this depravity continues to be ascertained and measured. Had there been a change in the standard, we should have had no means of determining the extent of the debasement;—had the weights and scales been altered, how could we have known how far the fallen creature, when “weighed in the balances,” was “found wanting?” The obligations that lie upon man in his fallen state, are the very same with those which lay upon him in his state of pristine innocence. His not fulfilling these obligations is his guilt. A change of character in any subject of the moral government of Deity, can never occasion a change in the principles of that government. The law is neither annulled nor altered by the rebellion of the subject.’ pp. 43—45.

Of the opinion here asserted, we can only say, that, if Dr. W. intends by this language, that but few of these philosophers have actually believed the doctrine of man’s entire depravity, and that their disbelief of it has affected their philosophy, we have no doubt of the fact. We do not complain of them, however, that they have not first established it as a theological doctrine, and then proceeded to erect upon it a system of ethics. Still less are we prepared to accede to the proposition which follows the announcement just noticed. This, if it amounts to any thing in the argument, amounts to nothing less than, that because man is a depraved being, he cannot rely upon a single conclusion in moral science; he cannot know truth from falsehood, nor right from wrong.

‘A very few observations will suffice to show the connection of the fall and depravity of man with our present inquiry, and to make you sensible how essentially and extensively it must affect all the speculations of the creature who is the subject of it, on every question relating to the principles of moral rectitude. I argue at present hypothetically. I assume the fact of man’s depravity,—of the natural and inveterate alienation of his heart from God. Now this state of his nature brings

with it two distinct sources of error. Man, let it be remembered, is, in our present inquiry, both the *investigator*, and, in part at least, the *subject of investigation*. In each of these views of him, there is a source of error; the first arising from the influence of his depravity on his character as an investigator; and the second from his disposition to make his own nature, without adverting to its fallen state, his standard of moral principles, and his *study* in endeavoring to ascertain them.' p. 46.

Two sources of error are here mentioned. The first is an important one, and is familiar to us all, and has been strongly insisted upon by every sound moralist. Lord Bacon tells us of the wolf, who, with all the letters of the alphabet before him, could spell no word but *agnus*. But it does not follow from this liability to error, that men should in no case think independently, and assert fearlessly; nor that they should not rest with a good degree of confidence on those conclusions upon which they have finally fixed. On what subject is not man liable to err? And truly, if liability to error is to exclude all confidence or certainty from every conclusion to which the mind arrives, then indeed we ask, what confidence is due to the conclusions of Dr. Wardlaw? A plain man would judge, that those who were aware of a liability to error of this sort, should be induced by a knowledge of it to think with greater earnestness, and to put themselves upon more searching inquiries. Should it be replied, after the judgment of Dr. W., that men for this reason should not think at all, except in interpreting the scriptures with the grammar and dictionary, he might answer, that this liability to error might exert an influence here. He might appeal to the history of the church, for proof, that its influence had been as baneful in the science of interpretation, as in the science of morals.

In the statement of a principle of such fundamental importance, as Dr. Wardlaw supposes this to be, we feel the want of more philosophical precision than he has adopted. In some instances, he represents the moral pravity of man as an "*unavoidable*" source of error in all his inquiries on moral subjects. In others, he speaks of the mental powers of man merely as "*prone to aberration*;" and tells us, "that his conclusions are not, *without great caution*, to be depended on," and, "that on the topic in discussion, there can be no certainty in the conclusions to which the subjects of this moral pravity may come; no ground on which, with any assurance, our minds can repose. It is a cause in which the judge is prepossessed, and his decisions not to be trusted." That we have here, instead of a single principle, a great variety of principles, must be obvious on the slightest inspection; and when amid this variety, the author would be understood to exhibit but one principle, and to ask us to estimate the force of his rea-

soning as founded upon it, we are utterly at a loss to make the selection. If Dr. Wardlaw means to say, that the moral character of the judge is such, that it furnishes no absolute security that his judgments are not perverted, we readily subscribe to the principle. Nor did we ever dream, that the character of the judge was to be the basis of confidence in his conclusions. In these matters, we hold ourselves bound to yield our opinions to evidence and to truth; nor did we ever suppose, that we are entitled to reject truth and evidence, because they are presented by one on whose character we cannot rely. Is truth the less truth, and evidence the less evidence, because they involve the judge himself in self-condemnation? Is a man the less condemned, because he is condemned out of his own mouth? So far from it, we think Dr. Wardlaw himself will concur in the opinion, that a complete system of ethics, if such a thing can be supposed, from an unsanctified mind, would deserve peculiar respect, as showing the power of truth amid the darkness of sin, and the triumph of intellect and conscience, even over the corruption of the heart. Or does this writer mean only to tell us, that from the depravity of man results a great *liability* to error in all his deductions in moral science? We fully admit the fact. But are we to judge of truth and error in the conclusions of men, by their liability to error? Is liability to error, proof of error? Where will such a principle land us, even with a revelation in our hands, and with the full admission of its authority? Plainly, truth and the evidence of truth exist, irrespective of liability to error; while mere liability to error implies both the possibility of discovering truth, and an unqualified obligation actually to discover and to receive it. But not to dwell on the utter futility of this principle in its application to this subject: the only principle which can subserve the purpose of Dr. Wardlaw, in this argument, is, that the moral pravity of man is a *necessary and "unavoidable"* source of error on the subject under discussion. But can this principle be sustained, or be commended to a reflecting mind, by even a shadow of plausibility? Is it true, that a depraved being, from the mere fact of his depravity, can have no knowledge of right and wrong? Does a moral being, the instant he becomes depraved, lose, by fatal necessity, those high powers of intellect and conscience, which are essential to his moral agency? We admit, that depravity involves a fearful perversion of these powers. But is the perversion of these powers their annihilation? We admit, that while the mind remains under the full power of determined sin, the darkness of the heart, in this state, utterly precludes those perceptions of the beauty and the excellence of divine things, which involve awakened sensibility and vivid apprehensions, and which are necessary to a moral transformation. But, are intellect and conscience *destroyed* by the

moral pravity of the mind? Was such the fact in our apostate parents, when they hid themselves from the presence of their Maker among the trees of the garden? Have the apostate angels lost all that knowledge of God which they had, when before God's throne they beheld his glory? And will a christian divine, after reading Paul's epistle to the Romans, actually tell us, that without a revelation, depraved men *cannot*, and *do not*, know the judgment of God, that they who do such things are worthy of death; will he actually deny, that "they are without excuse, because, that when they *knew* God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful?" Or need we tell a christian divine, how comprehensive the knowledge is, which an inspired apostle here attributes to the heathen mind, or how explicitly he aims to stop every mouth, and to bring in the whole world guilty before God,—not on the ground, that they have no knowledge, or can have none, but, "as they did *not like to retain* God in their knowledge?"

We have another thing to say. Conceding Dr. Wardlaw's principle, in the most absolute and unqualified form, are there yet, in this depraved world, no sanctified minds, even among those who are set for the defense of the gospel, who are competent to propound a system of pure ethics, irrespective of the authority of revelation? We may go further than this, and concede, that without the light and instructions of revelation, none would ever, *in fact*, produce such system. But, from neither of these concessions does it follow, that it *cannot* be done; nor that through the aid furnished by the instructions of the inspired writers, it *will not* actually be done. Many truths are seen and known to be truths by their own light, when stated by another, which otherwise would have been either wholly overlooked, or never sufficiently familiarized to be used in an argument. The student in geometry may be indebted to Euclid, for his knowledge of the fundamental axioms of his science; and yet, without conceding in the least to the authority of this great master, he may be able to furnish an independent demonstration of many a problem, relying solely on the perceived truth of his principles. So we maintain, that the moral philosopher may be indebted, not *of necessity*, but *in fact*, to revelation, for the knowledge of those truths on which a perfect system of ethics may depend; and yet be able to place such a system on its own independent foundations, as a system of truth, justly entitled to be received, without asking the least support from the authority of revelation. Indeed, that this possibility exists, is one of the most incontrovertible of all propositions. Words, language merely,—and this is all that revelation is, as the medium of thought,—can never convey to us the elementary knowledge of things. It can indeed present new and important combinations of thought, and in this

respect convey to the human mind, as God's revelation actually does, the most important discoveries of truth. But certain it is, that mere words can never impart to the human mind one primary element of thought or of knowledge. We think, therefore, that it belongs to Dr. Wardlaw, and all other men, who would depreciate the science of ethics, to tell us of what possible use a revealed system of morals could be to man, while destitute of that prior knowledge of things, without which language must be absolutely unintelligible. Let them tell us what *love to God or man* is, what faith is, what repentance is; let them unfold to us the nature of a single duty, or the import of a single precept, in christian morality, except on the principle, that all the elements of their knowledge are derived from the prior knowledge of mental facts and their relations. When this shall be done, we shall feel more respect for that class of writers, who, while aiming to degrade philosophy, that they may exalt revelation, cannot adopt a more effectual method to degrade revelation itself.

Of the second source of error, let us hear Dr. Wardlaw speak for himself:

‘There is, as has been mentioned, a second source of error, of no less illusory influence, arising from the assumption by philosophers of human nature in its present state as a legitimate standard from which to take their estimate of moral principles. We find them, with very few exceptions, trying to discover these principles,—the principles of rectitude,—from an attentive examination and analysis of this same fallen nature. They take man as he is. They contemplate him as an intellectual and moral agent, of a certain rank and character in the scale of created existence; as possessing the nature, and holding the place, which the Supreme Will has assigned him. Thus, assuming him as he now is, to be what his Creator made him and designed him to be, they pursue their investigations, and deduce their conclusions accordingly. They discover in man a variety of principles of action, which, according to their customary phraseology, “the author of his being has implanted in his nature;” and from the existence of these principles they infer the intentions and the character of the Being by whom the constitution of his nature has been adjusted, and elicit their theories respecting the essential elements of moral rectitude. Now, this would be a procedure altogether satisfactory, were the creature who is the subject of the analytical process of investigation in the state in which it came from its Creator’s hand; were it according to its appropriate nature, perfect, and so a fair specimen of the moral productions of Deity;—or, as it has been briefly and happily enough expressed, “if in man that which is were the same with that which *ought to be*.” But if the human nature be indeed in the condition in which revelation affirms it to be,—if it be a nature in a state of estrangement from God, and of moral corruption, it is needless to say how delusive all this necessarily becomes. How can any thing but error and confusion, or, at best, mingled and

partial truth, be the result of an attempt to discover the principles of moral rectitude from the constitution of a depraved nature?—to extract a pure system of ethics from the elements of corruption?—to found the superstructure of moral science on the scattered and unstable rubbish of fallen humanity?" pp. 48, 49.

In reference to this whole statement, we ask, in utter despair and confusion, to what does all this tend? What does the author mean by all that is here put forth with so much parade? As far as it is a description of certain philosophers, it is a just one, but the number to which it can with justice be applied, is small. Very few of the whole number of English moralists of received authority, maintain that man is what he ought to be. Very few are there, of the whole number, who have not contended, that these principles of action which "the Author of his being has implanted in his nature," should not be subject to a controlling will, and be made subservient to right action. The contrary opinion to this is exposed most triumphantly by Bishop Butler, in his three sermons upon human nature; though rather as the "licentious talk" of libertines, than the sober doctrines of the sages of the schools. Still, as far as Dr. W's charges on Bishop Butler's reputation apply with justice to any English philosopher, or to any tendencies in any English philosopher, let them rest on him in their full weight. When Dr. W. proceeds, however, to the inference, that a fatal necessity of error rests on every one, who, with human nature in its present condition as the subject of his inquiries, attempts, independently of the authority of revelation, to arrive at correct conclusions, and that this necessity arises from the fact, that the material is so bad, that nothing sound can come out from the process, we are greatly at a loss to understand what he means. We see not why it is impossible to learn from the constitution of this nature, for what sort of action it was originally constructed.

The error of Dr. Wardlaw, however,—and here we think we have not misapprehended him,—consists in confounding the distinction between what man is in *his constitution* as the work of God, with what man is in *moral character* as his own work. We fully believe, that the moral character of man is, by nature, wholly depraved; and we demur not in the least, in respect to the censures which Dr. W. bestows on a large class of philosophers, for overlooking or denying this material fact. But we protest against all that philosophy, which predicates depravity of the created properties or nature of the human mind, in distinction from those mental operations or acts, which alone constitute *moral principle* and moral character. What man is, in *his constitution*, and what, as the consequence, he *ought to be* in moral character, are inquiries which must precede the question, what *he is in moral*

character. The capacity for moral character must be ascertained, and the standard of moral character must be determined, from the constitutional powers and qualifications of the being, before the question of conformity or non-conformity to that standard can be tried or decided. If there is truth in any thing, sin—depravity—does not and cannot consist in any created structure or attribute of the human mind, nor in the ill-desert of one being transferred to another. The question here is not, how early those mental exercises which constitute the depravity or sinfulness of man begin. So early, in our opinion, that, according to the popular representations of the scriptures, it is properly said, that all men are sinners from the first. The question is not, what those changes are, either in the mind or out of it, which, in consequence of the first apostasy, became the occasion of the universal sinfulness of our race,—provided only, that we do not make the cause of the *first* sin, to be a *previous* sin. But the question is, what is sin,—what is depravity, as it first exists in the human mind? And we say, that to talk of a depraved nature, or a sinful nature, meaning any attribute of the mind which is the product of the creative power of God, or even any state of mind which does not involve an *intelligent preference*, is to talk of a depraved nature which is not depraved, and of a sinful nature which is not sinful. It is to substitute a false doctrine of depravity for the true doctrine, and one which, most calamitously for the cause of truth, the opposers of christianity, whether of the Deistic or Pelagian school, know by absolute intuition to be false and self-contradictory. We are aware, that some philosophical divines, to avoid the pressure of absurdity and self-contradiction, speak of a *sinful* nature, which is *not sinful*, meaning not *ill-deserving*. Without saying, that this is a mere subterfuge which needs no exposure, we do say, that no usage will authorize this import of the word *sinful*; and, that to turn such a word,—a *word* only as it is,—on this momentous subject from its true and only meaning, is to incur the responsibility of protecting error in its strong-hold. Definitions and explanations here will not, in our view, exempt from this responsibility; for every one knows, or ought to know, that the enemies of truth will understand the word in the only import which usage authorizes. They will thus regard known error as the scriptural doctrine, and so reject both. “Depravity,—sin, and all in the scriptures which is meant by sin, consists in a *preference* of ourselves to others,—to all others,—to the universe and to God.”* It involves, of course, the free, voluntary perversion of those high powers and attributes of the mind in which it is created after the similitude of God,† and which qualify it as truly for right as for wrong moral preference. These

* Dr. Dwight.

† Jas. iii. 9.

powers and attributes of the mind, not the use that is actually made of them in forming a moral character, show, in their nature and adaptation, the end for which they are created and the design of their Creator. They no sooner become, in their nature and adaptation, known in our own consciousness, than they reveal the knowledge of the right and wrong use of them; that use by which alone the end of our being can be secured, and that by which, with equal certainty, this end will be defeated. Instead, therefore, of a *necessary ignorance* on the part of man, there is a *necessary knowledge* of right and wrong, arising from the knowledge of his own powers, and their adaptation. Not only is this apparent from a moment's reflection on these powers themselves, as the pre-requisites to moral character, but also from the essential elements of moral action. One essential element involved in the very existence of moral action, is, the knowledge of right and wrong, and of the difference between them. But how shall this knowledge be acquired? Not by mere words, surely. Things must be known, before words can become the signs of them to the mind. Is it then said, that this knowledge is acquired by the character actually formed? But this is too late for the purpose to be answered by it; for how can moral character be formed, prior to any possible or actual knowledge of right and wrong? We are aware, that Dr. Wardlaw denies this plain principle of reason and common-sense, and supposes the actual existence of moral character in man, prior to the existence of all knowledge of right and wrong. We shall not stop to discuss this point, but submit the question, whether the position we have taken is not the infallible dictate of the competent, unperverted reason of man, as well as of the revelation of God. Even Dr. W. himself tells us, "that where there is no law, there can be no sin; and that, on the part of the creature, there cannot be any knowledge of sin at all, but in as far as the law is known, of which sin is the transgression." p. 145. Can there then be a law, where no law either is or can be known? Dr. W. says, "the absence of *all* knowledge and all means of knowledge, nullifies accountableness." Hence it follows, from Dr. Wardlaw's own premises, that there can be no sin, without the previous knowledge of right and wrong; and that of course this knowledge must exist prior to the formation of a sinful character.

To what purpose then does Dr. W. ask, how can we "discover the principles of moral rectitude from the constitution of a depraved nature,"—or "extract a pure system of ethics from the elements of corruption?" We answer, (if Dr. Wardlaw means *moral* corruption,) that he who knows what moral pravity is, must of necessity know what moral rectitude is. But we answer again, (if Dr. W. means, and this must be his meaning, that the mind is corrupted in its very constitution,—that its corruption lies in the

very nature, powers and properties of the mind, in distinction from the use or exercise of these powers;) then, we say, he begs the main question. He has no right to assume, that the human mind comes from the forming hand of God a mere mass of physical corruption. The true doctrine of moral depravity involves *no such fact* as he reasons from. His doctrine of depravity has not even a claim to orthodoxy; much less is it the doctrine of revelation. We feel constrained to say, therefore, that in his statements of the doctrine of human depravity, Dr. W. palpably misinterprets revelation itself, and furnishes another proof, that the interpreter of the word of God is as truly liable to error, as the interpreter of the works of God; and, that his theology is as erroneous on this point, as his philosophy. And here, as we consider it, is the fundamental error of his treatise, and the source of all his difficulties and objections in respect to forming a system of ethics from the light of nature. Let Dr. Wardlaw correct this single error,—let him learn to distinguish what man is in his *constitution*, from what man is in *moral character*,—let him understand what the human mind is, as God creates it; and if he cannot satisfy himself from his own consciousness, let him consult the oracles of God without the prejudices of a sectarian theology; and we venture to predict, that all his difficulties on this subject will vanish. He will find, that if there is any meaning in revelation, it finds man a sinner, with the knowledge of right and wrong, and under a just condemnation from the light of nature,—that if there is any truth in the revealed law of God, the absolute *moral* perfection of man, depraved as he is, consists in the right use of powers which he actually possesses,—that in respect to his nature, properly so called, that is, in his constitutional attributes, man is made in the image of God,—that sin is not and cannot be a literally corrupt property of a corrupted substance, but consists in the transgression of law—a perverted use of constitutional powers which belong to man as man, whether he be perfectly holy or perfectly sinful,—and, that it is the possession of these high powers which makes man a moral agent, and the fit subject of God's moral government. And now, to decide what such a creature of God *ought to be*; to decide what he ought to be from the constitution which God has given him, and to bring out from this source of knowledge the same system of morals which christianity inculcates, and to enforce this system on the human conscience by the combined authority of philosophy and the word of God, would, we think, but slightly tax the powers of Dr. Wardlaw himself.

We have said, that we are not fully confident that we understand Dr. Wardlaw on this part of the subject. With more propriety we might say, that in our opinion, he does not fully understand himself. We cannot doubt, that he often reasons on the

assumption, that a depraved being, such as man is, cannot come to the knowledge of right and wrong from the knowledge of himself and of his relations. And yet he tells us, that "Reason and conscience are not obliterated, but do certainly continue to bear testimony for God,"—that the means of knowing the will of God from the light of nature are sufficient,—that the law of revelation, and the law of nature and of conscience are, substantially, the same,—and, that "the absence of *all* knowledge and of all means of knowledge, would have nullified accountableness." We might here put several questions, which would show a great want of precision of thought and language, in what Dr. W. says respecting "the second source of error" in moral science. So great, indeed, is the confusion which seems to have possessed the mind of the writer as to the exact thing of which he would treat, that we dare not trust ourselves to express, in any well-defined proposition, what his meaning is, in this his great position. On this he plumes himself, it would seem, as being his grand discovery of an error common to all previous philosophy. We, however, cannot imagine what other difficulty lies in the way of sound reasoning, than a known perversion of the powers of moral agency. We do not believe, that to an honest inquirer, a deep and obscure darkness rests on the question, what sort of action is right and what is wrong, or upon any other of the vexed questions in the science of morals.

Though this second difficulty, in the path to truth, is so vaguely stated by Dr. W., that we have been unable to conclude precisely what was his own apprehension of it, he yet keeps this in view by a constant reference to it, in his examination of some of the more noted philosophers, both ancient and modern. As these pass in order, before his critical eye, he discerns in them all a deficiency arising from this single source, this "root of all evil." He applies this as a test, a touch-stone, to each, and the secret of their error is at once revealed. We do not pause upon this examination, for the same confusion accompanies each step of the application of this principle, as attended its first announcement. We have given our own opinions sufficiently at large, and the reader can compare them at his leisure with those advanced by Dr. Wardlaw.

Lecture IV. is devoted to an extended investigation of the moral system of Bishop Butler, and is characterized by the same defects which mark the more rapid view of other systems. Clearness and accuracy of statement are, to a great extent, wanting; while there is occasionally displayed acuteness of remark and vigor of expression. We would direct our reader, who would judge of the truth of so summary an account of this part of the work, to his comment on Butler's interpretation of Rom. ii. 14, 15. No genuine disciple of Butler will sit with patience, while such rea-

soning is attempted to be substituted for his master's luminous conceptions and rigid logic.

Lecture V. has for its subject and title the "Rule of moral obligation." Its doctrine is the following: "If the moral government of God be granted, and the consequent subjection of man to that government, it evidently follows, as an instant and unavoidable consequence, without even a single link of intermediate reasoning, that the rule by which his conduct is to be regulated, must be the will of the Supreme Governor." No man could ever have doubted the truth of such a statement, who could derive a conclusion from a premise.

Lecture VI. is upon "The original principle of moral obligation." The views of Dr. Wardlaw on this subject, are marked with the same confusion of thought and language to which we have adverted on other topics. Our design is not to examine his opinions, any farther than to correct what we think his misapprehensions of the doctrines of an American writer. This writer is Dr. Dwight. His sermon entitled "*Utility the foundation of Virtue*," we have long considered the most lucid and satisfactory discussion of this important subject, within our knowledge. His doctrine is presented in various forms of expression, as follows: "The foundation of virtue is not in the will of God, but *in the nature* of things." To prevent all misapprehension, he states the question to be this: "What constitutes it virtue makes it valuable, excellent, lovely, praiseworthy and rewardable." Having frequently said, that the foundation of virtue, is *in the nature* of things, he proceeds to the inquiry, "Where, *in the nature* of things, shall we find this foundation?" He answers this question in different forms of phraseology. He exhibits the nature of virtue, by designating it as the cause or means of happiness, or, as that which produces, or *tends* to produce, happiness; maintaining, that *this nature of virtue* is that which constitutes it valuable, excellent, lovely, etc. He says, "if virtue and vice had originally, or, as they were seen by the eye of God, no moral difference *in their nature*, then there was plainly no reason why God should prefer, or why he actually preferred, one of them to the other." On this exhibition of the subject, as made by Dr. Dwight, Dr. W. thus remarks: "Now the moral difference *in their nature* does not consist in their different tendencies and effects; but their different tendencies and effects are the appropriate indications of their respective natures." "The nature of things and tendencies of things, it seems very inadmissible thus to confound." He repeats this charge of confounding different things again and again. We are disposed to ask, who could have found *confusion* in these statements, except Dr. Wardlaw? Every one, acquainted with philo-

sophical discussion, knows, that the nature of a thing is often described by specifying its *tendency*,—by exhibiting it as a cause of certain effects ; and every one who will read the sermon of Dr. Dwight, will see how careful he is to exhibit the excellence of virtue, as consisting in that nature which constitutes it a cause of happiness, or gives it its tendency to produce happiness. Dr. Wardlaw says, “with all deference, I would submit the query, whether this is finding the foundation of virtue in the nature of things?” We think the deference which is here professed, was altogether becoming in Dr. Wardlaw.

Lecture VII. is “On the identity of morality and religion.” Lecture VIII. “How far disinterestedness is an essential quality in legitimate love to God.” Lecture IX. “Peculiarities of christian obligation and duty.” In this last lecture, the high claims of the christian system, as a moral system, and the wonderful effects in moral character, which flow from its doctrines believed and its truths confided in, are worthily set forth. With this Lecture we were far better pleased, than with any part of the whole work beside. Of the two Lectures preceding it, we say nothing ; as in them almost every question in morals comes up for discussion,—and to remark on the discussion, would require limits as extensive as those occupied by the author himself.

Throughout the whole, there is displayed a certain measure of acuteness, which breaks out in flashes at intervals, and sheds a strong but transient light on some important question, while it does not deeply enter into, nor characterize as a whole, the body of the work. The philosophical spirit, using the word in its fair import, is absent. In this respect, the Bridgewater Treatise of Dr. Chalmers far surpasses it, and deserves to be contrasted with it to its own credit. The author of “Christian Ethics,” manifests much of the “*præfervidum Scotorum ingenium*,” which leads him into a zeal which is often as ill-timed as it is unfounded in its application. This pugilistic fervor also, does not conduce to clearness of perception, on the part of the author, nor to just discrimination.

The general impression which his labors will leave upon the minds of the moral philosophers of the day, will not, we are persuaded, be very happy. They will be little moved by one who is so little of a philosopher himself. His acquaintance with philosophical systems and philosophical writers, they will see, is rather the result of rapid reading, than of careful examination and candid research. They must know, in their own consciences, that the cause which he would advocate, that of “christian ethics,” possesses a strength of its own ; but they cannot fail to observe, that the true place of its strength has been overlooked by Dr. Wardlaw.

His appeals, and his stern rebukes, will therefore fall upon them with little weight. Religious philosophy, a philosophy indeed "baptized," while it is none the less philosophical, appears to us to be greatly deficient on the other side of the water. Why is it, that the cause which formerly rested for its defense on Wollaston, Butler and Clarke, now presents no such champions? Why is it, that those whose fathers delighted to honor such men as these and their pursuits, now begin to question even the rightful claim to existence, of that science which they labored to advance? Such opinions, in relation to moral science, as those which are beginning to be prevalent in England, among the defenders of the truth, cannot but end in weakening the intellect of the whole nation, in lowering the tone of its character, and in bringing into contempt the cause of truth. But such a result as this must not be thought of. The spirit of Butler and Clarke will again be revived in some of the present generation. The science of morals will yet retain its own rights as a science, and it will yet carry its disciples forward, till it leads them in joyful hope to "the church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth."

We have said nothing of the Introductory Essay, and the very high commendation bestowed upon the work by Dr. W's "friend and correspondent" on this side of the Atlantic. Our readers already understand, that we cannot unite in these praises, and the reasons for our dissent. We have always thought highly of Dr. Wardlaw as an evangelical minister,—never as a great divine,—and least of all, judging from the present specimen, can we concede to him the name of a sound philosopher and close thinker. We have been not a little astonished, to hear of the adoption of this volume as a text-book, in one of our colleges. There may, indeed, be some advantages in a text-book not altogether sound, provided the principles it sets forth are thoroughly canvassed by the instructor; but we should choose one more nearly correct, or rather less defective, than the present volume, for such a purpose. A good work on *Ethics*, in advance of what we have, is greatly needed. Among all the treatises which have been multiplied on this subject, we know of nothing which at all comes up to our ideas of what such a work should be; and among them all, we recollect of none less deserving of such a character, than the "*Christian Ethics*" of Dr. Wardlaw. Yet it is not wholly destitute of good things, and merits high commendation for the ease and perspicuity of its style. With these remarks, we leave the volume to the further reflections of our readers.

ART. V.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF SLEEP.

The Philosophy of Sleep. By ROBERT MACNISH. New-York: 1834.

An Account of Jane C. Rider, the Springfield Somnambulist. By L. W. BELDEN, M. D. Springfield: 1834.

An Account of Jane C. Rider, the Springfield Somnambulist. By L. W. BELDEN, M. D. (Boston Medical and Surgical Journal.) Boston: September, 1834.

THE first appearance of Dr. Macnish's work, excited in our minds high expectations. From its title, from some recommendatory notices we had seen of the work, and from the fact, that its author was a physician, and therefore, in all probability, familiar with the physiological bearings of his subject, we were led to hope some important additions to a most interesting and difficult department of science. These just expectations, we are compelled to say, have not been realized. Dr. Macnish, it is very clear, has not the capacity required by his subject. He is wholly incapable of writing about the *philosophy* of any thing, and more especially, the "philosophy of sleep,"—a most perplexing theme. He has not strength of understanding, or reach of mental vision, or power of analysis, sufficient to grapple with the higher truths of science. This fact he should have known and regarded. His attempt to take rank as a philosopher, is nothing better than gross and unpardonable presumption. There is not, in his whole intellectual character, so far as we can see, one element of the man he would affect to be. We have been unable to find in his book a single line of "philosophy," from beginning to end; of course, its title is a gross misnomer. It is nothing like what its name imports. We do not mean to say, that the volume is destitute of merit of every kind. It is, perhaps, well enough in its way. It would make a respectable appearance in the form of a series of papers, in a magazine. It is generally interesting, and sometimes instructive. There are many curious and valuable facts to be found in it, evincing some observation and considerable reading, which it is convenient, to say the least, to have embodied in the form we here find them. In point of literary execution, the work is respectable. It is generally written in good taste, though there are some things in it which we should feel disposed to call—downright fustian. When there is no effort at display, the style is commonly animated, easy and flowing. On the whole, Dr. M. has written an interesting, and not altogether valueless book. He may congratulate himself on having done an acceptable service to the lovers of light reading. We would, however, respectfully suggest to him, that, in case another edition of his work should be called for, he should change its title to a more fitting and unassuming one. "Stories about sleep," would be

apropos, and moreover would *take* well with that class of *philosophers* for which it is adapted.

The two "Accounts" of Dr. Belden, the first a popular, the second a more scientific one, contain a record of one of the most extraordinary cases of disordered mental manifestation, depending on cerebral irritation, which is to be found in authentic history. Dr. B. we know to be a credible and competent witness, a close observer, and an honest and intelligent inquirer after truth. No one, we think, can read his statements, as wonderful as are the facts which they contain, without having the impression strong upon his mind, that delusion and collusion are out of the question.

It may, perhaps, be unnecessary here to say, that the subject upon which we are about to enter,—sleep, dreaming, somnambulism, and their modifications, is one of the most complicated and difficult in the whole range of philosophy. Possibly, before we get through, we may be willing to acquit Dr. Macnish of the killing charge of being no philosopher,—a charge grounded on the results of his *philosophical* labors in this intricate department of science. We beg that we may not be held to strict account for our own short-comings in the same field of labor.

The *object of sleep* is considered to be the restoration to activity of certain functions which have been exhausted by exercise. All our organs are so constituted, that they cannot sustain unintermitting action. After continuing in exercise for a certain but somewhat variable length of time, their present stock of energies is exhausted, exertion becomes extremely painful, and they require an interval of repose. This repose, in the case of the organic functions,—those which are common to all organized beings,—is called simply *rest*; in the case of the animal functions, those which are peculiar to animals, as sensation, it is called either *rest* or *sleep*, according to its nature, duration, and universality. Whether repose is the *only* object of sleep, as seems to be taken for granted, there is good reason to doubt. We suspect it to have an important renovating operation upon the voluntary or animal functions, independently of the intermission of exercise which accompanies it, that has been very commonly overlooked. Certain it is, that rest simply, or intermitted action alone, is not a substitute for sleep. Though a man should nearly refrain from all kinds of mental and muscular exercise, he would still be unable to live without sleep. Those who live a life of listlessness and inactivity, slumber no less, but rather more, than other persons. Neither is sleep without a refreshing influence, even though there is properly no rest. It is so light and imperfect with some, that they never cease to be conscious of all that is going on about them, while the brain hardly intermits its operations for a moment; and yet such persons are fully sensible of its renewing and invigorating

effects. How many are there, who spend most of their hours, from the time of lying down to that of rising up, in dreaming,—a state in which there is often as much mental exercise, as in the busier periods of wakefulness,—who nevertheless rise in the morning no less refreshed than others?

We suspect, then, that sleep has a direct and important renovating influence upon the mental powers and all the animal functions, which has not commonly been appreciated; an influence which is independent of the rest, or intermitted action which attends it. We suspect, too, that this influence is more diffused than is generally supposed; that it is extended to the organic as well as the animal functions; indeed, that it is felt in every tissue and organ of the living system. Plants, which are destitute of nervous system and animal sensation, pass diurnally into a state very analogous to sleep, by which they seem to be refreshed, and which is probably essential to their existence. And it is fair to suppose, that what is required and experienced by the vegetative or organic functions, as they are exercised in plants, is unnecessary to the same class of functions as exercised by animals?

Sleep has been considered, by Dr. Good and others, as a partial death, in which there is a cessation of certain functions, the voluntary or animal, while certain other functions, the involuntary or organic, continue in exercise. "Sleep is the death or torpitude of the voluntary organs, while the involuntary continue their accustomed actions. Death is the sleep or torpitude of the whole."* Now, to our minds, the similarity here assumed seems more imaginary than real. There is, in truth, very little resemblance between sleep and death; and he who supposes it, takes a license, which, though pardonable, perhaps, in poetry, is very unwarrantable in philosophy. The former seems to us nothing more than a state or modification of being,—one of the numerous forms of existence into which we are constituted to pass periodically, while the latter is an absolute cessation of being, (in the physical sense.) The former has its cause in the intimate structure of our organs, and is the essential condition of their existence. It plays a distinct part in this complex existence of ours, called life, and is as truly and essentially vital in its nature, as any other kind of living manifestation. It is true, this state is characterized by unusual insensibility to the common means of excitement, and, in this respect, is distinguished from the ordinary waking state; but this torpitude is only relative to stimuli of a certain force, and is entirely distinct from the torpitude of death, which is absolute and complete. Even in the waking state, excitement of a mental organ

* Good's Book of Nature.

does not follow the application of the proper stimulus, unless that stimulus be of the requisite strength. In the ordinary condition of the eye, there is required for vision a certain (specific in each instance,) amount of light; in certain other conditions, there is required a certain other amount, etc. In sleep, this amount must be increased, sometimes to a very considerable extent, or vision does not result; but let this condition be complied with, and perception is as certain as in the period of wakefulness. There are, then, in either case, certain conditions, (different, it is true, in each instance,) which must be regarded, if we would rouse a sense or faculty into action. These considerations show very distinctly, as we conceive, the resemblance between sleeping and waking, and the entire dissimilarity between these living conditions and death,—the cessation of every living phenomenon,—the annihilation of all *power* of action.

The human mind is considered, in most of the systems of philosophy, to be composed of a certain number of fundamental powers, or elementary faculties, from whose separate and combined action result all the phenomena of thought and feeling. These powers the phrenologists have endeavored to refer each to its appropriate and distinct organ in the brain, as we have attempted to show in our articles on phrenology. Perfect sleep is supposed to be a suspension of activity, by natural causes, of all these powers, and of course, a suspension of all thought and feeling. Whether there is any such thing as perfect sleep, in this sense, may be doubtful; though we have been accustomed to think, that there probably is. On such a subject, we can have only the evidence of some loose reasoning from analogy. Consciousness, in the form of remembrance, is silent, and ever must be in a case like the present, when, if there is any mental action at all, it is too feeble to leave durable impressions, or to be recalled by memory. The common metaphysical arguments, both pro and contra, which are adduced to give greater certainty to this question, we hold to be worth just—nothing.

The prevailing theory of dreaming supposes, that these fundamental faculties go to sleep, not simultaneously, but one by one, and in succession, and, that the incoherence of our sleeping thoughts results from the loss of balance in the mind thus occasioned; one set of faculties continuing in action, while another set, which is usually associated with it, and whose joint action is essential to the perfection and truth of our ideas, is buried in the torpor of sleep. This theory looks extremely plausible at first sight, and on a superficial view; and, when considered only in the abstract, will even bear some scrutiny; but the worst of it is, it utterly fails to account for *facts*. One of two things is certain; either the theory in question is without truth or foundation

in nature, or, in other words, is a pure fiction; or we have nothing like a true analysis and classification of the powers of mind, and have, therefore, no rule by which to test it and determine its just claims to belief. In either case, the theory is practically worthless. Even the phrenological form of it,—that form which assigns a distinct cerebral organ to each special faculty,—about which certain dreamy enthusiasts talk so pompously, can scarcely be considered an improvement. We can tell the phrenologists, (a class of men for whom, for reasons heretofore stated, we entertain a particular respect, notwithstanding the intolerable quackery of a set of itinerant vagabonds, calling themselves lecturers, who claim fellowship with them,) and we tell them for their special *information*,—You must entirely re-model your classification of the mental faculties, before *your* science will serve to illustrate the phenomena of dreaming. We have often, in order to stop the mouths of cavilers, and to make our set of experiments *complete*, adopted your arrangement, as possibly the correct one, and then have faithfully applied the theory of dreaming, which has been under consideration, and which you adopt, to the solution of our own sleeping thoughts; and have as uniformly found ourselves bewildered and lost,—fast anchored, and far from shore, in “a continent of mud.” The result has been the same, whatever arrangement has been adopted. Our feet stick fast, in whatever direction they are turned. It is impossible to proceed, and flouncing only sinks us deeper in the mire. We are compelled, then, either to reject all the systems of mental philosophy which have ever been invented, or to discard the notion, that the faculties go to sleep in succession, as a chimera; and, as it is not rational to forsake a philosophy which is supported at least by *some* proofs, in order to receive a hypothesis which is sustained by none, and which, in the present state of our knowledge, must remain a pure abstraction, we prefer the latter alternative.

We do not deny, that the hypothesis in question is countenanced by some facts, which, by the superficial, might be accounted as proof. The external senses do certainly seem to fall asleep and awake in succession; the sight first, (it has been said,) then taste, smell, hearing and touch, all in regular order; and these faculties very commonly continue closed to impressions, while the others are busy in the *dreamy* occupations of the night. These facts, open to common observation, have doubtless given rise to the supposition, that all the faculties follow the same law. But if we take a broader view of the subject,—if we go from the surface to the depths of the mind, we shall be at once convinced of the limited application of this law. True, if we confine ourselves to reasoning abstractedly in the case, leaving entirely out of view the facts we would explain, we can get along well enough; but the

moment we come to employ ourselves about realities, perplexity assails us, and progress is at an end. Take any classification of the mental powers which you please, and see if the phenomena of dreaming, as they occur in the interior of the mind, can be explained by this law of the senses. Is memory a fundamental faculty? And will the supposition, that memory falls to sleep earlier or later than the other faculties, give to our sleeping vagaries the consistency and truth of waking thoughts? But memory is evidently exercised as well in our dreams as at other times. Take judgment, reason, imagination, association, volition, taste, or any of the affections, or any of the long list of faculties enumerated by Gall, and test the theory of dreaming which has been under examination. Why have not the advocates of this theory thus tested its claims to belief, and afterwards presented us with the result, instead of merely proclaiming and asserting its truth, as seems to have been the uniform practice? *We* have thus tested it over and over again. Our opinion of its merits the reader already knows. The truth is, in dreaming, as in waking, *all* the internal faculties seem to be called into action, either simultaneously, or successively, or interruptedly, according to the subject matter of thought; and the former state differs from the latter, not so much in the torpitude* of one set of faculties and the continued action of another, as in *the irregular action of the whole*. We judge, and reason, and remember, in both cases; but in the first we judge, and reason, and remember, falsely. We conceive and imagine as well in our dreams as at other times, but our conceptions and imaginations are strangely confused and distorted. In the visions of sleep, the tastes, and appetites, and affections, are changed. We have new desires. We love, and hate, and fear, new objects, and without adequate cause. The moral sense is perverted. We approve where we should disapprove, and the contrary. Truth and falsehood, reality and fiction, are mingled in the wildest confusion. New principles of association are developed, and regulate the successions of our ideas. The play of the faculties is disordered, both as to time of acting and mode of action. A given power is called into exercise when it should not be, and *vice versa*, remains at rest when it should be exercised, etc.

This sort of irregularity seems to be a usual characteristic of our dreams, but they are not *regular* even in this. Sometimes the balance of the mind, and the natural and harmonious relation of

* It is true, some of these powers may be in a state of relative torpor in our dreams, acting with less than their accustomed vigor and ease; but this is no more than is liable to happen at any time during the meditations and imaginations of the day. There are few subjects that employ the thoughts, which admit of the equal and uninterrupted operation of all the faculties.

all its parts, seem to be perfectly preserved. It is then that our thoughts are as coherent and just, as in the period of wakefulness. Witness the extemporaneous performances of the "sleeping preachers," of whom so much has been said. Witness the instances of persons composing speeches, poems, &c., and solving mathematical problems, in their sleep; and when the train of thought has been recovered, finding it singularly happy, (often original,) connected and just. Dr. Abercrombie mentions an anecdote of a distinguished lawyer in Scotland, who had for several days been intently engaged in the investigation of a complicated and important case, and who was noticed one night to rise from his bed, seat himself at his writing-desk, and there write a long paper, which he put carefully by, and then returned to bed. On the following morning he told his wife, that he had dreamed of delivering a clear and luminous opinion respecting a case that had perplexed him exceedingly, and that he would give any thing to recover the train of thought. She then directed him to his desk, where he discovered the opinion clearly and fully written out, and which was afterwards found to be perfectly correct. It is mentioned by Dr. Franklin, that the bearings and issue of political events, which had puzzled him much when awake, were often unfolded to him in his dreams.

It is not a little remarkable, that persons in their sleep, (and in other instances in which the brain is under excitement, as mania, and the delirium of fever, etc.,) sometimes show themselves capable of mental efforts, which, in point of argument, taste, and all the requisites of good composition and execution, entirely surpass any thing to which they are known to be equal at other times. Such persons at such times seem to rise far above the general level of their natures. Powers and "gifts" which they are supposed never to have possessed, are brought suddenly into exercise. To vulgar minds, in fact, they seem to be inspired. Ignorant persons will converse with great propriety. Those who know little of music, will sing delightfully. The conceptions are quick. The connections and relations of things are caught at a glance. The judgments are rapid. The memory seems to have acquired new vigor. Events which have long been forgotten,—scenes of former life, which have gradually faded away, and finally disappeared in the distance, are brought up once more to the mind, and represented there with all their original truth and freshness. All this, we need not now say, (as the subject will come up for full consideration in another place,) is the consequence of cerebral irritation.

Though the mind, in our dreams, and in instances of somnambulism, seems sometimes to act in a regular and connected manner, it very rarely does so for a long period at a time, and perhaps

never in reference to different and unrelated trains of thought passing through it in succession. Its tendency to fly off and revel in the extravagances of fiction, is almost incessant and irresistible. It has a fondness for the ridiculous, the impossible and the absurd, which is constantly gratified. It is forever under the influence of some false impression, which leads to error and extravagance.

The preceding remarks, we trust, will be sufficient to show, that the distinction between our sleeping and waking thoughts does not consist in that which has commonly been supposed,—in the quiescence or torpitude of one set of faculties, and the continued activity of another. All this we say in reference to the *internal* powers. The senses, it is true, do not, as a general rule, take part in our dreams; but this law of the senses should not, except for better reasons than we are able to find, be extended to the interior of the mind. Not even are the senses always asleep during the mental occupations of the night. They are sometimes, either part or all of them, fully awake, and take as active a share in whatever is to be done, as any of the faculties. We shall hereafter have occasion, in another connection, to refer to some instances in point.

Some may ask, in reference to cases in which the senses and internal faculties are all in a state of activity, what relation such cases have to sleep? On what principle are they embraced in treatises on sleep and its modifications, and excluded from those on the various forms of delirium and insanity? And when the mental powers are all awake, what propriety is there in considering a man in any other than a waking state? These may be difficult questions to answer satisfactorily, particularly if we confine ourselves to the consideration of present phenomena, leaving causes and the phenomena which precede and follow, out of the account. The subject about which we are engaged,—the irregular and anomalous manifestations of mind,—does not admit the use of accurate definitions, such as we are accustomed to meet with in natural history. The various mental affections are the worst of all things to classify. They are not substances, but modes of existence; not visible and tangible objects, having fixed qualities, but states of being, perpetually changing. They run into one another by imperceptible degrees; they blend in a hundred different ways, exhibiting *cross-breeds* of almost every description; so that it is impossible to set the stakes and draw the lines, as we are able to do in natural history. The characteristics of insanity are so variable and indefinite, that it is often, as is well known to medical jurists, a matter of extreme difficulty and delicacy to distinguish it from eccentricity. It is frequently a thing of equal difficulty to draw the line between it and cases of proper delirium, ungovernable passion, or somnambulism. Of the latter affection, the only

one of them to which this article especially relates, we can only say, that the name has been given, by common consent, to a certain set of cases, having certain, but not very defined, attributes in common, coming on in paroxysms, and which, throughout their duration, or at some period of it, are characterized by mental aberrations or irregularities; which irregularities are made manifest by muscular activity, partial or general;* which paroxysms are preceded by sleep, or the usual precursors of sleep, such as drowsiness, yawning, closing of the eye-lids, nodding of the head, interrupted loss of consciousness, etc., or are succeeded and terminated by a period of natural sleep. In addition to these characterizing circumstances, we may add, that the occurrences of the paroxysm are forgotten, or imperfectly remembered, during the interval, or are remembered only as a dream. It will be perceived by this, that the term somnambulism has a far more comprehensive meaning than is indicated by its derivation, being applied to a variety of cases of disordered sleep, in which there is bodily or mental activity.

We have said, that our dreams are characterized by the irregular action of all the faculties, more than by the activity of some, and the torpitude of others. This we have asserted, and made some attempts to prove, though perhaps the reader may desire more arguments and illustrations than have yet been offered. We shall endeavor to gratify this desire, so far as our limits will allow; yet we have other objects in view, in the subsequent part of this article, than the proving of this single point. We shall take a comprehensive survey of our subject, so far as we proceed in it, embracing, under a few heads, as many of the phenomena which belong to it, as time, and the discovered relations of a great variety of widely separated topics, will admit. We shall consider the state of some of our faculties in dreaming, at considerable length. Other faculties we shall be obliged to neglect, or only allude to.

In reference to the state of the *will* in sleep and dreaming, the learned Dr. Good makes the following remarks, after mentioning, that the external senses are the first to fall asleep:

“The first of the internal senses that becomes thus influenced,

* Somnambulism and ordinary dreaming are essentially the same affection, so far as the *mind* is concerned. If we abstract from the former those various muscular acts, such as speaking, walking, and the various bodily movements which are conceived necessary to it, and which are purely *mechanical*, serving only to make mind *visible*, so to speak, it will be difficult to point out any difference between them which is not one of degree. We have, therefore, throughout this article, considered them as degrees, or mere modifications of the same general thing, and (provided no circumstance in which they truly differ were involved,) have adduced the phenomena of each, indiscriminately, in the illustration of our subject, whether we have been endeavoring to prove a point or to refute a theory.

(by the torpor of sleep,) is the will itself." "It gives way first of all, and sleeps along with the exterior organs, while the other faculties of the mind remain awake." "In what may be called our own times, there are many valuable writers, who have turned their attention to this curious subject, (dreaming,) and who concur in the two following important positions: First, that the faculty, or at least the action of the will, is suspended during the influence of sleep; and, secondly, that in consequence of this suspension or discontinuance, the trains of ideas which persevere in rushing over the mind, are produced and catenated by that general habit of association which catenates them while we are awake. The power of the will, it is contended, is not necessary to the existence of ideas, which, therefore, may continue whilst such power is in a state of abeyance; but which, if they continue at all, must take the general order and succession imprinted upon them by the law of association, excepting in cases in which such law is broken in upon by a variety of incidental circumstances, as uneasiness, arising from a surcharged stomach, or other bodily sensations."*

Now, as it regards the influence of the principle of association, in regulating the current of our sleeping thoughts, we do not feel disposed to quarrel with Dr. Good and "many valuable writers" in the opinion here expressed; though the idea, that this principle is the sole regulator of such thoughts, is undoubtedly erroneous, provided association means the same as habit, implying antecedent connection. Ideas are linked together so that they suggest one another, *naturally*, as well as by the effect of custom, etc. That the principle of association is powerful in governing the trains of ideas in our dreams, is unquestionably true: but that it is, uniformly and as a general thing, *more* powerful than in our waking hours, we see no good reason to believe.† But upon this point we cannot dwell.

As it relates to another point and another opinion,—that which regards the will as suspended in our dreams,—we cannot be so brief. We cannot but believe, that this opinion, which has figured so largely in most of the attempted explanations of dreaming, is without foundation. It is true, the *approach* of sleep is characterized by the difficult and imperfect exercise of some of those functions which are supposed especially dependent upon the will. Voluntary motion, for instance, ceases. The muscles, which have been

* The Book of Nature, Lecture VII.

† The principle of association is *deranged* in its exercise in dreaming, as it would be easy to show; thus exemplifying the irregularity of action, which is so conspicuous a circumstance in relation to all the mental operations in this state. Certain ideas which are usually linked together in our waking hours, are separated in sleep, and new combinations formed. Thus the train of thought takes a new direction, and novel products and novel creations are the result, etc.

kept in a certain state of tension, by the stimulus of the will, become relaxed, the head and trunk incline forward, and every member of the body shows a tendency to obey the laws of gravity, or to fall into the position most favored by its weight. Attention, too, which is considered a voluntary power, is but faintly and imperfectly exercised. We regard things with little emotion or interest; therefore they make little impression, incite to no investigation, and give rise to no reflections. All this happens during the approach of sleep; but it is unfair to infer from this circumstance, that the like happens in our dreams, when the feebleness which characterized all the mental operations at the accession of sleep, has disappeared and given place to the ordinary and perhaps energetic action of at least some of the faculties. But this inference seems to have been made, as illegitimate as it is. A fact occurring in one state and under one set of circumstances, is assumed to occur in a different state and under a very different set of circumstances.

For our part, we do not see why the will is not as truly active in our dreams as at other times. Those specific mental acts which are the invariable antecedents or causes of muscular motion, and which, more appropriately than any other class of mental operations, come under the appellation of will, are undoubtedly and indeed almost continually put forth in the dreaming state. We use our hands, (or seem to do so,) we walk, we run, we speak, we are even busy actors in the scenes in which we conceive ourselves to be engaged. It is true, all this time we are perfectly motionless, lying prostrate upon our beds; but we *will*, nevertheless, all these muscular acts. That is, we go through all the *mental* part of the process which is concerned in such acts, though the mechanical part of it,—that which properly constitutes *motion*,—does not follow. This is the general fact; though there is the long list of cases, occurring in every variety of form, which come under the head of somnambulism and its modifications, in which there is not only will, but obedience to will, or motion. In such cases, we execute the various bodily movements just as we do when awake, evincing to all the entire possession of the power in question, and also, that the relation between this power and the muscular motion is unbroken.

Attention, too, is very evidently exercised in our dreams. We certainly often observe intently and with a lively interest or emotion. The whole energies of the mind seem to be concentrated and fixed, not unfrequently, upon some object, or train of objects, which is supposed present to the mind. We often compare, too, and reason, (sometimes correctly, but oftener the contrary,) which, in the broader sense, are voluntary processes. Somnambulists carry on an argument, etc., involving the exercise of all the intel-

lectual powers which can be supposed under the control of the will. They seem, at times, to arrest the current of thought, select certain ideas for special consideration, place them side by side, in order to notice their agreement or disagreement, draw inferences, &c. They are even sometimes conscious of making efforts at recollection.

It may be said, that the exercise of the faculties in this way is a very rare thing in our dreams, and contrasts very strongly with their common and irregular mode of operation. This is true. In our ordinary dreams, we certainly do not stop to weigh, to compare or contrast, to reason, etc., but give ourselves up to the natural current of our ideas, suffering ourselves to be carried along passively, as it were, down the stream of thought. And precisely the same happens to us in our ordinary waking hours. It is only occasionally, that we are engaged in serious argument or close investigation, pausing, now and then, to survey the ground we have passed over, and to examine minutely and critically, that which is before the mind. Indeed, we have sometimes thought, that the great mass of men (ourselves *not* included of course!) never investigate, or argue with themselves, in this way, at all. At any rate, the waking existence of a majority of mankind, is principally spent in a kind of reverie,—a state not very different from that of a dreaming, if we except the reality which there seems to be about the latter,—a state in which the mind, roving and wandering lawlessly about from object to object over the whole field of thought, seems to be given up to its own spontaneous movements and direction. It has often appeared to us, that if the train of ideas, as it actually passes through the brain in one of our musing moods, could be accurately and vividly represented to the mind, in its retrospective glances, it would be found little less wild, incoherent, strangely catenated, and amusingly linked together, than the trains of our ordinary dreams; and if, in addition to this circumstance, the seeming reality which is the accompaniment of our sleeping visions could be the attendant of our waking reveries, it might not, perhaps, be easy to distinguish the difference.

Among all the faculties which are disordered in dreaming, that which is called *memory* seems as curiously and profoundly affected as any. We very rarely, in our dreams, recur to the events of our former lives, recognizing, at the same time, such events as *past*, or referring them to their true position in respect to time. We do, however, sometimes thus recur to our former experience, as most will be able to satisfy themselves, by examining their own sleeping history. We probably still more rarely refer in one part of a dream to the occurrences of another part, recognizing clearly the distinction between the present and the past; but we occasionally do even this. We have now in mind a striking instance, drawn from

our own experience. We dreamed of seeing men fighting with carpenters' axes. We afterwards (in the same dream) dreamed of relating from memory, all the circumstances of the fight, the place of its occurrence, etc., to certain acquaintances; and what is equally singular, thought, during the relation, that we were telling a dream, which we endeavored to trace to its cause and explain, and of which, in fact, we gave a very rational account. We traced it to an impression made upon the ear, by the shouting, in the night, of a number of men in the neighborhood.

We frequently have a kind of *false* memory in our dreams; that is, we refer an event to our past experience, which has actually never occurred. We suppose certain acts of the mind to be acts of memory, which are, in truth, nothing more than simple conceptions or imaginations.

There is a curious and interesting set of phenomena which is developed in certain cases of somnambulism, mania, etc., and designated by the term *double consciousness*, which it may be worth our while to examine. Many instances are on record, of somnambulists and others, who, while in the paroxysm, forget all that has occurred in the previous life, and in the intervals, while there is a perfect recollection of all that has happened in the former paroxysms; and who again in the intervals forget whatever has transpired in the paroxysms, but retain a perfect knowledge of all that has taken place in previous intervals. Dr. Abercrombie quotes from Dr. Prichard the case of a lady, "who was liable to sudden attacks of delirium, which, after continuing for various periods, went off as suddenly, leaving her at once perfectly rational. The attack was often so sudden, that it commenced while she was engaged in interesting conversation; and on such occasions it happened, that on her recovery from the state of delirium, she instantly recurred to the conversation she had been engaged in at the time of the attack, though she had never referred to it during the continuance of the affection. To such a degree was this carried, that she would even complete an unfinished sentence. During the subsequent paroxysm, again she would pursue the train of ideas which had occupied her mind in the former."

We find mentioned, by Mr. George Combe, the case of a girl* of sixteen, of whom an account has been given by Dr. Dyce, of Aberdeen. On the first appearance of her disease, (for so we call it,) she manifested an uncommon propensity to fall asleep in the evenings, which was soon followed by the habit of talking on these

* It is worthy of remark, that nearly all the extraordinary instances of this and a similar kind, occur in young women, characterized by great sensibility and mobility of the nervous system, and who, at the same time, in nearly every instance, will be found, on inquiry, to be laboring under some of the peculiar diseases of their sex.

occasions. One evening, after having fallen asleep in this manner, she imagined herself an Episcopal clergyman, went through the ceremony of baptizing three children, and gave an appropriate extemporaneous prayer. At one time, in this state, she "sat at the breakfast table with perfect correctness, with her eyes shut." She answered questions put to her; but the answers were often, though not always, incongruous. In one instance, she sung a hymn delightfully in this state, and "it appeared incomparably better done, than she could accomplish when well."

"In the mean time, a still more singular and interesting symptom began to make its appearance. The circumstances which occurred during the paroxysm were completely forgotten by her when the paroxysm was over, but were perfectly remembered during subsequent paroxysms." She told her mistress, in one instance, what was said to her on the evening on which she baptized the children. A depraved fellow-servant, understanding that she wholly forgot every circumstance which occurred during the paroxysms, clandestinely introduced to her a young man, who treated her, though vigorously resisted, in a most rude and shameful manner. Next day, she had not the slightest recollection of the transaction, nor did any of her friends know of it, until, in a subsequent fit, she related the whole story to her mother.

Perhaps the following considerations may help to make these extraordinary cases, and others like them, more intelligible than they would otherwise be.

The brain of every person having a well-regulated mind, may be considered to be in a certain specific state. That all the faculties may be exercised, that impressions may be properly received, and that such impressions may remain, or be called up at any future and distant time by *memory*, etc., it is required, that there be a certain and continued sameness of organic cerebral constitution. While this sameness remains, there is sameness of character and conscious mental identity. While it remains, the same distinguishing traits of mind are discovered during all the periods of existence, the knowledge acquired in youth serves us through life, the experience of to-day is recollected to-morrow, and helps to guide us ever after. This sameness does not preclude all change or diversity of being. It is not meant, that slight alterations in the state of the brain, efface all knowledge and destroy conscious identity; such alterations, for instance, as take place at the different periods and stages of life, or such as occur in the ordinary sicknesses to which we are exposed. Every degree of change is compatible with the conscious continuity of being, etc., which does not border upon the *revolutionary*. There are certain prescribed limits which must not be passed, certain bounds which must not be broken over. As long as these limits (not capable of being accurately

defined, perhaps,) are observed, all is well; but the moment they are overstepped, all cerebral and conscious mental identity ceases. A *revolution* in the brain has been effected. It has taken a new mode of being, and acquired a new organic constitution. Old impressions are effaced. All the accustomed channels of thought are obliterated. Old connections, and relations, and habits of association, are broken up and destroyed. The knowledge of many years has perished, and the mind once more becomes a *tabula rasa*. Under these circumstances, the present life and the past are separated by an impassable barrier. Such is the state of the organ of thought and the functions depending upon it, in many of the profounder diseases of the head, such as the graver forms of fever and mania. Though this thorough and deep-seated change sometimes occurs, and occasionally even without destroying the capacity to acquire anew, as in some instances of somnambulism, etc. ;* a far more common occurrence is a lighter form or degree of the same kind of thing,—an alteration which is partial and imperfect, and which, without completely destroying identity of cerebral constitution, and thus obliterating all old impressions, only modifies this constitution, impairing the power of the memory, rendering the command over former acquisitions less perfect, and the connection between the past and the present less obvious. Such is the effect of the

* We cannot forbear to lay before the reader, in this connection, one of the most extraordinary instances of anomalous mental manifestation which is to be found on record, and which is related by Major Elliot, a professor in the Military Academy at West-Point. We extract the account from Dr. Macnish's work. The subject of the case, was a young lady of intelligence and good constitution. "Her memory was capacious, and well stored with a copious stock of ideas. Unexpectedly, and without any forewarning, she fell into a profound sleep, which continued several hours beyond the ordinary term. On waking, she was discovered to have lost every trait [trace?] of acquired knowledge. Her memory was *tabula rasa*; all vestiges, both of words and things, were obliterated and gone. It was found necessary for her to learn every thing again. She even acquired, by new efforts, the art of spelling, reading, writing and calculating, and gradually became acquainted with the persons and objects around, like a being for the first time brought into the world. In these exercises she made considerable proficiency. But after a few months, another fit of somnolency invaded her. On rousing from it, she found herself restored to the state she was in before the first paroxysm; but was wholly ignorant of every event and occurrence that had befallen her afterwards. The former condition of her existence she now calls the old state, and the latter the new state; and she is as unconscious of her double character, as two distinct persons are of their respective natures. For example, in her old state, she possesses all her original knowledge; in her new state, only what she acquired since. If a lady or gentleman be introduced to her in the old state, and *vice versa*, (and so of all other matters,) to know them satisfactorily, she must learn them in both states. In the old state, she possesses fine powers of penmanship; while in the new, she writes a poor, awkward hand, not having had time or means to become expert. During four years and upwards, she has had periodical transitions from one of these states to the other. The alterations are always consequent upon a long and sound sleep. Both the lady and her family are now capable of conducting the affair without embarrassment. By simply knowing whether she is in the old or new state, they regulate the intercourse and govern themselves accordingly."

changes which occur at the different periods of life, particularly in infancy and early childhood, and in many of those affections which are attended by moderate irritation of brain. The brains of very young children are in a constant state of mutation. This is the reason why an impression on the mind of an infant will remain distinct but a short time, and will be completely effaced after a longer period. In manhood, we recall imperfectly the events of childhood, while a perfect barrier seems to have been thrown up between our present selves and our infantile existence. In fevers, the whole system, the organ of thought included, undergoes a series of rapid alterations. Consequently, we recollect imperfectly the occurrences of yesterday, and of our former lives.

These considerations, if we mistake not, will help us to understand the phenomena occurring in somnambulism, etc., which have given origin to the term double consciousness. We may suppose the brain previous to such an affection to have been in one unvarying state, or to possess the same organic constitution; which constitution, on the attack of the somnambulant paroxysm, underwent a radical change, but which was perfectly restored or re-established in the intervals. During such intervals, of course, a man in such a case would be his former self. He would remember in any one interval all the occurrences of preceding intervals, and of his former life; while he would recollect nothing which happened in that other state of being,—his somnambulant existence. Again, this same person, under the circumstances supposed, would, during the paroxysms, forget, either partially or entirely, the events of the intervals, and of the previous life; while at the same time, there would be a perfect and conscious continuity of existence from one paroxysm to another, provided, in each successive fit, the organ of thought should return to the same state it was in during previous fits,—a thing which might readily happen, which must happen, indeed, in cases of the kind under examination. In such an event, of course, a man would exhibit all the phenomena of “double consciousness.” He would be the subject of two perfect, continuous, but at the same time interrupted, lives, not strictly contemporaneous, each of which is marked, at different stages along its course, by periods of oblivion; which periods indicate the alternating reign of another and an unconscious existence.

The reason why instances of this sort of double memory do not occur oftener, seems to be evidently this. The brain, in all the deviations from a natural state to which it is liable, very rarely, in two successive instances, deviates precisely in the same direction, or experiences the same identical change. This is owing to the fact, that the causes of such alterations are various. Were these causes always the same, the interrupted cerebral identity in question, and its necessary consequence, a double, alternating exist-

ence, would be common, provided, in the mean time, the brain undergoes no change which shall seriously impair its susceptibility to impressions, or too far weaken the exercise of its functions.

One of the most remarkable circumstances belonging to dreams, and one more noticed by common observers than any other, is the *illusion* we are constantly under, relative to objective existences, or the real presence of the objects of our thoughts. We invariably mistake conceptions for perceptions,—the fictions of imaginations for sober fact. Every thing that recurs to us,—things the most absurd and monstrous to which fancy ever gives birth,—are considered as undoubted realities. However ludicrously our ideas may be combined, however contradictory to one another, or however far removed they may be from the actual things of the world, we never think of doubting their strict conformity to truth or nature.* This fact is commonly accounted for on the supposition, that the senses, which usually correct such illusions, are buried in sleep. It is the common belief of philosophers, that if it were not for the senses, we should always believe the objects of our conceptions to be existent and present. But these faculties, it is said, constantly presenting real objects to the mind, which are immediately recognized as inconsistent with this belief, such illusions are dispelled in the instant of their birth, and as often as they arise.

Now this theory, like some others which we have examined, seems plausible enough at first sight ; but like them, we are not sure that it will bear severe scrutiny. The senses are sometimes partially, and at other times completely, awake in our dreams ; and yet, in such cases as well as in others, we firmly believe the scenes before the mind to be real. Cases of this sort differ in no respect from common dreams, except in the single fact, that the senses are open to impressions from without. In such instances, whenever a sense receives an impression, that impression, instead of arresting the current of thought and dissipating the phantoms of fancy, as it ought to do were the theory in question correct, is received as part and parcel of the train of real sensations, of which we suppose ourselves the subject, and is accordingly worked up into the fabric of the current dream. Sometimes it gives a new direction to the thoughts, or originates an entirely new train of ideas, without at

* True, we sometimes put the question to ourselves in our dreams,—“Am I not dreaming?” in the same manner that most of us often do when awake. But in neither case, do we ask this question because of any discovered inconsistency in the passing train of thought, or because of any doubt, that we really see, and hear, and feel, as we seem to do. Whether sleeping or waking, we sometimes smile at our own folly for asking such a question ; at other times, answer it much after the following manner.—“This *may* be a dream ; I cannot prove it is not : but of this much I am certain ; I *feel*, and things seem to me just as when awake ; therefore, it becomes me to act as though awake.”

all suggesting the unsubstantial nature of the scenes which we witness. A person who goes to bed with a bottle of hot water at his feet, dreams of walking barefoot up the burning sides of Mount *Ætna*. Another, who has fallen asleep with a blister upon the head, dreams of being scalped by a party of Indians. Many instances are related of persons who generally seem to sleep with their senses awake. In such cases, the sleeper's thoughts, by a little dexterous management, may be made to run in any channel or dwell upon any subject which a by-stander may choose. He will enter into free conversation upon any topic which is started, and will reveal, without reserve, his most secret thoughts and purposes. He has even been made to go through all the stages of a duel, from the first provocation which led to a challenge, to the final consummation of the tragedy. He has actually, in such cases, at the appointed signal, discharged the pistol placed in his hand for the purpose, and been awakened by the report. Many authentic accounts of the wonderful doings of somnambulists will occur to the reader in this connection. Now in these cases, it is evident, the senses are fully awake, and yet the vision is not dispelled. In common delirium, too, men see, and hear, and feel, as usual; but they entirely confound what they see, etc., with what they only conceive or imagine. And how happens it, that a man is utterly incapable of distinguishing an idea which comes from without, and has answering to it a real existence, from one which is suggested by an internal faculty, and has no cause external to the mind; when, at the same time, he is in the entire possession of all those powers (the external senses being in a state of full activity,) which are claimed to be necessary to make this distinction? The truth is, the integrity of the senses, though it may aid to do it under particular circumstances, will not alone secure us from the danger of mistaking fancy for fact.

Not only do the senses seem incapable of correcting the errors of the imagination, in those irregular states of mind which occur in dreaming, delirium, etc.; but we suspect, that the internal faculties alone, *when in a sound condition*, and during the period of wakefulness, can make the correction without any assistance from the senses; or rather, that we are, when the faculties are in this condition, liable to no error respecting the nature of our imaginations. Should we not, when all the mental energies were in healthful operation, though placed in a dark and solitary place, where no light could reach the eye, or sound strike upon the ear,—where the organs of taste and smell, and the muscular system, were in a state of perfect quiescence, and when the body was supported by pressure so equal and diffused, that even touch could hardly be said to be exercised; should we not, in such circumstances, know the creations of fancy to be creations, and not realities? Should we

suppose ourselves to be actually engaged in some of the frolics of youth, merely because a scene of early life was passing through the mind? Should we suppose some friend, whom we only conceived, or happened to be thinking about, and whom, perhaps, we knew to be a thousand miles off, to be really present to our view? The reader has doubtless been placed in circumstances much like those which we have supposed; and we would ask him whether he lost his consciousness, or thought himself what or where he was not? whether he verily believed himself to be President of the United States, or the killer of Tecumseh, merely because he gave his imagination a moment's license, and conceived himself to be so?

Again, the dreaming man does not always, and in every instance, even when the senses are closed, and external impressions shut out, believe his imaginations to be present realities; though, for the sake of bringing forward more distinctly the arguments against a received theory, we have chosen to consider this belief as invariable. We dream of having *conceptions* as well as perceptions. We think of absent objects which for the time are regarded as absent. We have ideas of the past and of the future, in distinction from ideas of the present,—conceptions, forming parts, and considerable parts, of every train of thought, which, in the instant of their birth, are recognized and considered as conceptions. For instance, we imagine ourselves on the verge of an awful precipice, and our feet slipping from under us. We have the sensation of slipping, and at once a crowd of ideas rush in upon the mind,—the shock of the fall, the mangling of the body, the horrors of dying, and perhaps the terrors of a judgment. The sensation, in this case, is felt to be present; but actual death is regarded as future, or prospective. Again, we suppose ourselves to be reading or composing a poem. We are delighted with the thoughts and the imagery, but we do not seem to lose our characters as readers or composers. The objects and scenes which are represented to the fancy, are not believed to be really present to the eye. So of the lawyer who dreams of addressing a court of law. He verily thinks himself standing in the attitude of an advocate, etc.; but he never supposes, that the venerable judge of other days is actually and corporeally present, so often as he uses his name as authority for his opinions.

For the sake of better illustrating this part of our argument, we have chosen to select instances (comparatively rare in occurrence,) of our more coherent dreams; though in so doing, we have only taken the more palpable examples of a general fact, which may be noticed even in the wildest of our dreams. Dreams of this latter kind differ from the former, chiefly, in the *capriciousness and irregularity* of the mind, in the distinction which it makes between impressions and imaginations. And it is this capricious-

ness, if we mistake 'not, that is the principal cause of the incoherence which is so strikingly characteristic of our ordinary sleeping thoughts. A train of ideas, for instance, is passing through the brain. The mind, taking cognizance of them and in the exercise of its sovereign pleasure, considers some as impressions derived from external objects, and some mere images called up by the fancy. Those of the train which are regarded as impressions, are linked together into something like a continuous series, and may be said to constitute the *experience* of the night. This series may exhibit some truth and consistency in its parts, or it may be a mere string of unrelated ideas, such as eye never saw united, and such as nature never joins, according as the laws of truth and nature have been observed or violated by the mind in its selections and combinations. If no ideas are grouped together and regarded as perceptions, but such as have real relations and are strictly compatible, dreams are said to be consistent. We suppose ourselves to see only such objects as do or might exist, etc. But if, in the grouping together of these ideas, no distinction is made between the possible and impossible; if the circumstances of time and place are disregarded; if those parts of a passing train which have little or no affinity, and which cannot enter into real combination, are selected, united and embodied, and considered as a natural combination; of course the current dream is incoherent, contradictory and absurd. We see monsters of every description, forms the most grotesque, groupings of objects the most ludicrous. Time and space, in one instance, are annihilated; in another, indefinitely expanded. In looking back upon such a train of thought, all nature seems to have undergone a kind of decomposition and subsequent re-composition,—a true metamorphosis. In this transformation, things appear to have lost their original characters, and acquired new and strange ones, etc. But we must return from this digression.

We are forced, then, in consequence of the considerations which have been offered, to reject the supposition, that the dreamer is imposed upon by his fancy, or is unable to distinguish ideas of imagination from those of sleep, *because* the senses are asleep. We have found, that somnambulists and persons in delirium are unable to make this distinction, even when the senses are awake. We have found reason to believe, too, that the waking man, when the movements of the internal faculties are regular, can make the distinction in question without the concurrence of the perceptive powers, or when they are in a state of perfect quiescence. We have ascertained, furthermore, that even the ordinary dreamer is not under an illusion in regard to *all* his conceptions, (some of them he considers as *conceptions* having no external and present objects;) though this illusion should be uniform and universal, in

his case, (the senses being asleep,) were the theory which has been under examination correct.

That the perceptive powers do, however, in certain cases, *help* the mind to distinguish between fantasy and fact, may be shown by an appeal to almost every one's experience. When the imagination is disordered in some slight degree, as in mild febrile affections, and other cases in which there is moderate cerebral irritation, this operation of the perceptive faculties is sufficiently distinct. In such instances, persons have perfect control of their thoughts, never mistaking internal suggestions for real impressions, as long as the eyes are open; but, the moment these are closed, they lose all self-command, and are delivered over to the tyranny of a diseased imagination; believing themselves, all the time, real actors or sufferers in the scenes so vividly represented to the mind's view. The illusion, in such a case, may be dispelled and renewed at pleasure, by the mere act of opening and shutting the eyes.

The *modus operandi* of the senses, in instances of the kind under consideration, we will endeavor to explain.

The fact, that the external and internal faculties, or their respective organs, have always acted together, or associately, has given rise, according to an uniform law, both of mind and body, to an indissoluble union or intimate sympathy between them,*—to a habit of acting in concert, and in one uniform manner. Of course, under these circumstances, when one set of the faculties or organs in question has, from any cause, fallen into disorder, and the other has not, there is exerted a reciprocal and assimilating influence between the two; the former set tending to derange the latter, and the latter tending to restore the former. Therefore, when the internal powers have become disturbed in their natural mode of action, and the external senses have escaped the same morbid influence, (as they are very apt to do, from the fact, perhaps, of their lying partly without the brain, and beyond the reach of those constitutional causes which affect this organ and embarrass its functions,) the sympathy between the two may be so strong, that the latter, as often as they are called into full and vigorous action, may completely suspend all disturbance in the former; *provided* this disturbance is only moderate in degree, and insufficient to overpower the restorative influence of the senses. Thus, in mild cases of nervous fever, attended by slight cerebral irritation, a person will be perfectly rational, and under the dominion of no il-

* We do not mean, that the habit of acting together is the only source of associate actions and sympathies, mental or corporeal. There are associations, etc., both of faculties and organs, which are *natural*, or the effect of a primary law impressed upon the functions, as well as those which are acquired or induced by custom. The instance in the text, probably, partakes of both characters, being an original association, confirmed and greatly strengthened by habit.

lusion, whilst the perceptive faculties are engaged; though the moment these are unoccupied, he may become the victim of a disorderly imagination. Let him be left in the dark,* for instance, or induce him to close his eyes, and he supposes himself pursued by a monster, or falling down a precipice, or haunted by ghosts: bring a light into the room again, or let him raise his eye-lids, and the vision has fled. Again, in certain other cases, when the brain is more profoundly affected, and its natural or healthful movements more seriously impaired, as in the graver fevers, delirium tremens, mania, some sorts of somnambulism, etc., there is no magic of this kind in the operation of the senses. Though they have been long associated with certain regular movements in the organ of thought, and though they tend powerfully to renew or restore this order of movements, according to a well-known principle already stated, the tendency of this sort is only of limited influence. Though adequate to remove the slighter grades of cerebral disorder, the influence in question is not potent enough to subdue affections of a deeper and more serious cast. Thus it happens, that the power of the senses, in correcting the errors of the imagination, is palpable and important, only in the slighter cases of cerebral irritation.

For the reasons which have been offered in a few of the preceding pages, and for others which might be produced, we feel authorized to reject, *in toto*, that opinion of philosophers which supposes, that we are always, even in the waking and sound state of the faculties, under a momentary illusion in regard to the nature of our conceptions. We are persuaded that we do not, as a general rule, believe in the real presence of the objects of our conceptions, even for an instant, unless the movements of the mind are in some way deranged. What is a conception? It is an idea suggested to the mind by its own internal laws, in the absence of

* We have now in mind the case of a gentleman, a member of a family in which had occurred several instances of insanity, who, for a long period, could not go to sleep in the night, unless a lamp was left burning in his bed-room. If the light was extinguished before retiring, the moment his head touched the pillow, he found himself in the complete possession of a morbid imagination; and though he was, in a great degree, conscious of his situation, and of the illusive nature of the visions which haunted him, he found it impossible to control the current of his thoughts, and to dispel the phantoms of an excited fancy; but the instant the light was restored, or the sense of sight was called again into exercise, his judgment regained the ascendancy, and the hallucination was at an end. If the lamp was suffered to burn near him, so that he could, at any time, check the extravagances of fancy, he lay quietly, and finally fell asleep.

This gentleman, all this time, was engaged in active business, and called himself well. He himself, and his friends, supposed, that he was only "nervous;" but the truth is, the integrity of the internal faculties was lost. There was a strong tendency to deranged movements of mind, which was only kept from manifesting itself in a very unequivocal manner, by the sympathizing and controlling influence of the perceptive powers, (chiefly the visual sense,) which were unimpaired. In other words, there was present the incipient stage of insanity.

the object which it represents, or of which it is the image. But what is an idea,—say the idea of a friend? Of what is it composed? Is it made up of visible figure alone, as the notion we combat would almost seem to imply; or of physical properties collectively? Or, do intellectual and moral character form constituent parts of it? Or, is it not rather an extremely complex idea, into whose composition a thousand elements enter,—elements as numerous as are the material, animal and mental qualities of our friend, added to the specific attributes, the innumerable peculiarities, distinctions, etc., which he has acquired from association with surrounding substances? Every object and circumstance with which he has maintained an uniform relation, or frequent connection in our minds, whether in instances of perception or conception,—his dress, his house and lands, his equipage, the members of his family, his public and private associates, the great events of the day in which he has had an agency, etc. etc., have each communicated something to our notion of him. Now all these things may and do enter as elements into the idea of our friend, whether this idea is suggested by the sight of his countenance, or his corn-fields, or by the sound of his voice. They are not contradictory: they may exist in combination. But there are qualities which cannot exist together, because they destroy one another. Such are the qualities of presence and absence. Neither of these has been an uniform accompaniment of our friend, as he has existed in our minds; and as they are contradictory in themselves, they destroy and expel one another. Therefore, when we have the conception of any object which we have often witnessed, and often thought of, there can be said to enter into this conception neither the idea of the presence or absence of this object; because, that effect of the principle of association which would persuade us to believe it to be present, is counteracted and destroyed by the effect of the same principle suggesting the belief of its absence, etc.

In closing this article, we can only say, that we have not said the half of what we designed to do when we commenced. Some of the most interesting departments of our subject have not been touched. Possibly, at some future time, should leisure permit, we may resume our lucubrations. In what has been already offered, we hope we shall not incur the charge of being *sleepy*, or *dreamy*, or obscure. If we are found to be guilty of either, we would plead, in extenuation, the *nature* of our subject, and our earnest endeavors to avoid so grievous a sin.

ART VI.—SPIRITUAL DESPOTISM.

Spiritual Despotism. By the author of *Natural History of Enthusiasm*. New-York: Leavitt, Lord & Co. Boston: Crocker & Brewster.

THE work, whose title is herewith prefixed, is in fulfillment of intentions expressed by the author in his preceding volume, (*Fanaticism*,) although he has seen fit to depart from the order of topics then announced. The present book, like the others which he has put forth, and which have successively received the notice of this journal, shows the hand of a master. It would be difficult, we think, for this anonymous censor of the age;* this religious Junius, with the characteristic attributes which he seems to possess, to write a tame, spiritless book. He must and will be read, whether his readers adopt or reject his conclusions. His brilliant and forcible style, and his original conceptions, cannot fail to fix every one's attention. We observe in the present publication, the same power of spiritual analysis, the same effectual dissections of the human heart, which constitutes so striking a feature of his former works. Every stroke of his pen is a moral portraiture. He has thoroughly read the heart, and fearlessly lays it open to its own inspection. The faults of his manner, if we mistake not, are less frequent than usual; and also the felicities of his description happen to be fewer. The cause of both may lie in the argumentative turn of his book, and the logical method he has taken to make out his case. He has set up a single object, and knight-errant-like, he pushes towards it, with lance in hand. Hence he has less use for paradox, and a bold, startling manner, and less temptation to digress from his main topic, in giving utterance to the exuberance of his thoughts, and in culling the flowers of rhetoric. Sufficient peculiarities, however, remain, to show the author of "*Saturday Evening*," and the elegant portrayer of moral sentiments. We are not aware, that there is any failure of originality, or any tendency to repetition, in the discussion of so many closely connected topics. On the contrary, his resources seem to be inexhaustible. His power of discrimination appears to be augmented in proportion as its objects are multiplied. The purpose repeatedly avowed, of exposing false religion in the shape of enthusiasm, fanaticism, and similar obliquities, seems to be steadily kept in view, and progressively fulfilled, the farther he enters into this den of Cacus. The author, however, retaining many of his characteristic excellences, has, on the whole, satis-

* There is reason to believe, that the opinion which ascribes the authorship of these works to Mr. Isaac Taylor, brother of the late Miss Jane Taylor, is correct.

fied us less than in his previous publications: we have more faults to find with his doctrines, or rather with the one great doctrine he undertakes to defend throughout the work. His opposition to the voluntary principle in sustaining religious institutions, and his advocacy of the church and state system, exhibit him to us, necessarily, in a less attractive light than has hitherto been the fact. With our republican prepossessions, we cannot so readily fall in with his more despotic notions. In our opinion, he has indulged again, as in his "*Model of Christian Missions*," a more theorizing spirit; he has proposed a less feasible plan than anything that appears in the intervening works. His peculiar views respecting the missions of the church, he seems not even to the present time to have entirely abandoned; since he remarks in the book before us, that "Our various sectarian missionary societies are now wrestling with Omnipotence on this very point;" that is, in attempting to diffuse a divided and incumbered gospel. "The experiment is being tried, whether the nations at large may be converted by the unamended and discordant christianity which we inherit from the Lutheran reformer." The degree of reform, likewise, which he would realize in the English establishment, is a theoretic perfectibility, of which such an institution is most probably unsusceptible. That he can pull down systems, better than he can build them up, and propose amendments, with greater ease than he can prove their practicability, seems too likely still to be a distinction of this writer.

Before we proceed to notice any particular positions, which need to be controverted, we would remark on a few obvious features of the book in general.

1. *It is sufficiently anti-American.* It is hardly in terms of respect, that he speaks of our country and its institutions. Had he suffered facts, and not theory or prejudice, to govern him in the present instance, he would never have committed the following paragraph to the press:

'The very relationship of the two people has formed a starting point, whence they have diverged. The people of the United States exist in agitation, and act from momentary excitement. The people of England are jealous of excitement; and though susceptible of agitation, gladly and quickly return to a state of rest. The love of order is as strong on this side the Atlantic, as is the disregard of it on the other. Here (a party excepted) authority, and those gradations of rank which are necessary to its stability, are steadily looked at, and are approved of as good and beneficial. There, from the domestic circle outward to the political, natural sentiments of deference are faint, and authority means very little beyond the limits of actual force. Climate has done something, the geographical conditions of the country have done something, and the political circumstances of the state more, to place the

transatlantic English at the antipodes of Britain. We shall not then draw our models of government thence. No infatuation could be more irrational. A certain order of things may indeed be good in America ; or it may be the best possible there, which is neither necessary, nor even practicable, nor in any sense whatever good, for England. England will no more import a church polity from America, than she will import thence domestic slavery, or the republicanism which favors and endures it. Two very efficient causes preserve American christianity from passing into some form of spiritual despotism : the first is the spirit of faction, which breaks the clerical body ; the second is the spirit of trade, which has always been found in an especial manner to repel priestly encroachments. England assuredly may do better than take her lessons from those who as yet have so much to learn.' pp. 38, 39.

It is a pity, for his own sake, that so sensible a writer should have spoken of the great American experiment, in government, religion, education and social happiness, with so little discrimination, and with so defective an acquaintance with our history. The great fundamental principles of social order, both political and religious, which are engaging so seriously the attention of philosophers and christians at this day, are not to be settled by a pert parallel of this nature. If our principles and forms of social life are not the best in themselves, or desirable or practicable for all nations, producing the largest amount of human happiness within a given portion of the globe, concerning which position we are by no means decided ; yet doubtless they are best for us : and the nation is not known, whose actual good, or whose prospective blessings, we would be willing to take in the room of our own. Except for occasional aggressions made on our quiet, principally by needy and ignorant European emigrants, in our large cities, we are not apprised of any peculiar disregard of order prevailing among us. And it has been remarked by those who are acquainted with the popular feeling of both continents, that circumstances which in Europe would produce a scene of tumult and riot, pass off here without any public demonstrations of morbid sensibility. We are eminently a people who love order ; for order is observed with few external means of enforcing it. In what portion of the world is a more peaceable population found than in New-England ? and a population, too, in whom are not wanting the elements of energetic passion and enterprise. The allusion to slavery need not disturb us, so long as the fact stands recorded in history, that a large number of transatlantic republics abolished slavery for years before "universal emancipation" was proclaimed from a single throne on the eastern continent. It is true, that all the States of our Union have not adopted measures to free themselves from the evils of domestic servitude ; but it will be time to bring an accu-

sation against us on this ground, when all the earlier offenders against human rights, among the monarchies of the old world, shall have set the example of freedom throughout their various dependencies. As a people, we have doubtless much "to learn," and it may be added, to learn from England; but has she received no instruction from us? Whose institutions and spirit are now operating in producing or encouraging that reforming process, which constitutes an era in British legislation? It may be safely said, that we have each much yet to learn from the other. In this, our own individual opinion is given, against that boasting temper which has been sometimes exhibited by American writers, as if our nation had already not only risen above every other, but had reached the pinnacle of perfection. Our country must suffer in the comparison with some others, in regard to objects realized by greater age, wealth and refinement; but in regard to those which include the most essential elements of prosperity, it would not be arrogant to say, that we are in advance of the rest of the world. We may well be contented with our plain and cheap republicanism, and equal distribution of competence and happiness, notwithstanding the author's glowing panegyric of monarchy.

'So long as a nation's welfare is held to turn upon nothing but its sheer arithmetical interests, a committee or a senate may properly have the charge of them. But if regard is had to those higher and more impulsive principles of national greatness which are in no way to be reduced to mathematical computation, then it is found, and especially so in extensive empires, that monarchy, with its attendant splendors,—monarchy, vivified by the free exercise of large prerogatives, and reared on the shoulders of an illustrious nobility,—monarchy, not born yesterday, and the creature of the populace, but the child of time, and the favorite of history,—such a monarchy forms a center of feeling, and imparts movement to sentiments of the highest importance, and which have little play within the dead machinery of a republic.' p. 139.

And if our author's theory, respecting the intimate and necessary connection between monarchy and episcopacy is correct, it is not the vast majority, either of republicans or religionists, who will feel complimented by the following representations, or prepared for the blessings that are to descend on us as a nation:

'Monarchy and episcopacy may be considered as the forms into which the social system will spontaneously subside: republicanism (in any of its modes) and presbyterianism, are those forms in which we stop short, when we do not think it safe to commit ourselves to the former. The latter is a cautionary proceeding, in which certain acknowledged advantages are foregone, on account of the dangers that attend the enjoyment of them. But could we find the means of averting those

perils, we should then no longer scruple to embrace the benefits of the more natural and efficient method. A limited monarchy, and a well counterpoised Episcopacy, would probably engage the suffrages of a majority of mankind, rather than any modification of the aristocratic, oligarchic, republican, or presbyterian principle.' pp. 137, 138.

2. *The very severe bearing of the work on the dissenters of England*, is no grateful feature of it. They will not fail to appreciate it in this respect, and especially the author's advocacy of a church supported by the *state*. He has become one of its most bold and strenuous defenders, bred up as he was in the midst of dissent. The principles and practices of that order, he treats in a spirit of uncharitableness, which we hardly know how to reconcile with his generally liberal and candid feelings. In respect to several circumstances, particularly the source and derivation of the clerical function, he has charged the dissenting communities of Great Britain with "a capital and very serious departure from apostolic principle and practice." The spirit of the writer on the subject of dissent, or otherwise Congregationalism, is manifested by such paragraphs as the following :

'No rule can be more whimsical or arbitrary, and none much more injurious or illiberal, than that which measures a church by the size of a chamber or a chapel. The energy and expansiveness of christian love disdains and resents any such mathematical restriction. A church is the organized christianity of a certain circle or district, within which actual combination and intercourse may take place. The temper and the usages generated by Congregationalism, have greatly obscured the glory of the gospel, as a principle of extensive fellowship.' p. 132.

'The Wesleyan Methodists and Moravians excepted, the great body of our English dissenters have fallen from Presbyterianism to Congregationalism, and in consequence of renovated party feelings, have been led of late to defend that form of government with warmth. At the very same time the evils and impracticability of this system have been so strongly, though silently, felt, as that several important deviations from it have been attempted. In truth, whenever christianity is in an expanding state, a polity essentially (though not by name) Episcopal, takes place; as for example, in missionary stations, and at home too, where a pastor is of Episcopal character, and is eminently assiduous and zealous, so as to extend his labors beyond the walls of his chapel. The very pattern of primitive Episcopacy might be pointed to in some of our rural districts, where a mother Congregational church has, under the laborious care of its pastor, surrounded itself with dependent chapels, scattered over a district of seven or ten miles diameter. All that is wanting in such cases, is ingenuousness enough not to inveigh against the name—bishop, while Episcopacy is actually used.

Again; conscious of the fault of their principles, individuals among
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the Congregational dissenters have labored, time after time, to establish some sort of organization of the body, for the management of their common interests. But neither ministers nor people, generally, are as yet prepared to yield what is indispensable to the rendering such unions—*unions* indeed, or for making them effective, in any considerable degree. Besides, it is little more than the political well-being of the body that could come under the cognizance of a metropolitan committee; and even in relation to these, wide disagreements prevent the concentration of the will of the body. The very principle of these communities repels organization, and so strong a feeling of jealousy toward every species of *extended* authority pervades them, that no sooner is any scheme advanced which might ripen into an efficient general government, than it draws upon itself universal dislike.

Considered in its relation to the pastors, individually, the Congregational system is, in one word,—the people's polity, framed or adhered to, for the purpose of circumscribing clerical power within the narrowest possible limits, and of absolutely excluding any exertions of authority, such as the high English temper could not brook. The minister of the meeting-house or chapel is—one against all. His neighboring brethren may listen in sympathy to his complaints, but they can seldom yield him succor: to attempt to interfere, might be to dislodge him at once from his position. No adjustment of ecclesiastical powers can leave a smaller balance in the hands of the pastor.' pp. 289—291.

The extract which we give below, follows the author's disclaimer of any intention of making an injurious or an exaggerated impression of facts; as also his commendation of the dissenters in certain points of view.

'But their opposition to the established church has deeply injured them; it has set them wrong, very far, in polity and principles; it has infected them in no small degree, with a politico-religious fanaticism; and especially it has fixed them, almost universally, in a blind confidence of being, on all points, "in the right," a confidence which precludes a modest and wise consideration of principles, and leaves scarcely a hope of their entertaining those serious and momentous inquiries concerning the general condition of our modern christianity, which are now called for.' p. 294.

A sort of summary arraignment of dissent, is found in the paragraph which reads as follows:

'We do not then find any where, among the dissenting communities, a system susceptible of universality, or much deserving to be thought of as likely to supersede the Episcopal church. Each of them is attached to certain prejudices,—called "great principles," which keep them sectarian in practice and feeling. Private liberty and personal preferences, are too often set above considerations of public utility; the necessity of concession, of compromise, and of submission to authority, is not admitted: especially the christian duty and solemn obligation of

preserving union, is but faintly seen. The sin of schism stands indeed in the catalogue of vices, for the apostles have placed it there; but an instance hardly ever occurs in which the guilt of schism is allowed to be imputed to separatists. Any reason is deemed reason enough for splitting a society, and for founding a rival church under the eaves of the mother chapel. Congregationalism puts forth its shoots with a too ready exuberance; and our country towns, in very many instances, present what we are required to believe is the apostolic spectacle of christian societies, within gun-shot of each other, and differing in nothing but their grudges, yet preserving little or no fellowship. Bodies acting upon principles of this sort have to learn the rudiments of christian order.' pp. 297, 298.

These, and many other obnoxious charges, will be much more likely to create *dissent* from the author's speculations, than soften the opposition of the dissenters to the English establishment.

3. It comes within the plan of the author to *expose the corruptions of the English church, and to propound several important items of reform*. Against this feature of his work, exceptions will be taken with no less sincerity on the part of the friends of the present establishment, than must happen to American republicans and English dissidents, in respect to portions in which they are depreciated. A reformation as extensive as he desires, would demand a new race of men in the members of the establishment. Indeed, he maintains, in a fearless manner, the inadequacy of the whole Lutheran reformation, and the necessity of achieving a "second reformation, scarcely less important than the first." Strongly as he advocates the church and state system, he is of opinion, that the proposed reforms in the English establishment must be fairly tried, before it can be known whether such a system is in principle wrong and impracticable. He avers, that the enemies of the establishment take an undue advantage of its imperfections or abuses, in arguing against the system itself; thus either blinking the abstract question of its propriety and utility, or mixing it up with extrinsic and accidental circumstances. We may here express our surprise, that the author's discernment did not lead him to infer, that if after so many ages of trial, among so many nations, ecclesiastical establishments cannot be known to be correct in principle, they never will be known,—the evils that have attended them are not affairs of accident, but belong to their very nature. His zeal for reformation, and even his radical turn, (radical in respect to the general principles of social and religious order,) cannot save him from the absurdity of attempting to wash the Ethiopian white. Might he not see, that it is a fruitless labor, and that it is time for the ablution to be performed, if it must be performed, at all, on a difficult and more promising subject? Two or three paragraphs from the book, will give the

reader some idea of the author's feelings on the subject of reform in the English establishment, and indeed of the general purification of Protestant christianity:

‘Much that is felt and thought by the people, in relation to their ministers, is never uttered, or is not uttered by the discreet and moderate, whose opinions deserve respect; and of that which is uttered, a very small portion at any time reaches the ears of the parties concerned. If the heavily beneficed pluralist,—we will suppose him mainly well-intentioned and respectable, (in a low sense of the terms,) could but, as he makes his way on a Sunday morning to the desk, penetrate the bosoms of his flock, and read the involuntary thoughts, not of the profligate and impudent, nor of the illiberal and vulgar, but of the intelligent and right-minded of his parishioners, he would hide his face in his sleeve, or shrink out of view, never again to meet the glance of his silent reprovers. While certain passages of scripture are on the lips of the minister, how pungent a feeling of his inconsistency pervades all minds! Even children, if acquainted with facts, are alive to the enormity of the offense of him, who, calling himself Christ's servant, and professing to deny himself daily, and to take up his cross, and solemnly renouncing the love of this world, and the eagerness of gain, nevertheless loads himself, to suffocation, with unearned church emoluments; and trails after him, as he goes, a long purse, crammed with the price of souls.

A minister of the gospel can labor under no disadvantage heavier than that of an imputation of being mainly impelled by motives of cupidity and wordly ambition. This disgrace would be fatal to the influence of the highest talents, and the most laborious zeal: how fatal then is it to the influence of those who do not belie it by any zeal, or any spontaneous labors! But the incalculable injury occasioned by such instances of sacrilegious selfishness, is by no means confined to the single cases in which it actually appears: if it were so, we might bear with some patience the particular wrong; but in truth, these flagrant examples (too numerous, alas,) affect the popular mind toward the church at large, and weigh against the clergy in mass. The clergy,—at least the beneficed portion of them, whether or not they be sharers in the guilty emoluments, are sure to have their part in the shame and obloquy thence arising. They are supposed to acquiesce in these enormities; they are known to associate with their culprit brethren; and they are thought to be themselves ready to accept a portion of these flagitious gains. Who shall calculate the amount of that deduction from the general salutary influence of the established clergy, which is constantly to be set off on the score of these abuses?

Let interested casuists spend their last grain of wit in excusing pluralities,—the sale of advowsons,—episcopal translations, and those ecclesiastical customs, of every sort, which have one simple motive,—the love of money;—let these apologies be carried a little further; it can be only a little,—for the common-sense and strong feeling of the nation already condemns them. Heaven will declare itself in anger

against them; and their abettors will sink confounded in perpetual shame.' pp. 299—301.

'Let us then candidly admit the serious truth, that what stayed the downfall of the Papacy, three hundred years ago, and what has given it a lengthened life, was certain principles, not yet altogether renounced by ourselves, and the retention of which has turned aside the weapons of our Protestant warfare.

The Lutheran Reformation was a glorious beginning, that waits for its consummation. Had it indeed been complete and consistent in principle and in practice, it would have been universal in its actual spread. The Papacy still lives, and it must live, until Protestantism shall be reformed.

Little difficulty would perhaps now be found in thoroughly dispelling what remains among us of the theoretic portion of the ancient despotism; but some real perplexities attend the clearing away of those notions and usages that have come down from the times immediately succeeding the apostolic age. We are still entangled in the snares woven in the age of Irenæus, Justin Martyr, and Cyprian. The argument for Popery is at present drawn from the authority of those ancient errors; and the weakness of Protestantism comes from the same source. Romanism sucks one breast of the pristine church, Protestantism another; but the milk which nourishes the stomach of the first, sickens that of the last.' p. 248.

4. The author opposes himself to *the influence of the press, especially the periodical press*, as at present "almost the sole medium of party warfare," and as putting to jeopardy some of the most precious interests of religion and society. He has made an effort to disabuse the public of its illusions on this subject, and has ingeniously reasoned the point, that the press does not actually represent the religious community. He has discriminated (with what success we will not pretend to say,) between the leaders and organs of parties and the mass of the people, in respect to those exasperations which obstruct the progress of national religious reform in Great Britain. On this subject he says, in part:

'A distinction like this is to be observed on most occasions of public excitement; but in the present instance a due recollection of it is of peculiar importance, inasmuch as the press, and especially the periodic press, has become almost the sole medium of party warfare. The periodic press not merely governs public sentiment, but it is from this, that the actual complexion of public sentiment is gathered, though incorrectly.

'Nothing, it must be granted, can seem more imprudent than for a writer to call in question those who, under our present literary economy, sit as the masters of his destiny. But the author (not, as he hopes, in the spirit of arrogance,) long ago fixed it in his purpose to incur all hazards while discharging what he thinks his duty. In the present instance he must not conceal his opinion, that what is needed, as preliminary to wholesome measures, is to disengage the public mind (if it might be

done) from the despotism of the periodic press, and to loosen the yoke fastened upon the neck of the people by our newspapers, magazines, and reviews.' p. 18.

He has thrown the gauntlet amidst a formidable array of talent and enterprise; and if he has miscalculated at all the power of periodical literature, he will be made to feel it to his disadvantage.

These general features of the work, stamp upon it no small a degree of peculiarity. As a writer, he has nearly cut himself off from the sympathies of numerous classes, who might otherwise give him at once a favorable and even enthusiastic hearing. He has arrayed himself against American republicans, English dissidents, English anti-reformers, and the makers and lovers of periodic literature. In the exposure of spiritual despotism, he has brought in, besides many who deserve the severe and unsparing detection, many also who would be his most efficient helpers, in putting an end to every sort of despotic influence.

The writer who can do and dare all this, must calculate largely on the justice of his cause, the good-nature of the community, and their superiority to passion and prejudice, or the strength of the logic with which he means to defend his positions. And he evidently does calculate on some or all of these circumstances, as an encouragement to his attempt, or as the ground of anticipated triumph. In the "measurable interval, and often a wide one," which he seems to see between the journal and its readers, he finds the basis on which to plant the foot of his lever. He says, "the author on this occasion challenges the public; and he looks too, with confidence to the *candor* and *generous feelings* of not a few of those to whom, in their public capacity, what he has to say may apply. He appeals then to *readers*, and to those *writers* too, whose employment has not spoiled them as christians and as men." Again, "an appeal is here made to the personal conscientiousness of every christian reader," and to his particular acquaintance with the religious circle in which he moves, while this broad affirmation is advanced,—that the British people, and especially the religious portion of it, is less factious and perverse, is more docile, and more ready to approve of reasonable, conciliatory measures, than it appears to be, when judged of by the spirit and temper of our newspapers, magazines and reviews. The happy, tranquil intercourse of christians in the walks of private life, belies the intemperance of the literary leaders of party." Again, "No man could stand in a nobler or more conspicuous position, than *one who should be able to hold this interference at bay*, (that is, the intervention of sectarian writers,) and to work directly upon the better nature of the christian public."

We will not affect to divine the issue of this open and fearless challenge; but such is our favorable opinion of the talents and spi-

rit of the writer, we will frankly own, that if any one might venture to take such a position, and hope to maintain it, it would be the author of "*Spiritual Despotism*." We believe, however, that it will be found too difficult a task, even for him; and that with all his logical acumen, power of religious analysis, and raciness and vigor of style, he will not bring over to his views, any considerable portion of the community. Thousands will read, and admire, and eulogize, but they will leave the author "alone in his glory." In his general principles of church polity, he will doubtless carry with him the minds of many in the British empire, as being already established in those principles; but to his minute details and plans of reform, with the peculiar radicalism of many of his views, he will, we apprehend, make but few converts. Did we, however, believe in the propriety of any national religious institution under the gospel, we should, of course, prefer one with the limitations which he has prescribed, or with the reforms which he recommends; but this, we are persuaded, would suit few of those who favor an establishment, and is, in all probability, incompatible with the nature of such an institution. It is a purity, which the inherent viciousness of the scheme itself forbids.

Our author, as has already been sufficiently intimated, is a fearless and unsparing advocate of the alliance between church and state. As a part of that system, also, he abets the doctrine of the maintenance of the clergy, and support of religious institutions, through the medium of a legal provision, and scouts the voluntary principle, as it has been called, as a means to that end. The compulsory principle is in his view the only adequate one. As intimately blended with this plan, he favors episcopacy as a form of church government, having by inference at least, the sanction of apostolic practice. At the outset, he endeavors to confute the allegation often made, that these are the sources and means of spiritual despotism. We believe, that he is in the wrong on this point, and that he has labored in vain to prove the contrary position. The remainder of the space, which it may be proper for us to occupy at the present time, we shall devote to a consideration of this subject. We will advert both to the history of the question and to its merits, but briefly as possible.

A deep interest, our readers hardly need be told, is felt at the present moment, particularly in Great Britain, in regard to religious establishments. The subject of reform, in respect to their own establishment, has awakened attention among the English people, to the general doctrine concerning these associations. Not only the character of their own church and state system, but that of any similar alliance of christianity with the civil power, is coming up extensively into view, and questioned or defended, according to the different feelings of those who are interested.

The whole subject is undergoing a deep and thorough discussion. Some of their most eminent writers have appeared on the different sides. They have taken it up as a great general question, on the grounds of scripture, reason and equity. The celebrated Chalmers, after having pleaded so eloquently in behalf of the abandonment of all compulsory assessments for the poor, and in behalf of the sufficiency of a spontaneous benevolence for their support, is now rather inconsistently depreciating the power of the voluntary principle, and insisting on its "inherent and essential weakness." Dr. Bloomfield, the bishop of London, we notice, has taken up his pen in favor of establishments, in a charge and two discourses. The London Quarterly Review, some time since, came out with a spirited and labored article in favor of the church, and against the voluntary system. A series of lectures on the lawfulness of the union of church and state, has been delivered of late, by an eminent clergyman in Edinburgh. These and many other efforts on the part of the friends of a compulsory system in religion, are met with equal talent and temper by the "Voluntaries." A series of lectures, under the patronage of the Glasgow Voluntary Church Society, have been delivered and published in the defense of dissenters and their principles, and in opposition to all ecclesiastical establishments. We notice the names of Wardlaw, Anderson and Heugh, as lecturers appointed by that society, and they seem to have acquitted themselves well of their task. The hour is felt, by both parties, to be extremely critical in respect to the religion, and through that to the constitution, of the empire.

As Americans, we have not the same, or an equal interest in this subject, though we have an interest of some sort. The influence of English christianity is felt, more or less, here, and throughout every part of the civilized world. Our author thinks, that it may be said, without national vanity, that "the moral and spiritual renovation of all countries is involved in the religious and civil well-being of the British empire." There is a degree of truth, no doubt, in this observation. So far, then, as a moral and religious influence is concerned, we are interested in this strife of opinion, and in its results. We are, indeed, untrammelled with civil establishments of christianity. Those regulations, formerly in some of the individual states of this Union, which approached to an alliance of the church with the state, or which involved, in some measure, the principle, were adopted under circumstances very different from any that now exist among us. Those circumstances respected the period of the first settlement of the pilgrims on these shores, the fact, that they were all of one faith, and the doubt whether they were not to be considered more as churches than civil communities. The change of circumstances, with more or

less delay, suggested the necessity of dispensing with the original form in which christianity and its institutions were to be supported, and they now universally stand on a footing which is consistent with equal rights, and with the freedom of our forms of government. We give to no sect or name of christians the sanction and support of governmental measures, whether by the individual states, or the Union. All the various religionists are secured in their equal immunities and privileges, and the attempt is now never made, by legislation, to determine which is the more correct sect. The phantom conjured up by the author of the work under review,—that if the government of a country does not take the religion of the gospel under its fostering care, it must assume a hostile attitude in relation to it, is not realized in this country, or in any part of it. To place christianity under its patronage, would be to favor all the various sects of it, however far many of them may be removed from its fundamental principles. This plan is justly liable to the objection, that it affords the positive sanction and influence of the nation, to the encouragement of the worst, equally with the best, forms of religion. Doubtless, under the system which, until lately, was in operation in a sister state, the cause of error has been advanced, by means of the legal obligation binding on all, to support the institutions of religion, apportioned and applied, indeed, to those forms of christian faith which each preferred. Left wholly to voluntary exertions, it is the friends of evangelical piety only, whose self-denial and zeal are equal to the vigorous and adequate support of religious institutions. Many there are, who, if legally obliged to pay for the support of the gospel, would perversely choose, that their quota should go to the maintenance of erroneous forms of christianity, rather than of those which are correct; thus giving a positive sanction to heresy and wickedness, where otherwise they only give a negative one.

How long the present state of things, in respect to religious institutions in this country, may continue, is known only to the Omniscient. Identified as it is with the structure of our government, the importance, that it should be prolonged to the latest period, is inconceivably great. It is a point which deserves to be well looked to, and guarded with the utmost jealousy. Under our circumstances, freedom, knowledge, virtue, religion, order and happiness, are indissolubly connected with a separation of the church from the state. It is believed, that none of the more considerable of the Protestant sects among us, either from temper or conviction, would care to be associated with the government as the favorite religion; and it is certain, that no one would be permitted by the rest, to become such, if it chose to be. But there is a body of religionists among us, who, from their foreign predilec-

tions and long cherished principles,—who, from all their past history, and from their natural coalescence with despotisms, would like, through the change of our institutions, to put themselves in power, and assert their ancient domination over the faith and faculties of men. There is too much evidence to doubt, that their aims and measures are directed to such ulterior results. In view of a possible evil of this nature, the subject of ecclesiastical establishments, cannot be without its interest to Americans. Is it not to be hoped, that so much light may be shed upon this topic, as that it will be always seen, that religion acts with the most efficiency, when left to its own inherent energies, under its own almighty patron? Undoubtedly this will be a free government, and there will be no state-endowed church, until the numerical superiority shall be on the side of the Catholics. Is it not worthy of every effort, that under the providence of God, and consistently with his will, such an event may be indefinitely delayed?

The relation of religion to the civil government of a nation, whatever that relation may be, is in itself a matter of deep interest; at least it ought to be so considered. It is a question which involves important views of divine truth. A correct conception of the kingdom of Christ, or the profession, support and propagation of his gospel, is next to the views which it is proper to take of the essential *doctrines* of his religion. If we mistake the nature of his kingdom on earth, an effect will be produced on “the whole practical working of the principles of his mediatorial administration, in subserviency to its present efficacy, its progressive advancement, and its final triumph.” The question, therefore, which is now so interesting to Britons, is not without its importance in itself.

Different kinds of ecclesiastical establishments are spoken of in this controversy, and may indeed be supposed to exist; but to every form of national christianity, three things, according to Paley, are essential. “1. A clergy, or an order of men secluded from other professions, to attend upon the services of religion. 2. A legal provision for the maintenance of the clergy. 3. The confining of that provision to the teachers of a particular sect of christianity.” This is considered comparatively low ground, and widely different from the *alliance* maintained by Warburton. Of course it is favorable to the party who maintain the propriety of establishments, and may be adduced as a correct definition of the term. Some theories, however, have been broached of late, doubtless with the view of divesting the thing of its obnoxious features, according to which there may be a connection between church and state, when there is no state endowment. Among others, the Rev. Mr. Cunningham, of Edinburgh, is said to have taken that ground, and thence argued at length in favor of a na-

tional christianity. If establishments of religion had been nothing more than this, "the necessity," as Dr. Wardlaw remarks, "would be removed, of all dispute about the respective claims to preference of the voluntary, or the compulsory system of provision for the maintenance of christian ordinances, inasmuch as the latter would have no existence." It is pertinent to observe, that there may be a relation, and a friendly relation, between the church and the state, that is, between christians and the government under which they live,—there may be a harmonious movement between them, the government being conducted according to christian principles, and the agents of it being themselves the members of Christ's spiritual community. There ought to be such a relation, and we should rejoice to see it in perfection, in this country, as well as every other. But so long as the government of a nation does not take the church, or any particular sect, under its patronage and pecuniary support, it is certainly unincumbered with an establishment. To talk of an establishment without an endowment, is to talk nonsense. It is a theoretic vision about which there can be no dispute. If any thing is essential to an union of church and state, as securing the object of universal instruction, it is the pecuniary provision which the state brings to the church. Of such a character ecclesiastical establishments always have been, and always will be, if they are to exist at all. This legal support may indeed be distributed variously, that is to say, either among all the denominations of christians which exist within the nation, as is done in France; or it may be limited, according to Paley's definition above given, to one denomination, denying it to others, as is the case in England, and most European states. These, properly speaking, are *exclusive civil establishments of religion*.

Are these right, either according to scripture, or in the nature of things? Are they necessary or beneficial, and especially as connected with that form of christianity with which they have almost always been identified, viz., Episcopacy and a sacerdotal hierarchy? This is the question which divides so many minds, at present, in Great Britain, and which, as above seen, is no indifferent matter in itself or prospectively to us Americans. National establishments of religion have been advocated on the following grounds, among others, viz., the inefficiency of the voluntary principle in the history of the antediluvian world,—the countenance given to the union of church and state, and to the support of the former by the latter, in the case of Melchisedec,—the divine authority for such union and such support from the constitution of the Jewish church,—the corrupting influence of the voluntary principle in the early period of christianity,—and finally, the dictates of natural reason, or certain maxims of human wisdom and policy, applicable to the subject. Our author does not, indeed,

dwell on all these topics, but they have been insisted on in this controversy, and in noticing the general course of argumentation, it may be proper to touch upon each one, and, so far as it can be done in a few paragraphs, to estimate the individual or collective value.

The argument from the *alleged insufficiency of the voluntary principle in the antediluvian world*, may be dismissed with a single remark or two. It cannot be seriously relied upon. As it supposes, that the corruption of those times might have been prevented or stayed, through a compulsory process for upholding religion, an egregious mistake must have been made, from some quarter, in this concern. A charge of this kind will not, of course, be brought against God, who could, if he had pleased, have given the human race such an institution. But this, it is acknowledged, he did not do. Man, then, was in the fault for not availing himself of the only effectual method, according to the argument, of preserving religion in the world. What, then, becomes of that natural reason, which, as is also pretended, suggests the necessity of religious establishments? Besides, had man adopted the scheme, would it have been any thing more than his own,—a human suggestion? Would it have had, therefore, any authority to bind the conscience? And, furthermore, who could have been assured beforehand, under such circumstances, that the device would have answered the purpose? That sinning race were sufficiently in fault for misimproving the means which they actually enjoyed, such as the prophesying of Enoch, and the preaching of Noah, without supposing them reprehensible, for not discovering, by the light of nature, the best or only possible method of counteracting human depravity.

It is easy, also, to dispose of the *argument from the case of Melchisedec*, in favor of establishments of religion, and the mode of its support. It is an incident in the scriptural history strangely pressed into the service. All we know of the purport or design of the original record, is derived from an inspired allusion to it, in two instances, from which it appears, that it has really nothing to do with religious establishments. All that the inspired commentary teaches us to believe concerning the account, aside from the fact which it embodies, is, that it is designed to exhibit Melchisedec, as one of the most eminent types of Christ. If the lawfulness of the union between church and state is inferred from the fact, that in the person of Melchisedec, the functions of royalty and the priesthood were united, then it would appear, that they may be united in the persons of christian kings. But this is not claimed, though the inference, if authorized at all, demands nothing less. It affords countenance to no other union, and the example has no relevancy, except to the precise case in view. We may, however, reject the inference altogether. It is traveling too far out of the

record, to find in it the shadow of a hint, furnishing us with a rule respecting our conduct, in ecclesiastical or civil concerns. We can expect from so obscure and peculiar a case, no farther light than that which is supplied by the Pauline commentary. If, moreover, ecclesiastical establishments are not symbolized or countenanced, by the junction of the priestly and kingly offices in the person of Melchisedec, then the justification of the *mode* of their support, derived from this case, of course falls to the ground. The giving of tithes on the part of Abraham, to this priest of the Most High God, could it be made to apply to so foreign a purpose as religious establishments, would prove the opposite to a compulsory process, to be the only correct one. All the precedent which it would furnish, is in favor of the voluntary principle, since it was merely a free-will offering on the part of the patriarch, dictated by the spirit of religion. There was no compulsion, but the promptings of pious and benevolent zeal,—the only basis known in scripture, of any tithe-giving, under any dispensation.

The constitution of the Jewish church has been extensively advocated, by the friends of a church and state system, as giving a divine sanction to such a system, under the christian dispensation, in christian communities. To this, several replies may be given, each of which, it is believed, is sufficient to set aside the argument thus urged in favor of establishments.

1. The Jewish constitution having been instituted by Jehovah for special purposes, is incapable of being imitated under different circumstances, and of course was never intended to be so imitated. It was a *theocracy*, the Deity himself being the supreme head of the ecclesiastical and civil government of the nation. The theocratic character of the government, was not a circumstantial difference in respect to that nation, but it was essential and elementary. Whenever there appears another theocracy, it will be time to talk of a national establishment of religion, as it can never be safely inferred, that because a theocracy admitted or demanded such an establishment, a human and consequently imperfect government admits or demands the same. An imitation of such a government, on the part of man, is plainly an impossibility. It is a divine government, set up for peculiar purposes, and requires the divine action in its administration. Hence it was in regard to the Jews, that the sins which they committed against God, and the crimes which they committed against the state, were identified, and in many instances were alike punishable, by statute. This can be rightfully done under no other government, and yet the fearful mistake has been made, of confounding the theocracy of Israel with ordinary human governments. It is on this ground, that those ecclesiastical polities have been reared, which have marred the beauty and corrupted the purity of religion, from age

to age. Nay more, the fires of persecution have been kindled on this altar; and because God might punish idolaters, with his righteous judgments, man has ventured to consign to the dungeon and the rack, his unbelieving or his dissenting brother. If the author of *Spiritual Despotism* did not mean to justify modern ecclesiastical establishments, at least as to that which is essential to them, by a reference to the Jewish polity, and by holding up the imitation of that polity as desirable, some good use may be made of a remark of his on the subject,—certainly it may be considered as harmless. “It will be strange indeed,” he says, “if a combination of religious and secular elements, molded by the very hand of God, should be found to yield to our modern eyes no instruction, or none of practical import. Far from admitting so irreverent a supposition, we should boldly advance the principle, that the Mosaic sacerdotal institute, stripped of whatever was special and temporary, and reduced to its pure ideal or abstract value, would furnish the best possible ground-work of a national religious polity; and it may be readily shown, that no permanent or universal rule of the christian dispensation prohibits the use it might seem expedient to make of such a pattern.” But as the compulsory character of modern religious state institutions, cannot comport with his pure ideal, a reference to the Jewish polity can be of very little service to his cause, whatever instruction it may yield, as will soon be seen, to the friends of the voluntary system.

2. God had a design connected with the conservation of the true religion in the world, to make and keep the Israelites a distinct community. This is evident from the sacred page, and from the whole history of that people. All their institutions, whether civil or religious, had respect, therefore, to such a purpose. These were intended to separate them from every other community. Their sacred rites and ceremonies, from the most important to the most minute, were so shaped as to have a tendency to secure that end. They had a national and exclusive cast. They were not adapted to the condition of mankind at large, like the institutions of christianity, but they served to cherish and preserve an unaccommodating nationality of feeling and character. No conclusion, then, can be more unsafe than that which would lead us to believe, that because a nation which was raised up and sustained for such a special purpose, had an ecclesiastical establishment, in connection with their civil administration, therefore other nations,—christian nations,—were required or permitted to have the same. Let so peculiar an object be shown to have place in the existence of any particular nation, and we shall then have the warrant for a national religious system, similar to that of the ancient Israelites. Let the important, though temporary purpose appear, as it did in their case, and the right is allowed, or the privilege is accorded, on

the acknowledged force of scriptural example. But nothing less than a similarity of condition, in this respect, can justify an attempt at imitation, unless it be accompanied by an express permission. Evils, and great evils, arose through the perverseness of the people, under their national institution, notwithstanding it was divinely appointed. Perhaps, the form of their religion, like the religion itself, was necessarily imperfect, compared with the religion by which it was designed to be followed. According to the decisions of the divine wisdom, we must infer, that it was the best, that the circumstances of the age, or the character of the people would allow ; but not the best in itself, or for other times and other nations. Certainly, its unique purpose must have been the great reason of its appointment. A religion for the world, requires a form which will adapt itself to all the world.

3. While the example of the Jewish national institute is pleaded, in favor of establishments among christian communities, it is well known, that none of those establishments are conformed to their model. From what has already been said, this, indeed, must be impracticable, because, in its most essential part, it never was intended for a pattern. God was its immediate head and administrator. But in the human and safer features of that religious system, it might be copied, though it could not be as a whole ; and why it is not copied in those respects, while the whole is pleaded as authority, is left for the friends of establishments to tell. The compulsory plan, which enters into the very essence of these constitutions in christian countries, was, strictly speaking, unknown to Judaism. This obnoxious system of a state-christianity, is anti-religious, even in the light of that common ancestral, though, in some respects, severe religion. The system of *tithe-paying*, was not the system of the Jewish church. The Jewish tithe-law was obligatory as a religious duty, but it was enforced by no temporal forfeiture. It was binding in the same sense that prayer, for instance, or the remembrance of "the stranger, the fatherless, or the widow," was binding, and the violation of it was guilt in the sight of God, but never exposed the offender to a mulct, or any punishment from the hand of man. For this opinion, several satisfactory reasons might be given, but it will be sufficient to say, that in all the history of that people, there is no evidence that they were subjected among themselves, to any thing like a personal or domestic assessment, with a view to forcible collection of taxes. For religious and charitable uses, they often contributed beyond the amount of their tithe, and were commended for their liberality. But even if we are mistaken on this subject, and the payment of the Jewish tithe might be enforced by a seizure of goods, or other violence, the advocates of establishments are bound to prove, that this law is obligatory in christian times,—a task which they will not soon

accomplish. Certainly, as a rule of proportion, the tithe of produce can never be sustained by fair reasoning. The author of the work under review, judiciously observes, "that nothing can be more preposterous than the argumentative use, that has been so often made of the Mosaic institution in this particular," that is, as to the tithe. "Let a tenth of the rents and income of any community, be taken and shared among all the professions, the clergy taking only their proportion of this tithe, and then the procedure will bear some analogy to the Jewish tithe-system," and this because the priests and Levites sustained a combination of civil and sacred functions.

4. The proper consequent to the national church of Israel, was a kingdom or community of spiritual subjects, out of all nations, under the direct superintendence of Christ. This, theoretically, would seem to be the necessary and intended issue. This is the only national religion, embracing the community of nations, and such appears to have been actually the divine intention. The wisdom and mercy of God ordained, that when the purposes of the Mosaic economy should be answered, and "the fulness of the time was come," and the nations were prepared for the blessing, the world at large should be opened to the rays of truth. The wall that separated Israel from the nations was to be thrown down, and the field was to become the world, out of which was to be gathered the Israel of God. "My kingdom," said Christ, "is not of this world." He designed his church to be a spiritual kingdom, "maintained and propagated by its own subjects, and its own resources, *in* the world, but not *of* the world, unindebted to earthly powers, uncontaminated by earthly alliances." All of every nation who believed in Jesus, and received the truth,—all of whatever name, or character, or language, who experienced the converting grace of God, were to constitute his kingdom. This was "the holy nation, the peculiar people," who were to succeed the national church-state of the Israelites. Prophecy declared the coming of such a period, and the early records of christianity, in the days of the apostles, showed, that it then began to be fulfilled.

5. This was that which actually took place. In the primary constitution of the new testament church, there was an actual departure from the Jewish model, in respect to its nationality. The system was wholly changed, the former having been abolished and done away. That this was the fact, appears from the declaration of our Savior, already alluded to, respecting the nature of his kingdom, from his own conduct in setting up his kingdom, and from the conduct and declarations of his disciples, subsequently to his ascension. In regard to the new testament church, they taught, especially by their practice, the universality of its fellowship, and

also its independence of state support. Their reliance for the support of christian institutions was on their own body. In view of these peculiarities, the new testament church was wholly divested of an individual, national character. Indeed, this fact is conceded by the advocates of the establishment and compulsory principle, in most instances. This concession appears, in their reasonings, and likewise in express declarations. For instance, it has been urged, as a reason why the religious system of Christ and his apostles was not conformed to its Jewish model, in respect to its nationality, that it *could not* be so conformed, under the circumstances that existed in their day; and that a concurrence of propitious events, some three centuries afterwards, was necessary, in order to effect what was supposed to have been agreeable to the divine will on this subject. A poor reason, truly, when Omnipotence had the direction of affairs, and could incline the heart of any heathen prince as well as that of Constantine, to take the church under his protection, and when in the inspired records of the first history of christianity, nothing is said of such a prospective contrivance in aid of Christ's kingdom. It has also been urged, and that by the author under review, in favor of a state ecclesiastical polity, and the compulsory system, that the different order of things, which existed in the first periods of christianity, was the source of those evils which at length overwhelmed the church. This argument in favor of establishments will soon be noticed,—the existence of it of course is based on the change of the Jewish religious polity, when the christian dispensation was introduced. Notwithstanding these admissions, and the facts on which they are founded,—facts which none will deny, for who doubts that christianity was left to its own resources at first, without the aid of earthly governments, and even with their opposition; yet some have been disposed to argue, that inasmuch as the national polity of the Jews was never expressly revoked, it was binding at the era of christianity. The fact that it was not so revoked, is inferred as proving its moral obligation, since all christians agree, that the ceremonial law was abolished by the authority which appointed it. But of what consequence is it to infer, that the national constitution of the Jewish church, and the system of tithes by which it was supported, was morally obligatory; when Christ and his apostles did not incorporate the new religion with any state polity, and when it was as effectually done away by their conduct and example, as it could be by their declaration? It was no part of the moral law, if Christ and his apostles did not introduce it into their religious system. Their practice was the revocation of the ancient order of things, in this particular, and the evidence that this order was unessential or ceremonial.

The argument in favor of the establishment, and compulsory
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principle, derived from the alledged *corrupting influence of the voluntary system, in the early period of christianity*, has been strenuously insisted on, especially by the author of *Spiritual Despotism*. We have just alluded to his opinion on this subject, with a view to show, that this was the conceded principle on which the support of the gospel kingdom was placed at the beginning. His reasoning against it, under these circumstances, is not more unsound than it is presumptuous.

‘A balance of evils, and a compromise of advantages, has attached to every scheme of clerical maintenance hitherto devised. If the provision has been at once ample, and independent of the popular will, sloth, pride, and secularity, have crept upon those to whom mankind should look up for patterns of purity and heavenly-mindedness. On the other hand, it has always been seen, and the history of early christianity affords the most striking exemplification of the truth, that when church revenues flow from the precarious liberality of the people, and are altogether undefined, exaggerations of doctrine, perversions of morality, superstitions, mummeries, hypocrisies, usurpations, cruelties, gain ground, not always slowly, until priests and people,—the church and the state, are thoroughly infected with the worst sort of corruption,—religious corruption.

If we wish to see what is now vauntingly termed, the voluntary principle, fully evolved, and ripened under a summer heat, we have only to turn to the Papacy,—the produce of the voluntary principle, with its spiritual debauchery and its tyranny, its lying miracles, its lying mendicity, its lying sanctity, such as we find in the tenth century: the gospel utterly darkened, the civil authority trampled in the dust, the people bound in fetters of fear and ignorance, and the clergy transmuted into swine, or into wolves: these were the fruits of that system which leaves the priest to set his own price upon the spiritual goods he dispenses among the people.

What has happened once, may happen again; and will do so under like circumstances. We need not draw upon imagination in conceiving of the natural course of events, and the operation of common principles. The church, we may suppose, instead of being befriended by the state, is barely tolerated, or perhaps oppressed. The clerical body, including as it may, many high-minded and disinterested individuals, is yet, as a body, (what body is not?) actuated by the ordinary motives of our nature, and tends therefore, with a silent and steady momentum, toward its corporate aggrandizement, its wealth, its ease, its credit, and its secure enjoyment of special prerogatives. Every corporation shifts itself, if it be possible, from precarious ground, and moves toward that which is firm. If then the state does not lend its aid in this endeavor of the clergy to substantiate their honors and revenues, a resource will be found of another sort, and the minds of the people will be worked upon with a proportionate eagerness, in order to make sure of their subserviency. Exaggerated doctrines will supply the place of legal provisions.’ pp. 44, 45.

‘Theories apart, and the lessons of experience duly regarded; or, in other words, church history looked into for practical uses, there appears reason to distrust what is termed the voluntary principle in relation to church revenues, on the two opposite grounds, of its inadequacy, and its exuberance; or its sluggishness in some respects, and its extravagance in others. During one and the same period, and within one and the same circle, this mode of maintaining the clergy has failed to propagate and to support christianity; and yet has suffocated piety by its profusion; it has been not less niggardly, than prodigal.

If we desire, as undoubtedly we ought, to stimulate this power in a safe manner, and to turn it into auspicious channels, we should form a sober and exact estimate of its real efficiency, and of its necessary limits.’ This estimate can be formed on no other ground than that of experience; and if the hollow croaking voice of antiquity will not gain our ear, we must turn to facts under our eye. These (as we assume) make it evident that a capital, and, as it seems, an irremediable defect attaches to the voluntary principle, first, in relation to the classes of the community it affects; and secondly, in relation to the purposes to which it may be made to apply.’ pp. 49, 50.

‘In truth, to preserve, for any length of time, and in its absolute simplicity and purity, the principle of clerical support, by the immediate and undefined gratuities of the people, is what no communion has been able to effect: nor can we even imagine the means of doing so. But when once this pristine simplicity has given way, as it soon must, in part, or entirely, to a **FINANCIAL SYSTEM**, and has admitted accumulations, endowments, and corporate possessions, then a very fair question presents itself, namely, whether an irregular, an anomalous method, open to undefined abuses, may not, with high advantage, as well to the people as to the clergy, be exchanged for a legal provision. To oppose such an exchange on the pretext of primitive purity and abstract principle, must be deemed equally disingenuous and illogical, when the objection comes from those who make no scruple of accepting bequests, of retaining endowments, of accumulating funds, or of renting the area of a chapel. To demand payment for so many square inches of a bench or pew, is a practice as little apostolic as to demand a tithe.’ pp. 110, 111.

‘We are perpetually hearing from certain quarters, of the first political establishment of christianity as the fatal blow which brought the true church to the ground, and laid her celestial honors in the dust. A mistake indeed! Beside that christianity was then already deeply stained with earthly impurities, it may, on the most substantial grounds, be affirmed, that it was the want of a well-devised church and state system,—the want of an establishment, which made the revolution at court in favor of christianity, extensively and lastingly injurious to the christian commonwealth. Adhering still to the line of probability, we may easily imagine a system which would have given a new turn to the fortunes of the church, (if the phrase may be allowed,) would have arrested the papal usurpation, would have broken up the concentration of spiritual powers, would have starved the monastery, (a discipline which the pro-

fessors of extreme abstemiousness ought to have meekly received,) would have destroyed the marketable quality of superstition, and, in a word, would have reduced church corruption and ambition within some limits of modesty and reason.' pp. 198, 199.

We cannot follow our author in the many remarks he has submitted on this subject. The paragraphs above presented, show, in a few points, the ground which he assumes. Our limits prevent a particular notice even of these. We would only rebut his general argument in favor of establishments, and the legal pecuniary provisions connected with them, drawn from the state of things in the first ages of the church, by offering the following naked suggestions; reserving for another head, some remarks on the true character of the voluntary principle, and Congregationalism, its natural ally.

1. The first teachers of christianity could not be mistaken, as to the best and most proper method of supporting its ministry and its institutions. They adopted the voluntary principle, and neither allied religion with the civil government, nor depended on it for patronage and influence. They allowed no interference of the magistrate with the Redeemer's spiritual kingdom. As inspired men, acting under its divine Head, they were its only legislators. In devolving the care of the church on their successors, they devolved it on those who were *of* the church. To its members, as such, were its regulations committed. This must be acknowledged to be the fact, by all who are acquainted with the inspired record of the doings of the primitive christian teachers.

2. It is to be supposed, that the mode at first adopted would continue, unless intimations were given to the contrary. If a subsequent change had been contemplated as desirable and necessary, would it not have been divinely suggested or predicted? Would not some circumstances or events in divine providence have been mentioned, as indicating the time or manner of the intended change? The substitution of christianity for Judaism, with many particulars of the change, was a subject of prophetic intimation; and if the form of christianity was necessarily imperfect in its bearing, the certainty and the season of its improvement, could also have been infallibly pointed out. It would seem, that divine wisdom would have dictated such a course, had a change been contemplated; but such a course it did not dictate. The kingdom of Christ was established in entire independence of the civil power, and nothing is gathered from the statute-book of our religion, to show that the case was ever to be otherwise.

3. In this state of things, what earthly power,—what prince or sovereign, is authorized to tamper with the church, and to place its support on a new foundation,—a foundation altogether different

from that on which it was placed, by its heaven-directed founders ! For, however much the rulers of nations may aid religion, and are bound to aid it, by their personal holiness, and the influence they may legitimately exert by means of their station, yet they have nothing to do with it in the way of civil enactments. It is not the concern of the state, as such, to regulate the interests of religion. The province of the state, strictly speaking, is limited to civil matters. Magistrates, in their official capacity, may not expound, modify or reform the articles of religious belief. They may not interpose in directing the ordinances, or executing the discipline, or exacting the dues of the church. All such matters are evidently foreign to their jurisdiction. Constantine, although he did right in tolerating christianity and declaring it a lawful religion,—an act of justice which ought to have been done to that religion from its very commencement,—yet in taking it under his patronage and legislating in behalf of its interests, interfering in its internal concerns, and in some instances, persecuting the heretics of the day, found no warrant in the word of God for this part of his conduct.

4. It will not be believed, that the mere fact of the change of christianity to a state-supported religion, is any indication of its accordance with the divine will, or with the spirit of its own precepts. If this principle were assumed in the present case, it would justify all the wrongs that have ever been committed, whether with or without the pretence of a scriptural warrant. It is a matter of gratitude to God, that the persecutions of christians ceased in consequence of the event here alluded to, and that the prince of an empire, if he was sincere in his profession, became a christian ; but in that, as to which he exceeded his commission and jeopardized the interests of the church, he is obnoxious to merited censure, whatever may have been his intentions.

5. If the union of church and state was a desideratum at all, why should three centuries have elapsed before the event was brought about,—the evils arising from the opposite state of things increasing throughout the whole period ? Why should superstitions and corruptions of doctrine in the church,—why should the usurpations of the bishop of Rome, have been suffered to rise to such a height, that, according to the opinion of our author, even the power of Constantine was probably inadequate to produce the necessary reform ? Would the divine wisdom have deferred so long the desired consummation, with so little prospect too, of answering the purpose, when the result might have been brought about with far greater ease and certainty, some age or two before ? In this view of the subject, it looks still more clear, that the act of Constantine was never entitled to the divine approbation.

6. The alliance of religion with the state, when it took place, did

not diminish the evils complained of. On the contrary, it contributed greatly to their increase. This is the ample and decided testimony of ecclesiastical history; but we have not space to adduce particular instances. The tribulations of the church, as often as they occurred, had served to restrain its corruptions in a measure: but evils poured in apace when no such barrier was interposed. The spirit of the world at once deeply infected the christian body. Ambition, sensuality, and all the baser passions, were supplied with the unrestricted means of gratification. The hierarchy rose to power, and constantly increased its pretensions and usurpations. And finally persecution, after the example of Pagan Rome, was employed, with a view to effect a conformity to the creed or usages of a dominant party in the church. All this is readily accounted for, on the principles by which depraved human nature is governed. The professors of christianity, as a body, had attained to security,—they enjoyed the sunshine of imperial favor,—and the sword, moreover, was put into their hands, with the consequent power of extending and establishing the principles, which they thought proper to inculcate. By this means was the degradation of the church hastened, and the darkness of ten miserable centuries gathered over its path. All this mischief we know is ascribed by the author before us, to “the working of the voluntary machine,” as its source. The evil, in his opinion, commenced extremely early. The germ of the subsequent corruption was visible soon after the age of the apostles, and its expansion and growth, he thinks, were scarcely hastened by what we must nevertheless call the hot-bed process of state alliance. Constantine, in our author’s view, instead of carrying the establishment principle too far, stopped short of that application of state power which the true interests of the church required. Had he framed a wisely balanced church and state system, supposing he was able to do it, and had he restrained the voluntary principle within moderate bounds, or put an end to it altogether, all might have done well. It would not, indeed, be easy to tell how far the degeneracy of the church might have extended, so long as she was unaided by the government of the Roman empire; but it would not be difficult to say, that in some of its forms, it must have been checked by the persecutions of that government, and that there would have been little danger of its advance in general, by the mere fact of the toleration of christianity. It was the possession of power, after it had been a persecuted religion, that operated so signally to its disadvantage, and to the misery of the world. The sword, at the command of the ecclesiastical body, was necessary to extend or consummate the worst designs of the papacy,—its tyranny and lust of dominion. The sword made it the creature that it afterwards proved to be, “drunken with the blood of the saints.” Without

that, it would have effected little, in the way of bringing the nations under its corrupting influence. The voluntary principle, in itself, did nothing in introducing such a state of things. With the peculiar causes that were at work, there would have been a deterioration of the church, whether with or without the voluntary principle; but the crisis was hastened by the alliance of the church with the state. Had that event been earlier, it would be easy to see, that spiritual despotism and corruption would have been sooner consummated. The voluntary principle, no doubt, may be abused and perverted: circumstances may exist, that shall give it an unhappy direction. Too little or too much church revenue, may then be the result. Too great irregularity may mark its pecuniary contributions. But the possibility of such a result, constitutes no justification of a compulsory provision for the maintenance of the gospel, so long as our Savior and his apostles neither set the example, nor enjoined the propriety, of seeking the aid of civil enactments. Our author may believe, if he pleases, that the insecurity felt by preachers of the gospel, in respect to their support, if it flow not from the treasury of the state, will lead them generally into exaggerations of doctrine, perversions of morality, and the like, for the purpose of commanding the contributions of the people, and that it actually had this effect in the first ages of christianity: yet we must be allowed to say, that no such result, under the operation of the same principle, is realized in the experience of our own times and country. The fact, that such evils took place in the primitive church, is no proof that they attach to the system of support which was then adopted. Those evils arose from a different source. They were connected with peculiar circumstances, such as may never occur again. Some of them can never occur a second time. Christianity was then an untried religion, having sprung up amidst an infinite preponderance of evil principles in the world. The philosophy and polytheism of antiquity occupied the field of thought, and filled the hearts of men with their pernicious influence. These were all arrayed against the heavenly stranger. A decaying empire, too, with which the earthly fortunes of the gospel were connected, gave to it the appearance of a premature decrepitude. Learning on the decline, and a growing distaste of intellectual pursuits, denied to the gospel the means of exhibiting its form and features, or developing its internal spirit, to advantage. With every other valuable interest of this kind, it was thrown into the shade. And, finally, the irruptions of barbarism upon the domains and relics of civilization, fixed the church, as it did the world, in a condition of most pitiable and long continued imbecility.

Appeals to the *natural reason or common sense of mankind*,—to certain *principles of human wisdom and policy*, conceived to

be applicable in the case before us, and derived from the analogy of civil life,—have finally been made in behalf of ecclesiastical establishments, and particularly, in connection with them, in behalf of the Episcopal form of church government. Little justice can be done to so extended a topic, in the conclusion of our remarks; but as various considerations, aside from the scriptures and the history of ancient times, have been urged in favor of such a plan of maintaining the kingdom of Christ in the world, and been much relied on, it may be proper to notice a few of the more important of those considerations, presenting, at the same time, our views more particularly of the opposite plan. Our author speaks with his usual decision, on the points before us. The following are specimens of his views and reasonings:

‘We assume then that christians, near to each other, are not to constitute many churches, but one church,—let the chapels in which they happen to assemble be five, or five hundred. As a matter of history, no question can be raised respecting the combination of christians in cities and districts during the primitive ages. We hear little or nothing of the unimportant circumstance of the particular buildings or chambers in which congregations met; but we know, beyond doubt, that, until the seamless vesture of Christ was rent by angry spirits, the brethren of every city, and its suburbs, formed one communion, and ate of one loaf, and were led and ruled by one staff. There was one center and one circumference; or rather, one fold and one shepherd. Our modern chapel-economy, which makes each congregation a church, with its bishop, assuredly was not known at Jerusalem, at Cæsarea, at Antioch, at Carthage, at Alexandria. There were indeed the churches of Galatia; and there was a church in a house, where that house could contain all the faithful of the vicinity; but not so where converts were reckoned by thousands or myriads. Congregationalism, in the modern sense of the term, had place wherever christianity was hemmed in, or wherever it had become inert; but not where the word of the Lord “ran and was glorified;” or where “believers were added to the church daily,—multitudes, both of men and women.”

But how did the primitive combination of christians, within cities and districts, affect the relationship and internal organization of the clergy? or how must such a combination, necessary and proper as it is, affect church government in any age? The clergy are, by such combinations, brought into society as a body, and nothing can then avert, (nor should we wish it to be averted,) the establishment of some species of hierarchical subordination. An incidental, and yet highly important consequence of this municipal organization, in the ancient church, was the interchange of the services of teachers among the congregations of a diocese. It was not imagined, that the talents and accomplishments of a single mind, even of the most gifted, could supply sufficient movement and instruction to the same people, week after week, and year after year. Our modern usages, in this behalf, involve a very serious practical error. To leave a congregation submerged in the stagnant

pool of a single mind, for half a century, can never consist with its progress in knowledge, or with its vitality. Nothing, perhaps, has more benumbed christianity, or prevented its extension.

Again ; this same municipal association of the people and clergy, effectually cut off the dependence of the clergy, individually, upon the leaders of single congregations. The church fund did indeed accrue from voluntary contributions ; but it arose from a broad surface, and it reached indirectly those who received it. The people had no opportunity given them to modify doctrine, to soften morality, or to avert discipline, by the tacit efficacy of their power as the paymasters of their teachers.

Once more ; the same economy broke up, in great degree, that too natural tendency of things, which places the clergy of a vicinity in opposition, the one to the other, as chiefs of companies, and as rival candidates for popular favor. Wholly to preclude this most unhappy tendency, is indeed impracticable on any scheme ; yet we should certainly avoid a system which, in a direct and powerful manner, stimulates personal ambition. Neighboring congregations, founded on the congregational principle, hardly avoid grudges and disagreements, transmitted often from one generation to another, like the feuds of Arabian hordes. Then again, the spirit of this system, irritated by a false jealousy on the subject of the rights of conscience, impels division and separation, often on trivial grounds. Dislikes or predilections, personal bickerings, and family discords, lead to outbursts of independency ; and thus a sect propagates itself, not always by natural growth or offset, like a tree ; but by bisection or rending, like certain orders of the animal kingdom.

Congregationalism, a modern scheme altogether, sprung, as a reaction, from arrogant prelacy, and the despotism of national churches. It was the inevitable product of evil times,—the child of oppression, and the nursling of persecution. But, destitute as it is of permanent reasons, and unsupported by ancient authority, and incompatible, as it must always be, with the just and necessary influence of the ministers of religion, it will give way when the accidental causes to which it owes its origin are removed. Deprived of the invigorating disadvantages of political depression, congregationalism will slide into some form of comprehensive polity. When the mass ceases to be agitated, crystallization will commence. That this system should prevail, and be in favor, where democratic sentiments and tastes are rife, can be no matter of surprise ; but the fact of its prevalence, under such circumstances, surely must not be urged abstractedly, in its recommendation, or as a presumption that it is apostolic.' pp. 133—136.

'The current of popular opinion may indeed set against this or that general principle ; and yet nature (we should say the Divine Providence) goes on in its course, notwithstanding the temporary infatuations of mankind. Often have the purest enjoyments, and the most solid advantages, been renounced by the proud impatience, or the sheer caprices of communities,—by absurd and vicious fashions, or sophistical opinions. Popular distastes, then, afford no presumption whatever against the system which they repugnate. Episcopacy may be abstractedly good, although all the world were to scout it.

Now any number of religiously gifted persons being taken promiscuously, we shall not fail to find among them those marked inequalities of natural power, and those decisive diversities of temper and accomplishment, which speak loudly (as loudly as nature ever speaks) in favor of a corresponding distribution of services, and gradation of employment and dignities. To assign to all the same duties, and to reduce all to the same level, is to affront reason and nature in an egregious manner. The church needs services to be performed, not of one kind, but of many; and nature actually provides persons adapted to that diversity of service. Among fifty or a hundred clerical persons, some will be found whose bold and ardent zeal calls them into the field of labor and danger in carrying the gospel upon new ground; some, whose taste for intellectual pursuits, and whose faculty of acquisition, mark them for the closet, or for the chair of catechetical instruction; some, whose powers of utterance and flow of soul challenge them for the pulpit; some, whose gentleness of spirit, and whose placid skill, fit them for the difficult task of the personal cure of souls; some, whose philanthropy and self-denying love, forbid them to be happy any where but among the poor and wretched; and some, moreover, although it be a few, whose calmness of judgment and temper, whose comprehensiveness of understanding, whose paternal sentiments and personal dignity, declare them, without mistake, to be destined to the throne of government. We may decry Episcopacy; but the Lord sends us bishops, whether or not we will avail ourselves of the boon.' pp. 140, 141.

On appeals to the natural reason and sense of mankind, in respect to the subject in controversy, it is obvious to remark, that we can never arrive at certainty by such a process. It seems not a little preposterous, to appeal to the principles and maxims of human wisdom, for the determination of questions pertaining to the constitution of the christian church. The most plausible grounds of argument or inference, may be utterly fallacious. Revelation here is the only expositor and judge of truth. The suggestions of reason may corroborate the dictates of scripture, on such a subject, but they have no independent authority. In respect to Episcopacy in particular, must the ground of decision be the sacred volume. This only can correctly guide us, and definitely settle the question. The strength of the controversy of late, on this topic, has rested very much on that ground, as the pages of the *Christian Spectator* can testify; and we have no inclination or occasion to add to what has been done so satisfactorily, by another hand. Nor in respect to arguments suggested by reason and human experience, in favor of Episcopacy, is it necessary to say more, than that they are uncertain in themselves, and besides, have but a remote application to us as a people. If monarchy and Episcopacy, according to our author, naturally befit each other, then Episcopacy rightfully belongs to another hemisphere.

Our own New-England Congregationalism, though, like the republicanism which it fosters, it may be "a cautionary proceeding, in which certain acknowledged advantages are foregone, on account of the dangers that attend the enjoyment of them;" yet confers on us, as a community, all the advantages we could wish, from any form of religious polity. While its analogy to the principles of our government secures it from the danger of attempting the public liberty, its primitive and living vigor admirably fits it to subserve its own most important ends, as a medium of the preservation and diffusion of the truth. As the actual result of the Congregational principle, we find that it insures vigilance in the guardians and members of the churches, in regard to the doctrines that are inculcated in them. The christian body on this principle, constitutes a sort of mutual and voluntary supervisorship, in regard to their soundness in the faith. Under the regulations that now exist, any signal departure from the faith would be nearly impracticable. It never could be tolerated. Our mutual understanding of one another as churches, and our constant habits of fellowship, would prevent, or at least soon correct it. Not only the rules of our particular associations and consociations, and the more general formularies which virtually and substantially guide us, though we do not literally subscribe to them; but that common law of christian truth, upon which we act as ministers and churches, consisting of precedents clearly defined and well established, must present an almost insuperable barrier to the inroads of deadly error. Every examination of a candidate for a license to preach the gospel, or for settlement in the ministry, respecting his doctrinal opinions and religious experience, brings into view the common law of christianity,—that construction of the scriptures on which we are substantially agreed. In such a recurrence to first principles and settled opinions, through our plan of administration and communion, we enjoy a guarantee of the truth, which would not be strengthened by subscription to minute confessions of faith,—confessions that are often but partially believed, and indifferently adhered to.

But to come to the particular considerations suggested by human wisdom and experience, according to which the comparative advantage of an endowed and established church, and the voluntary system, is supposed, on the part of many, to be determined,—it is urged in favor of the former, that it is *better adapted to secure the independence, and with that, the authority, of the christian ministry*, than is the case with the voluntary system. It has been represented, that where the preacher of the gospel is subjected to the will of his people, in regard to his continuance or maintenance among them, it is difficult to preserve that firmness which is one of the most essential qualifications for the office,—that a mode of

support, or a tenure of office secured by the state, is, in the great majority of cases, essential to the exercise of a salutary ministerial authority, since "systems are to be judged of by their operation on ordinary minds." A few men of commanding talent and rare piety, are enabled to exert a proper influence and authority, under any and the most unfavorable circumstances; but the great mass even of good men in the ministry, it is argued, need the countenance and patronage of the state, to sustain them in the fearless discharge of their duties.

In reply to such representations, it may be remarked, we have never learned from the history of any establishments, that as a matter of fact, their clergy are endowed with any peculiar firmness in the performance of their sacred functions, or that, as a body, they are distinguished above the ministers of other communions, by an influence and authority, such as become them as servants of Jesus Christ. The state of religion under establishments does, by no means, indicate such a superiority. On the contrary, we believe, that it indicates, more frequently than is the case under other circumstances of the christian church, the absence of a salutary control and influence, on the part of the incumbents of the sacred office. We are not now to learn, that great numbers of clergymen in the English establishment, exercise no other kind of official firmness and authority, than that which is employed against those active and zealous men, falsely termed fanatics, who would break the slumbers of the church, and effect a revival of piety throughout the establishment and the empire. But, however much might be said on this topic, it is more important to remark again, that in our view, the independence which a minister is enabled to feel, and the authority which it is proper for him to exercise, spring from the consciousness of pure intentions, and faithful services rendered to his people. Such a consciousness must inspire qualities of this kind, because he would feel, that a new situation and an adequate stipend might be readily obtained, if circumstances should require his change of station. It will not be doubted, that in most cases, stations of usefulness in the church may be secured, as often as is necessary, for the godly and competent christian teacher. This is the true influence of a real man of God,—this is the good and lawful control over his fellow-men to which he may hope to attain. Exemplary devotion to his duties creates it. Whereas, that independence and authority which arise merely from official character, and the position which the minister sustains in respect to his people, as a stipendiary rather of the state than of them, is of very trifling consequence. These, connected with moral and intellectual worth, are indeed no disadvantage; but according to the voluntary and Congregational plan, there is usually no want of influence, if the incumbent of the sacred office be per-

sonally deserving. The great complaint raised by the enemies of religion, against preachers of the Congregational order, is, that they have *too much* influence,—that their authority is dangerous to liberty. The most bitter invectives have been heaped upon them, for the control which they have seemed to exercise over the minds of the community. Without doubt, if the variety of talents and natural temper be considered, there is no marked want of ministerial firmness and influence in the Congregational denomination, and under the voluntary plan. The comparison, in this respect, with Episcopacy, and with establishments, cannot be unfavorable. Generally speaking, personal purity of character, uncompromising doctrine, efficiency of administration, and flourishing churches, show that the situation of our preachers produces neither obsequiousness nor fear.

The pecuniary support of clergymen, and generally the means of upholding the institutions of religion, are supposed to be better provided for by establishments and state endowments, than by the opposite scheme. This is a consideration much insisted on by the advocates of a national christianity, however the scriptures may seem to decide in favor of a free support. If the interests above mentioned, are left to the voluntary contributions or stipulations of the people, it is contended, that they must be inadequately or precariously sustained. The supposed unpropitious influence of the voluntary plan, in respect to the maintenance and advancement of religion, has been illustrated in various ways. The author of the work under review, dwells much on its operation during the early periods of christianity, as an instrument in the hands of an aspiring priesthood, of securing *superabundant wealth*. Although the supply was more scanty at first, the superstition and credulity of the people was so effectually wrought upon, at length, that their free-will offerings, if they might be so called, when fear and terror were the principal engines in drawing them forth, were multiplied to almost any desired extent. It will suffice for us to remark here, merely, that the peculiarity of the causes at work in those times, has been already noticed, and, that no argument derived from the state of things then, can be applicable at present. Certainly we witness no such results among us, nor any approximating toward them, as produced by the operation of our ecclesiastical system; and although what has occurred once may occur again, yet it must be under a similarity of circumstances, and this similarity can never be expected.

“The grinding exaction” of the voluntary system, in some cases, has also been illustrated as one of its operations. Something like a contradiction is involved in this association of terms; but in a certain sense it may express a truth, especially when a disposition is manifested between a minister and his people, on one

side or both, "to drive as hard a bargain as possible." The case of the Catholics in Ireland has been brought in, as illustrating the effects of the voluntary plan, in their communion,—where take place "the most violent and disgraceful altercations, previous to and even during the most solemn religious ceremonies; bartering and chaffering, to which the traffic of the buyers and sellers in the temple were decent and reverential." "Such," as the reviewer in the *London Quarterly* sums it up, "is the *voluntary* system in the case of a body so powerfully influential as the Romish priesthood in Ireland." And the implication is, that it is liable to such or worse consequences in communions where the sacerdotal order possesses less power; but how contrary this is to facts, we need not say. Besides, the operation of a principle which is correct in itself, may be bad among the Catholics, as also every thing else among them is bad, in a spiritual view. There is no arguing from the case of such religionists to that of Protestants, under their very different systems in other respects. Doubtless the services of the Catholic priests of Ireland are appreciated as highly as they deserve to be; and if those priests cannot always obtain so considerable a stipend as they would, that which they actually secure is so much the more *voluntary*, as it comes short of the price demanded.

Generally, the influence of the voluntary principle is represented as unfavorable, on account of the inadequacy and precariousness of the supply. Its greatest evil, taking one age with another, is conceived to lie here. It is urged, that the maintenance and extension of religion can never be calculated upon from such a source, with any certainty,—that the very fact that the system meets with some success, in this era of "exuberant religious life and vigor," should warn us of the fearful effects of a reaction; and that a method ought to be adopted, wherever the gospel is preached, to secure the decent maintenance of the ministry, in times when "such outbursts of over-strained excitement, collapse into comparative indifference and apathy." In confirmation of their views, foreign writers who favor religious establishments, allude to this country, where they find the principle of free support in full operation. Both the prevalence and the character of our religion are called into question, and the spiritual evils which are believed to abound among us, are ascribed to the want of a national and compulsory system, as their principal source. It is due to truth, also, to say, that other writers among them allude to America in a better spirit, and that they see in the multiplied and extending triumphs of religion, and in our increasing benevolent operations, a proof of the correctness of the opposite theory. Perhaps we do not understand the manner in which some of the former class speak of our voluntary support of the gospel. From

an allusion to the subject in one instance, we should suppose, that they believed the mode of support was simply by voluntary contributions or collections, such as are taken up in the churches, without any reference to a mutual stipulation, as to a certain or definite sum. Hence President Dwight is quoted as saying, on the subject of a minister's maintenance, and in proof of its precariousness, in the United States: "A voluntary contribution, *except in a large town*, is as uncertain as the wind, and a chameleon alone can expect to derive a permanent support from that source." But, when it is understood, that in most of our communions, a minister's support or salary is a matter of mutual agreement and contract, and like other lawful pecuniary engagements, comes under legal cognizance, it will be seen, that in every sense it is not precarious, and that as a thing of course, it need not be inadequate.

True it is, however, that in some cases the support is inadequate. Circumstances sometimes place an American clergyman, even among the most respectable denominations, under an unwelcome pressure, in respect to the means of living. The limited resources of his people, or the want of liberal views on their part, or a miscalculation at first, in respect to the required amount of support, may stint him to a meager compensation for his services. And if in this condition, the providences of God are adverse, and removal is a doubtful remedy, his prospect is any thing rather than inviting. Few scenes in life, where the sufferer is not implicated in special guilt, or affected by some overwhelming dispensation of providence, are calculated to excite a painful sensibility, like those sometimes presented in the clerical profession. A sense of dependence on the public favor, inspired by no other profession, and ceaseless anxieties and contrivances for the support, it may be, of a numerous family, beyond the ordinary cares of the domestic state, when added to the labors of an arduous calling, to the trials often of a difficult service, and to the responsibilities assumed by the most solemn of trusts,—all requiring a sleepless activity of mind, and a bodily frame capable of endurance, or, if not capable of it, yet obliged to bear,—would be sufficient to operate discouragingly on any class of men. Much more must it be the case in regard to the class of persons here described, many of whom, through their education and habits of life, have a refinement of feeling which prepares them for peculiar self-inflictions; a modesty and reserve which forbid them to complain; and a benevolent delicacy which refuses to burden others for its own relief. And the case is aggravated, in some of its features of unpleasantness, by the consciousness, that the suffering comes upon the incumbent of the sacred office, through a benevolent consecration to the good of others, when he might have made a better provision for his family in some other walk of life. He may look on the abundance and pros-

perity around him, and reflect, that they are, in an important sense, the result of an instrumentality employed by him, in common with his brethren ; while out of it all, his own share is a miserable pittance,—a portion too small to furnish him with the means of fully achieving the work nearest to his heart. The competence which would give him ease, is all that is wanting to enable him to live entirely for others.

Such instances are occasionally found in the clerical calling among us. But the unhappy case is not known to be worse, or more frequent, than it is under the English establishment, where the state is virtually the trustee of the fund destined to the support of the ministry. The condition of many of the curates, the working-men of the establishment, has often called forth the commiseration of those who feel an interest in the christian ministry and in its objects. The prototype of the description above adventured, is, indeed, oftener found in that wealthy institution, so unequally is its wealth distributed, than among the pastors of our churches. As a general remark, it is true, that the clergymen of our country, especially of New-England, are nearer than is the case with the clerical order of other christian countries, to that mean between affluence and poverty which is the most favorable to virtue, and to the diligent and faithful execution of their sacred trust. They are, perhaps, less removed from want than from wealth ; still, their lack of abundance has not been without its benefits on their own character, and on the character of the community. A more generous provision for their support, would be of no disservice to them, and would enlarge the sphere of their usefulness ; but with the bare competence which is now their own, and with the self-denying virtues which it generates, are connected the enjoyment of many blessings, and the opportunity and means of doing much good. Certainly, the condition and the character of the ministry in New-England, is a proof of any thing rather than of the infelicities and inferiority of Congregationalism. Exempt cases of want and suffering will occur under any form of ecclesiastical finance, whether it springs from the dictates of the government, or from the volitions of individuals. No human administration of these sacred interests is perfect, or will insure absolute equity of appointment. But the advantage on this point, is evidently not on the side of establishments, taking the whole number of the clerical body, or the desirable medium state between wealth and poverty.

We intended to notice two or three other principles, connected with the opposing systems which have been here brought into view ; as for instance, the animosities supposed to be engendered by the constitution of churches after the Congregational mode, and also the fanaticism, and what are rather sneeringly called the

“bursts of revivalism,” produced or countenanced by the American mode of ecclesiastical administration and support, together with the alledged superiority of establishments, in regard to the harmony and sober piety which they foster among their communions; but these, and some direct considerations showing the injustice and evils of the compulsory principle in religion, must be omitted, as our remarks have already been extended far beyond the space we originally designed to occupy in these pages.

ART. VII.—BEECHER'S PLEA FOR THE WEST.

A Plea for the West. By Lyman Beecher, D. D. Cincinnati: Truman & Smith.

To any one, who, from his own quiet retreat and in the hour of of calm reflection, looks out on the agitated world, a spectacle of no ordinary interest is presented. The forms, customs and faces of society, are every where undergoing a radical change. With scarcely an exception, systems of government and modes of life are,—some indeed more, some less rapidly, yet both surely,—verging to a revolution. Long-cherished dogmas, which by proscription have gained such a sway, that it is deemed heresy to deny them, are re-examined and tested; sentiments that have held undisputed control, are brought to the standard of common-sense; and the claim of authority is boldly set aside when opposed to reason. In this conflict of opinions, this breaking up of former things to re-compound and re-cast them in a mold better fitted for the coming latter-day, what shall be the fate of our own country? Extensive as it is, covered with a rapidly increasing and heterogeneous population, and subject to influences so varied, will it continue prosperous and happy, and in the enjoyment of the name and privileges of a republic? This question is yet to be decided,—decided too, doubtless, in the lifetime of the present generation. We are not fond of boding ill; still, we must confess our fears: and but for our trust in God, that he has destined these United States to aid his own great design of reclaiming a lost world to himself, we should be tempted to despair. Many are the causes at work, seeming to prognosticate, that this our experiment, vaunted with such confidence for half a century, may end in a failure. The stability of our constitution and frame of government, is, to say the least, more problematical now than formerly. Guarded as it was by the wise architects who planned and reared the noble fabric, experience has shown it to need additional guards, in essential points, to protect it from assaults, which the prophetic minds of those keen-sighted men scarcely anticipated. The influx of foreign immigration, the reckless partisanship of political aspirants, the general spirit of ultraism, the agitating nature of various subjects en-

gaging public attention, with the growing corruptions of all classes ; the outcry against the wealthy and educated, and the bitter hostility to morals, worth and religion, which breathes out from so many bosoms, and stamps itself on countless productions of the press ; these and similar things are among the painful indications, that a harder struggle is before us. A leaven of iniquity is fast diffusing itself, and powerfully, though in some cases almost imperceptibly, converting the elements of our national prosperity into materials of disorganization, and for the subversion of our hopes and prospects. If any proof of this is needed, compare for a moment the growing disregard for the institutions of God, the laxity of conscience as to the sabbath and religious obligation, with the reverent feelings once cherished on these subjects.

In this state of our country, the christian patriot anxiously looks around and inquires, How, and by what means, under God, may our impending ruin be averted ? One voice of reply is re-echoed from every quarter,—Moral and religious improvement ; more strenuous efforts to render intelligent and virtuous the entire mass of the community who have the power of fixing our destiny as a nation.

The bearing of the WEST on the ultimate condition of our whole country, has been often urged ; and the fact is too clear to admit of question. Trite as are the arguments by which a "plea for the West" may be sustained, yet until they are realized and acted on with far greater unanimity and zeal than is now the case, such reasonings, and the facts on which they are grounded, must be repeated ; and repeated, if need be, for the thousandth or ten thousandth time. We mean not, however, to imply, that such is the character of the work before us. Its author's name, on the contrary, is a sufficient warrant for its originality and strength of argument, as well as vigor of conception and power of delineation. No one need fear, that in giving himself to its pages he will only be tracking the beaten path of former and inferior writers. Dr. Beecher has ever been a man *sui generis*. The subject too, is one well adapted to a mind like his. For a long time conversant with the institutions and affairs of New-England ; accustomed to take enlarged views of topics most closely related to sound political economy, and in a style of peculiar eloquence to urge truth on the conscience ; he now occupies a station of commanding influence, as president of a rising seminary, to which the West, especially, looks for its future pastors and religious teachers. He has, therefore, rare opportunities of comparing and estimating the characteristics and mutual relations of the eastern and western States ; and his judgments, on this subject, are unquestionably entitled to serious consideration.

The present volume comprises, as many of our readers will re-

cognize from their own recollections, "a discourse delivered by the author in several of the Atlantic States, last season, while on an agency for the Cincinnati Lane Seminary." To the appeal then made, a hearty response was given, in the contributions of benevolent individuals and churches; and funds were secured for the establishment of a new professorship, the erection of a chapel, and the enlargement of the library. The seminary, notwithstanding a temporary embarrassment from the secession of some of its former students, is flourishing, and bids fair to exceed the most sanguine expectations of its friends. Its importance can hardly be appreciated, by those whose attention has not been directed to a particular consideration of the wants and future abilities of the West. The main portion of the "plea" is occupied in exhibiting the alarming influence of popery on the rising states of the great western valley; and in enforcing the immediate necessity of counteracting, by all practicable moral influence, the efforts of its emissaries. In noticing the volume, we shall pursue the author's own train of thought, adding any suggestions which may occur to us at the time.

Dr. Beecher believes, with Edwards, that the Millenium is to commence in America. The grounds of this opinion are, the experimental knowledge of free institutions, and the unbounded facilities and resources of communication here possessed; and that "there is not a nation on earth, which in fifty years can, by all possible reformatations, place itself in circumstances so favorable as our own, for the free and unembarrassed application of physical effort and pecuniary and moral power to evangelize the world." From this he comes to the position, that the religious and political destiny of this republic is to be decided in the West; "a young empire of mind, and power, and wealth, rushing up to giant manhood with a rapidity and a power never before witnessed below the sun." No one can doubt this fact, who will ponder, even for a short time, the extent, resources and numerical superiority of the West, compared with the older states; and the balance of power which the states in the Mississippi valley already hold in the halls of congress. The eastern states can expect but little increase, if any, in their representation; the western states and territories will be constantly gaining.

The first inquiry, therefore, which Dr. B. proposes is, "What is required to secure the civil and religious prosperity of the West?" His answer is as follows:

'The thing required for the civil and religious prosperity of the West, is universal education, and moral culture, by institutions commensurate to that result,—the all-pervading influence of schools, and colleges, and seminaries, and pastors, and churches. When the West is well supplied in this respect, though there may be great relative defects, there will

be, as we believe, the stamina and the vitality of a perpetual civil and religious prosperity.' pp. 12, 13.

In reply to the question, "By whom shall the work of rearing the literary institutions of the West be done?" Dr. B. aims to show, that the concurrence and aid of the East is indispensable. He amply vindicates the ability and willingness of the West, *in time*, to accomplish the desired reformation; affirming, that no where is the subject of education more appreciated. Why then, it may be asked, cannot they do all that is needed for themselves in this matter? The reason is obvious, on a moment's reflection. Educated mind and literary *matériel* are wanted. No people ever did or could, at once, turn a wilderness into a nursery of the sciences and arts. Such things are of slower growth, and betoken the advance of society, in the means for supplying the necessities and comforts of life. New-England, privileged as she was with a homogeneous population, strongly linked together by common hopes and common perils, and reached as she might be by immediate legislation, yet had to be indebted, in part, to foreign aid, and to seek, for a time, from the mother country, pastors for her churches; thus allowing her newly established institutions to grow and strengthen. In these respects, the West labors under far greater disadvantages. With every variety of population, mostly uneducated; with no uniform public sentiment to control and direct the action of minds, not a few of whom were never before unshackled, and hence are liable to run, riot and plunge into wild and wanton misrule; her towns, villages and cities springing up with a rapidity which almost realizes the fables of ancient song; it would be miraculous, and not human power, which could at once, in a single generation, have completed the work of rearing up a people so circumstanced, to the full enjoyment of the privileges of education and religion. Let not then the West be blamed, that she has not done it. Miracles are not now to be expected. The age of such wonders is past. But the period has come, when, through proper means, the desired result may be confidently anticipated. The population of that country, in many portions, are assimilating more and more, and acquiring consistency of purpose and action. A train of causes is in operation, which, with right direction, will contribute to hasten its accomplishment; but which, neglected or misapplied, will, with a tremendous energy, defeat or paralyze every subsequent attempt to effect so desirable a change. Spread over that extensive country, there is an immense mass of mind, possessing all the characteristics of development usually found in new-born states and territories, and stamped with the manifold peculiarities of their situation and circumstances. By whom now shall this mental power be trained and guided? at what object aim-

ed? and with what spirit shall it be brought into action? Shall it fall into the hands of foreign emissaries, to aid their purposes of ambition and selfishness? or shall it be swayed by an influence of American benevolence, thus to rear up a people on whom the blessing of God may rest, and who shall be the willing benefactors of a guilty and perishing world? A question this, deeply interesting to every citizen of these United States. Every man who loves his country,—whose prayer is, that this republic may stand forth unbroken and mighty to bless the nations of the earth, long after ancient despotisms shall have crumbled in ruins; or who believes, that our fathers have not in vain planted their feet on these shores, and founded this realm of liberty; yea, every descendant of such sires is personally interested in the decision of this question. Who that has a rising family, which are here to meet the changes of life, and call this land their home; who that has already sent forth from the warm embrace of his love some darling child, to seek his fortune afar from the place of his birth, and where are the sepulchres of his fathers; and who that shudders at the thought of some possible conflict, where brother may meet brother in the field of deadly strife; who that would bind and rivet together in christian union the widely extended parts of this vast empire; who is there, indeed, with a heart to feel and a soul to be moved, but must look with the deepest solicitude to the question, What influences shall the West acknowledge, and what character shall it bear?

One of the most obvious methods of aiding the West is, *immigration from the Atlantic States*. They who are to be the direct and efficient instruments in this work, it is evident, must be on the field of action, ready to watch every impulse, to counteract whatever is unfavorable, and urge on whatever may promote the desired end. But how shall they go? Shall they go out in colonies, and plant their distinct settlements here and there in eligible situations; or shall they disperse themselves abroad, and become an integral part of the people? We say, by all means, the latter. This is a case where the concentration of some scores or hundreds will be less likely to effect the purpose, than by divisions and subdivisions. The *final* result is to be regarded. It is not merely to make a spot here and there in the midst of a wilderness, to bloom with the loveliness of an Eden; it is to turn the entire wilderness into one smiling landscape, where whatever is noxious may find no place, and whatever is useful and fair may thrive. Dispersed among the population of the West, identifying themselves and their own interests with the prospects and welfare of its inhabitants, such new comers must “be absorbed in their multitude, as rain-drops fall into the bosom of the ocean and mingle with that world of waters.” Thus their efficiency may be felt.

Every step they take, every blow they strike, every word they speak, and every prayer they breathe, will have an influence, and tell upon the surrounding empire of mind and heart. Such too are Dr. B's views with respect to *personal residence* and *personal effort*. He justly disapproves of the other plan, upon which some have acted, of forming distinct settlements in colonies and townships; so far, especially, as it relates to the exertion of a propitious influence on the western population. No doubt the settlement of a township almost exclusively by those who have been neighbors and friends in New-England, and thus wont to think and act together, may in the highest degree contribute to present enjoyment; and hence such a plan is by far the most inviting which can be presented to families or individuals, who look to the West as a field of future enterprise. But we see many objections to it, considered as a plan for ultimate success in aiding the West in the right employment and direction of her vast resources of physical and moral energies. Mutual jealousies will be the natural and almost inevitable result. Confidence, so necessary to success in any effort to benefit others, can never be as well established; and instead of shedding over the darkness a sprinkling of light, which betokens the break of day, it will but spangle it here and there with a bright point, whose solitary luster will only render the encircling gloom more perceptible and appalling. Unacquainted, comparatively, with the peculiarities of the people spread out on the soil, their opportunities for usefulness will be slight and transient; whereas, if brought into daily contact with the existing inhabitants there, they may notice and acquire their desirable traits of character, and at the same time draw them off from hurtful principles and practices, guiding them to new and better views and opinions. A dissimilarity exists between the two classes, yet not so great, that their respective peculiarities may not be associated and turned to good account. In the West we meet with bold hardihood, untiring enterprise, free, spirited, and fearless avowal of sentiments and feelings, with a warmth and strength of emotion, the inevitable result of their situation and circumstances of life. Its wide extent, the grand features of the country, the amazing rapidity of its increase of population, the consciousness that such hopes and prospects are theirs, and the knowledge, that nothing can hinder each one from working out his own share in the work, —these are causes and considerations adapted to exert a mighty influence in giving vigor and spring to intellectual and moral energy in any bosom of her native sons. Born on the soil, cradled in the wilds, familiar, up from the days of infancy and boyhood, with the stories of peril and toil, trained to roam undaunted over the forests and prairies, to cross and recross the mighty streams, beholding the inhabitants of every clime seeking there a refuge and

a home ; having thus ever before them, something to awaken attention and excite inquiry, the hardy sons of the West, if they perhaps lack the refinement and polish of the more educated Atlantic population, are yet admirably suited to urge forward the great designs of God's providence for evangelizing the world. Incorporate now with these the more staid, cool-headed and inquisitive sons of the pilgrims, bred from their earliest days to habits of industry, taught to revere the institutions of God and their fathers, prizing the blessings which they leave, eager to diffuse like blessings wherever they go ; and let them, breathing the high purpose of serving God and strengthening his cause, become one with the warm-hearted christian there, each borrowing from the other their respective and estimable peculiarities, and where could we look for a type of intellectual excellence, or a basis for moral and religious character of better promise ? Such, now, may be the result of the mingled and mingling population. Sectional feeling, if it has ever had a place in the breast of the eastern emigrant, must no longer be harbored. He will, indeed, recollect his boyish days, and how he sported over the green hills, and along the streams and valleys of New-England ; that there he tripped his way to the village-school, with the sons and daughters of the neighborhood ; how, in the home of his youth, seated on the knees of a pious parent, he began to lisp the praises of God ; or, led on by the hand of the same father or mother, he went to the sanctuary, and there was taught the truth as it fell from the preacher's lips. All these and many more such reminiscences and associations, grateful as they are to his heart, he may and must ever cherish. Now and then, too, as it were, revisiting the spot of his birth, he may draw forth from the treasure of by-gone days some scene of his earlier history, to aid him in binding to himself and his far-off kindred and friends, the rising family with which God has blessed him. But he is no longer distinctively a New-Englander. Whatever consciousness he may feel of superiority in former privileges and acquisitions, he must lock up in his own breast ; nothing of such a feeling must appear, if he would be useful. He is henceforth to live and act, so far as any separate views and interests as a citizen are his, for the West. Her broad streams, waving fields and teeming villages, are to witness his future labors. There he is to garner his choicest riches, and a thousand new and tender associations are to spring up and hallow the spot. There his heart is to lay down what it loves most, and his feelings are to gush out, as he bears forth his kindred to their last home. There he is himself to die, having the sweet consciousness, that " he will sleep, dust to dust," in the same burial place " with the objects of his affections." There his children are to enter on their heritage ; and within those bounds,—no narrow ones, indeed,—which encir-

cle him, he and they are to bring their physical, mental and moral energies to bear in direct personal efforts to benefit mankind. Nor is it solely by personal residence and efforts, that the West is to be aided.

The permanent establishment of schools, colleges, churches, and similar institutions there, are indispensable. On such means, as Dr. Beecher clearly shows, the main hope, under God, must be placed. To rely permanently on the East, for literary and religious teachers, is "but a drop of the bucket to the ocean." The requisite supply can only be raised up by institutions there, and "by the instrumentality of a learned and pious ministry on the spot." Here he adverts to a fact deserving consideration, and which should never be lost from the mind :

' Experience has evinced, that schools and popular education, in their best estate, go not far beyond the suburbs of the city of God. All attempts to legislate prosperous colleges and schools into being, without the intervening influence of religious education and moral principle, and habits of intellectual culture which spring up in alliance with evangelical institutions, have failed. Schools wane, invariably, in those towns where the evangelical ministry is neglected, and the sabbath is profaned, and the tavern supplants the worship of God. Thrift and knowledge in such places go out, while vice and irreligion come in.

But the ministry is a central luminary in each sphere, and soon sends out schools and seminaries as its satellites, by the hands of sons and daughters of its own training. A land supplied with able and faithful ministers, will of course be filled with schools, academies, libraries, colleges, and all the apparatus for the perpetuity of republican institutions. It always has been so,—it always will be.' pp. 22, 23.

' If we possessed the accommodations and the funds, we might easily send out a hundred ministers a year,—a thousand ministers in ten years,—around each of whom schools would arise, and instructors multiply, and churches spring up, and revivals extend, and all the elements of civil and religious prosperity abound.' p. 24.

Referring to an idea once quite current, but now, we trust, almost wholly exploded, "that mediocrity of talent will suffice for the West," he gives us the following graphic picture of the population in the new states :

' But let him not go to the West. The men who, *somehow*, do not succeed at the East, are the very men who will succeed still less at the West. If there be in the new settlements at the West a lack of schools and educated mind, there is no lack of shrewd and vigorous mind ; and if they are not deep read in Latin and Greek, they are well read in men and things. On their vast rivers, they go every where, and see every body, and know every thing, and judge with the tact of perspicacious common-sense. They are disciplined to resolution and mental vigor, by toils, and perils, and enterprises ; and often they are called to

attend as umpires to the earnest discussions of their most able and eloquent men, which cannot fail to throw prosing dullness in the ministry at a fearful distance. No where, if a minister is deficient, will he be more sure to be "weighed in the balance and found wanting." On the contrary, there is not a place on earth where piety, and talent, and learning, and argument, and popular eloquence, are more highly appreciated, or rewarded with a more frank and enthusiastic admiration. There are chords in the heart of the West which vibrate to the touch of genius, and to the power of argumentative eloquence, with a sensibility and enthusiasm no where surpassed. A hundred ministers of cultivated mind and popular eloquence might find settlement in an hundred places, and without the aid of missions, and only to increase the demand for a hundred more.

Most unquestionably the West demands the instrumentality of the first order of minds in the ministry, and thoroughly furnished minds, to command attention, enlighten the understanding, form the conscience, and gain the heart, and bring into religious organization and order the uncommitted mind and families of that great world; and many a man who might guide respectably a well-organized congregation here of homogeneous character, and moving onward under the impetus of long-continued habits, might fail utterly to call around him the population of a new country.' pp. 25—28.

The institutions which are to exert their influence on such a people, ought not to be stinted in the means they offer of improvement, and the advantages of a thorough and complete education. Let there, then, be a sufficiency of well-endowed colleges and seminaries, and let no pains be spared to raise them to the first rank, so far as time will allow. We see with regret, that in some of the Western states, a disposition is manifested to create numerous local institutions, thus weakening the strength of the churches which might, for the present at least, be advantageously concentrated in a less number, adequate for all useful purposes. The result will be, we fear, that none of them can as well succeed in enlisting the sympathies and aid of eastern benevolence. We can imagine no good reason why colleges and seminaries should now be planted more thickly in Ohio than in Massachusetts or Connecticut; and the effect of this measure is to hinder any one from reaching so high a grade as it might otherwise do, and to depress the standard of a liberal education. In the difficulty of procuring capable and experienced teachers, the offices are liable to be filled with unsuitable persons, and the education given, defective. We fear that this will be the result of some of the experiments now making in the West. We would, however, strenuously urge the establishment of primary, sabbath and common schools, the blessings of which may be widely diffused among the entire community. On these it is, that we must chiefly rely, while the future pastors and teachers of the West are in a course of training. Let the young

mind every where be thus pre-occupied, and fitted to receive the more advanced lessons which shall afterwards be communicated.

Under the head of *motives* immediately to aid in securing to that country institutions of a high character, Dr. Beecher portrays a glowing picture of the prospective greatness of the West. Some may think it a hackneyed subject; but we cannot resist the temptation to quote here a few passages, and we earnestly commend them to the prayerful reflection of all to whom the future welfare of our country is dear.

‘The territory is eight thousand miles in circumference, extending from the Alleghany to the Rocky mountains, and from the Gulf of Mexico to the Lakes of the north; and it is the largest territory, and most beneficent in climate, and soil, and mineral wealth, and commercial facilities, ever prepared for the habitation of man, and qualified to sustain in prosperity and happiness, the densest population on the globe. By 24,000 miles of steam navigation, and canals and rail-roads, a market is brought near to every man, and the whole is brought into near neighborhood.

When I first entered the West, its vastness overpowered me with the impression of its uncontrollable greatness, in which all human effort must be lost. When I perceived the active intercourse between the great cities, like the rapid circulation of a giant's blood; and heard merchants speak of just stepping up to Pittsburgh,—only 600 miles,—and back in a few days; and others just from New-Orleans, or St. Louis, or the far West; and others going thither; and when I heard my ministerial brethren negotiating exchanges in the near neighborhood,—only 100 miles up or down the river,—and going and returning on Saturday and Monday, and without trespassing on the sabbath;—then did I perceive how God, who seeth the end from the beginning, had prepared the West to be mighty, and still wieldable, that the moral energy of his word and spirit might take it up as a very little thing.

This vast territory is occupied now by ten states and will soon be by twelve. Forty years since it contained about 150,000 souls; while now it contains little short of 5,000,000. At the close of this century, if no calamity intervenes, it will contain, probably, 100,000,000,—a day which some of our children may live to see; and when fully peopled, may accommodate 300,000,000. It is half as large as all Europe, four times as large as the Atlantic states, and twenty times as large as New-England. Was there ever such a spectacle,—such a field in which to plant the seeds of an immortal harvest!—so vast a ship, so richly laden with the world's treasures and riches, whose helm is offered to the guiding influence of early forming institutions.’ pp. 33—35.

With these considerations he dwells upon the *certainly of success*,—the *quickness* and *cheapness* by which such a guarantee of our prosperity may be secured.

‘The West needs but a momentary aid, when almost as soon as re-

ceived, should it be needed, she will repay and quadruple both principal and interest. Lend a hand to get up her institutions, to give ubiquity to her schools, and sabbaths, and sanctuaries, while her forests are falling and her ocean floods of population rolling in, and afterwards we will not come here to ask for aid; for there is a wealth and chivalrous munificence there, which, when it has first performed the necessary work of self-preservation, will pour with you a noble tide of rival benevolence, into that river which is "to make glad the city of our God" p. 38.

Many are the striking passages running through this part of the volume, highly characteristic of their author, and marked by his peculiar style of eloquence. Bold and energetic imagery, spirit-stirring appeals, startling facts, "thoughts that breathe, and words that burn," are every where crowded together, and form an array irresistible to the candid mind and feeling heart. We wonder not at the success of such a discourse, uttered as it was from his lips, and every where bearing the impress of his own spirit.

The dangers which threaten our prosperity from "uneducated mind," (which, somewhat paradoxically, he calls "educated vice,") in its influence on our elections, are drawn by a master's pen. The picture is indeed dark and appalling.

'According to the most accurate estimate which can be obtained, there are in the United States about a million and a half of children without the means of education, and about an equal number of adults, either foreigners or native Americans, that are uneducated. * * * * * In one of the smaller eastern states, there are thirty thousand adults that cannot read or write. In one of the largest, there are *four hundred thousand* adults and children who have had no instruction, and no means provided. In one of the western states, two-thirds of all the children in the state are destitute of any provision for education. These are the states who have taken the lead in making legislative investigations.' pp. 47, 48.

That the statements of the destitution of some of the Western states in the means of education, are not too strong, we believe from the fact, that similar ones have recently been made among us, by the Bishop of Kentucky, and others who have taken pains to ascertain the truth on this subject, and whose veracity is undoubted. Such facts, we know, have been eagerly cited by English writers in favor of an established religion, and to prove the evils of a *voluntary* system. But in our view, they are greatly mistaken in thus using them. They are not to their purpose. They are but the inevitable result of the rapid increase of population in a country lately a wilderness, and the peculiar circumstances of its first settlement. What was England herself, in the first two or three centuries after her conversion to christianity, with all the benefits of her establishment? Considerations like the above,

which go far to solve the whole difficulty, have not been adverted to by the writers just mentioned ; either owing to their ignorance of the state of our country, or from consciousness, that they were destructive to their favorite theory. We admit and we deplore the destitution of the ordinary means of grace, but we deny, that it is to be traced to the *voluntary* system, or the want of an establishment among us. But to return from this momentary digression.

Having thus depicted the necessities of the West, proposed the means of aiding her own population, held out the motives to engage in this enterprise, and warned us of the dangers of an uneducated people, Dr. Beecher next proceeds to consider *the situation of our country in respect to the introduction and prevalence of the Catholic religion*. This topic occupies the remainder of his volume. We have more than once, and recently, urged this subject on the attention of our readers. We shall, probably, hereafter keep it steadily in view, as one of the great questions of the present day. We wish, however, to indulge in no bitterness of feeling, but in a spirit of kindness to state plainly, from time to time, our honest belief and sincere apprehensions. The facts mentioned in this volume are similar to those heretofore transferred to our pages. We shall not, therefore, again quote them at length.

The reverend author has incurred no little odium and reproach for his sentiments on this great subject. He has even been accused of instigating, if not openly yet indirectly, the lawless destruction of the convent in Charlestown. We deem it, then, no more than justice to quote some of his language from this part of his volume.

‘ But before I proceed, to prevent misapprehension, I would say, that I have no fear of the Catholics, considered simply as a religious denomination, and unallied to the church and state establishments of the European governments hostile to republican institutions.

Let the Catholics mingle with us as Americans, and come with their children under the full action of our common schools and republican institutions, and the various powers of assimilation, and we are prepared cheerfully to abide the consequences. If in these circumstances the Protestant religion cannot stand before the Catholic, let it go down, and we will sound no alarm, and ask no aid, and make no complaint. It is no ecclesiastical quarrel to which we would call the attention of the American people.

Nor would I consent, that the civil and religious rights of the Catholics should be abridged or violated. As naturalized citizens, to all that we enjoy we bid them welcome, and would have their property and rights protected with the same impartiality and efficacy, that the property and rights of every other denomination are protected ; and we should abhor the interposition of lawless violence to injure the property or control the rights of Catholics, as vehemently as if it were directed against Protestants and their religion. For when the day comes that

lawless force prevails, argument and free inquiry are ended, and law and courts are impotent and useless, and liberty is extinct, and anarchy by its terrors will compel men to call in the protection of despotic power to save them from the pursuing hell. The late violence done to Catholic property at Charlestown, is regarded with regret and abhorrence by Protestants and patriots throughout the land, though the excitement which produced it had no relation whatever to religious opinions, and no connection with any religious denomination of christians.

We are equally opposed to any attempt to cast odium upon Catholics of the present generation, for any maxims, doctrines or practices of past ages, which are now, by the competent authority of the pope or a general council, disavowed. But for all the political bearings of their unchangeable and infallible creed, and for all the deeds of persecution and blood, justified by their principles and perpetrated by Catholic powers, and not disavowed by his holiness or by a council, the Catholic church is accountable, whatever may be the personal opinion of particular individuals or particular departments of that great community.' pp. 60—62.

Discountenancing the tone of acrimonious controversy, "invective, taunt, sarcasm and reviling," he thus inculcates the positions to be taken, and the manner of exhibiting the evils justly apprehended from an alien Catholic population.

'It is to the political claims and character of the Catholic religion, and its church and state alliance with the political and ecclesiastical governments of Europe hostile to liberty, and the tendency upon our republican institutions of flooding the nation suddenly with emigrants of this description, on whom for many years European influence may be exerted with such ease, and certainty, and power, that we call the attention of the people of this nation. Did the Catholics regard themselves as only one of many denominations of christians, entitled only to equal rights and privileges, there would be no such cause for apprehension while they peaceably sustained themselves by their own arguments and well-doing. But if Catholics are taught to believe, that their church is the only church of Christ, out of whose enclosure none can be saved,—that none may read the bible but by permission of the priesthood, and no one be permitted to understand it and worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,—that heresy is a capital offense, not to be tolerated, but punished by the civil power with disfranchisement, death, and confiscation of goods,—that the pope and the councils of the church are infallible, and her rights of ecclesiastical jurisdiction universal, and as far as possible and expedient may be of right, and ought to be as a matter of duty, enforced by the civil power,—that to the pope belongs the right of interference with the political concerns of nations, enforced by his authority over the consciences of Catholics, and his power to corroborate or cancel their oath of allegiance, and to sway them to obedience or insurrection by the power of life or death eternal; if such, I say, are the maxims avowed by her pontiffs, sanctioned by her councils, stereotyped on her ancient records, advocated

by her most approved authors, illustrated in all ages by her history, and still unrepealed, and still acted upon in the armed prohibition of free inquiry and religious liberty, and the punishment of heresy wherever her power remains unbroken; if these things are so, is it invidious, and is it superfluous to call the attention of a nation to the bearing of such a denomination upon our civil and religious institutions and equal rights? It is the right of self-preservation, and the denial of it is treason, or the infatuation of folly.' pp. 66—68.

As a Calvinist, and in behalf of those who believe in Calvinism, he says:

'We are not annoyed by scrutiny; we seek no concealment. We court investigation of our past history, and of all the tendencies of the doctrines and doings of the friends of the Reformation;—and why should the Catholic religion be exempted from scrutiny? Has it disclosed more vigorous republican tendencies? Has it done more to enlighten the intellect, to purify the morals, and sanctify the hearts of men, and fit them for self-government? Has it fought more frequently or successfully the battles of liberty against despotism, or done more to enlighten the intellect, purify the morals, and sanctify the heart of the world, and prepare it for universal liberty?' p. 81.

'It is an anti-republican charity, then, which would shield the Catholics, or any other religious denomination, from the animadversion of impartial criticism. And if ever the Catholic religion is liberalized and assimilated to our institutions, it must be done, not by sickly sentimentalism screening it from animadversion, but by subjecting it to the tug of controversy, and turning upon it the searching inspection of the public eye, and compelling it, like all other religions among us, to pass the ordeal of an enlightened public sentiment.' pp. 83, 84.

We recommend also to our readers, the unanswerable argument of Dr. Beecher, to the objections often urged to prevent any public notice of the Catholics and their operations. We see no reason why Catholics should not be as subject to animadversion as any other denomination; and what other denomination is there which does not receive its full share? The question is not, Are they *sincere* or not in their belief? "The republican tendencies of their faith depends on *what* they believe, and not on the simple fact, that they do believe it." We have no wish to doubt their sincerity; but we have yet to learn, that this sincerity insures our safety. There was no want of sincerity in many of those disciples of Loyola, by whom the scenes of inquisitorial despotism and cruelty were enacted in the old world. There are, however, some points of faith, as to which the people of the United States should insist on a definite answer, not merely by word, but by open and decided conduct. Catholics are deeply concerned to favor us with a frank avowal on these subjects; nor can they expect, until their reply is

in the affirmative, and their conduct is in unison therewith, that Protestant patriots will rest satisfied. Do they, then, believe, and are they ready to show it whenever and wherever practicable, in universal education, free inquiry, the right of all to read and study God's word, and the liberty and equality of all religious denominations? Do they renounce,—and if so, let them distinctly avow it,—the infallibility of the pope and Catholic church, his universal jurisdiction, the power of eternal life vested in the priesthood, the heresy and consequent exposure to damnation of all who are not Catholics, and the propriety of their extermination by force, if other means fail? Let them fairly meet these questions, and no longer seek to evade them, by urging the piety and sincerity of Fenelon, Thomas à Kempis, and others in their communion. We cheerfully admit, that there are pious and devoted men within the pale of the Catholic church; men like Van Ess, ready to labor with their might to give the bible to the world,—individuals whose purity of life and sterling worth might put to the blush many who bear the name of Protestants. But this is nothing to the point under consideration. “Whether Catholics are pious or learned, is not the question; but what are the republican tendencies of the system?” No candid person, after reading the following extracts, can reproach Dr. Beecher with intolerance.

“But have not the Catholics just as good a right to their religion as other denominations have to theirs?” I have said so. I not only admit their equal rights, but insist upon them; and am prepared to defend their rights as I am those of my own and other Protestant denominations. The Catholics have a perfect right to proselyte the nation to their faith, if they are able to do it. But I too have the right of preventing it, if I am able. They have a right freely to propagate their opinions and arguments; and I too have a right to apprise the nation of their political bearings on our republican institutions. They have a right to test the tendencies of protestantism by an appeal to history; and I, by an appeal to history, have a right to illustrate the coincidence between the political doctrines and the practice of the Catholic church, and to show, that always they have been hostile to civil and religious liberty. The Catholics claim and exercise the liberty of animadverting on the doctrines and doings of Protestants, and we do not complain of it: and why should they or their friends complain, that we in turn should animadvert on the political maxims and doings of the Catholic church? Must Catholics have all the liberty,—their own and ours too? Can they not endure the reaction of free inquiry? Must we lay our hand on our mouth in their presence, and stop the press? Let them count the cost, and such as cannot bear the scrutiny of free inquiry, return where there is none; for though we would kindly accommodate them in all practicable ways, we cannot surrender our rights for their accommodation.’ pp. 87—89.

Another plea in behalf of the Catholics, is their influence in

procuring the restitution of stolen property and allaying excitements among the ignorant population. But we are not so ready to admit this plea, as many others are. So far from it, this very fact is, in our view, one of the strongest objections to the prevalence of the Catholic religion, and the favor with which some Protestants seem to regard it. Is it so, that our rights, property and lives, the invaluable legacy bequeathed us by those who hazarded all for freedom, are to be held by the tenure of a dependence on the will of the Catholic priesthood, to protect us and ours? Can the lifted hand of a Jesuit still the tumult and make the waves retire? But who shall assure us, that the same hand may not be raised to urge forward the tide about to overwhelm us? Is there in the midst of us such an irresponsible power, whose councils are guided by the *dicta* of a foreign head, whose decrees are secret as the grave, having at its beck thousands over whom it exerts a terrific control? and are we to be told, that the people of this republic have no cause for alarm?

‘For what was the city of Boston for five nights under arms,—her military upon the alert,—her citizens enrolled, and a body of five hundred men constantly patrolling the streets? Why were the accustomed lectures for public worship, and other public secular meetings, suspended? Why were the citizens, at sound of bell, convened at mid-day in Faneuil Hall?—to hear Catholicism eulogized, and thanksgiving offered to his reverence the bishop, for his merciful protection of the children of the pilgrims! And why, by the cradle of liberty and under the shadow of Bunker’s Hill, did men turn pale, and whisper, and look over their shoulders and around to ascertain whether it were safe to speak aloud, or meet to worship God? Has it come to this?—that the capital of New-England has been thrown into consternation by the threat of a Catholic mob, and that her temples and mansions stand only through the forbearance of a Catholic bishop? There can be no liberty in the presence of such masses of dark mind, and of such despotic power over it in a single man. Safety on such terms is not the protection of law, but of single handed despotism. Will our great cities consent to receive protection from the Catholic priesthood,—dependent on the Catholic powers of Europe, and favored by his holiness, who is himself governed by the bayonets of Austria?’ pp. 90—92.

Dr. Beecher has not put this question too strongly. We all know the testimony of the Lady Superior at the trial of the Convent rioters, as to the influence of the bishop over his 20,000 brave Irish. Within the last two or three years we have made most alarming strides in disorganization. Our cities have rung with the shouts of mobs; our papers are filled with the demonstrations of the interference of aliens with our political prospects as a nation; and surely it is no pleasing fact to know, that the Catholic priesthood, by their overawing influence, *may* be a barrier for us against

the threats and attempts of lawless violence. Even while we are writing, the public journals inform us, that blood has been shed in various places ; and scarcely a week passes, in which something does not occur to show us the disposition felt, by men comparatively aliens, to break down the peace and order of our well-regulated communities. Are the confessional and the ordinances of papal priests to be our substitutes for courts of justice and civil enactments ?

Dr. Beecher next speaks of Catholic schools, designed for the education of Protestant children. We see not how the purpose and tendency of these schools can be denied by any one, who has given an hour's reflection to the influences thus made to bear on the susceptible minds of youth. The whole machinery of this system of education is calculated, if any thing can do so, to effect the object of gaining important proselytes to the Catholic faith. These schools are wholly under the direction and supervision of Catholics. No public examinations are had from year to year ; no reports are laid before the community in the midst of which they are situated ; no invited visits and intercourse of Protestant parents and friends with the pupils. All these things are parts of the Protestant system of education. Not another denomination besides the Catholics, have ever manifested a wish to withhold all desired explanations, or not to have the whole system of instruction open to the public eye. Every thing among Protestants is unveiled and visible. Why should it be otherwise in Catholic seminaries and schools ? Is there any reason why greater confidence should be placed in the conductors of them, than in those who manage Protestant establishments ? Yet, what Protestant school could hope for the least encouragement, which should be carried on in accordance with the same principles of secrecy and concealment as prevails in Catholic institutions ? Who can doubt, that an influence is designed, and is actually exerted, to make the pupils Catholics ? No other reason can be alledged for the difference just adverted to, which is at all satisfactory to a candid mind. If credit is to be given to the sincerity of their professions, it cannot but be so. Viewing the children and youth committed to their charge as heretics, and, so long as out of the Catholic church, exposed to perdition, will they not seek to bring them into the true fold,—in a word, to make them Catholics ? Catholic manuals are the only religious books tolerated ; the Catholic worship only is maintained, and the pupils are required to assist in it. Now, what in the nature of things must be the result, with respect to the young and susceptible minds on which these causes are continually operating ? Is a benevolent desire of imparting useful knowledge, aside from a wish to exert a proselyting influence, the object ; why then are these schools so particularly devoted to Protestant chil-

dren? Why are thousands and tens of thousands of Catholic children left groaning under all the evils of ignorance, and withheld from Protestant schools? Why are large sums of money lavished in endowing these Catholic schools, and gathering in Protestant children from the bosoms of families where they will not be wholly neglected? and why are not increasing and untiring efforts put forth, to raise the Catholic population among us from their almost hopeless condition of degradation? How can such things be reconciled? The christian public has a right to put these questions; and they ought not to rest satisfied, until some better reason than any which has yet been given, is offered in reply. Professions, that Catholics have no wish to interfere with the religious principles of Protestant children, may be incessantly reiterated; but who can believe them, so long as their conduct is thus palpably inconsistent? We have no fault to find with their wish to proselyte; it is natural: but we cannot sufficiently express our detestation of the concealment under which they choose to act, and the utter disregard of candor which they evince, in seeking to disguise the purpose from those at whose dearest interests they aim so treacherous a blow, through their children. The dilemma is one they cannot avoid. If they are sincere, then, they believe that none can be saved out of the Catholic church; and even with the feelings of common humanity, they must feel prompted to labor for the conversion of the children to the Catholic religion; or, if insincere in that belief, distrusting them here, we must lose all ground of confidence in their denials, as to the object of their schools, and are left without any thing to assure us, that for the promotion of their selfish ends, and to strengthen their power, they will not do what they can, to establish and maintain a Catholic influence over the minds of their pupils. Let them take which side of the supposition they choose, and the result is the same. No desire will be felt to uphold the children in the Protestant faith. A powerful and secret influence, where a more open one cannot be used, will be exerted to effect their darling object. Nor are the Catholic priests, when writing to friends and employers in Europe, careful to disclaim such an intention. Extracts from their communications which have been translated and published, show this. Facts too, confirm the view which we have taken, as to the operation of causes. We need only refer our readers to statements made during the last anniversary of the American Home Missionary Society, and especially to the speech of the Rev. Mr. Hatfield, of St. Louis, respecting occurrences which had fallen within his own cognizance. Pupils who enter these schools Protestants, do come out Catholics. We might cite facts in support of the positions we have taken, but we presume our readers are familiar with most if not all of them. We have no doubt at all, from the evidence be-

fore us, that among the adherents of the papal supremacy, both in this country and in Europe, an anxious desire is felt to promote the progress of the Catholic religion in the United States. We fully believe in the existence of the Leopold Society in Austria, and similar associations in other parts of Europe, which, under the patronage of men like Metternich, are laboring to effect this favorite object. Some, we know, think, that by proving the number of emigrants directly from Austria to be few, they have overthrown all the evidence of such a design. Far from it: they have done no such thing. The Catholic church is one and indivisible, as to the influence of its priesthood upon its adherents. Now it cannot be denied, that by far the greatest portion of the *Irish* emigrants are bigoted Catholics. The power of the priests over them is proverbial. Who does not see, that if the establishment of the supremacy of the pope in these United States, and the destruction of our prosperity as a free and Protestant nation, is an object with Austria, the end may be as well accomplished, indirectly, through the influence of priests over the Catholic population coming from Ireland, as if she sent out her own subjects? The simple question is, Does the system which they are laboring to uphold, tend to destroy free institutions? On this subject, history speaks with a voice which cannot be gainsaid. All analogy favors the conclusion, that nothing but power in the priesthood is wanting, to renew here scenes which have been acted over in many a Catholic country in Europe. We mean not to include in this judgment Roman Catholics who are the native citizens of these States. We do not believe, that men like Charles Carroll, who have shared with Protestants in the burden and toil of rearing up our free institutions, and like them have pledged their "lives, fortunes and sacred honor" in their defense, would ever deliberately engage in scenes of outrage and persecution against their fellow-citizens. We regret that a discrimination has not been more clearly made, in the discussion of this subject, between such men and a foreign priesthood. It is from the influence of the latter, that dangers must arise, if our civil or religious rights are invaded by our Catholic population. How far home-born Americans, who hold the same opinions, might be wrought up by the influence of this foreign priesthood, could they secure an ascendancy, we pretend not to say. It would be natural, were they, blinded by success, and in the moment of triumph, to forget the injustice of which they were guilty. We disclaim, however, all intention of associating them with a foreign priesthood, against whom, and the system which they inculcate, our remarks are particularly aimed.

The political and religious constitution of the Roman Catholic system are so blended, that it is impossible to consider them separately, when we treat of the influence which it may exert on our

country. While, therefore, we utterly disclaim a wish to abridge the freedom of religious opinion, we cannot help *protesting*, as did the reformers of old, against that artful system which is now aiming to incorporate itself with our dear-bought privileges, and to subvert our political rights, through the means of a priesthood who have ever been averse to the spread of liberal principles and free institutions. In relation to the population which is constantly disgorged upon our shores, we say with Dr. Beecher :

‘If they associated with republicans, the power of caste would wear away. If they mingled in our schools, the republican atmosphere would impregnate their minds. If they scattered, unassociated, the attrition of circumstances would wear off their predilections and aversions. If they could read the bible, and might, and did, their darkened intellect would brighten, and their bowed down mind would rise. If they dared to think for themselves, the contrast of Protestant independence with their thralldom, would awaken the desire of equal privileges, and put an end to an arbitrary clerical dominion over trembling superstitious minds. If the pope and potentates of Europe held no dominion over ecclesiastics here, we might trust to time and circumstances to mitigate their ascendancy and produce assimilation. But for conscience sake and patronage, they are dependent on the powers that be across the deep, by whom they are sustained and nurtured ; and receive and organize all who come, and retain all who are born ; while by argument, and a Catholic education, they beguile the children of credulous unsuspecting Protestants into their own communion.’ pp. 117—119.

Again :

‘But it is notorious, that the Catholic immigrants to this country are generally of the class least enlightened, and most implicit in their religious subjection to the priesthood, who are able, by their spiritual ascendancy, to direct easily and infallibly, the exercise of their civil rights and political action. And it were easy to show, were this the time and place, that they do interfere in the exaction of fees, in the control of children, and in the article of marriage, as no Protestant minister ever did or would dare to attempt ; and that a secular influence is beginning to be exerted over the political action of their dependent, confiding people.’ pp. 127, 128.

The author has drawn the following picture of the Catholic religion, and we quote it for the clear and strong light in which it presents to us the powerful influences which are at work among us. Let every American citizen ponder well the truth in this matter :

‘It is a religion exclusive in its claims, and awful in its sanctions, and terrific in its power of declaring sins remitted or retained. By the confessional it searches the heart, learns the thoughts, and motives, and habits, and condition of individuals and families, and thus acquires the means of an unlimited ascendancy over mind, by the united influence of both worlds. It is majestic and imposing in its ceremonies, dazzling

by its lights and ornaments, vestments and gorgeous drapery, and fascinating by the power of music, and the breathing marble and living canvas, and all the diversified contributions of art,—strong in the patronage of the great, and the power of wealth and the versatilities of art, and unlimited in its powers of accommodation to the various characters, tastes and conditions of men. For the profound, it has metaphysics and philosophy,—the fine arts for men of taste, and wealth, and fashion,—signs and wonders for the superstitious,—forbearance for the sceptic,—toleration for the liberal, who eulogize and aid her cause,—enthusiasm for the ardent,—lenity for the voluptuous, and severity for the austere,—fanaticism for the excited, and mysticism for moody musing. For the formalist, rites and ceremonies,—for the moral, the merit of good works, and for those who are destitute, the merits of the saints at accommodating prices,—for the poor, penance,—extreme unction for the dying, and masses for the spirits in prison, who, by donation or testament, or by their friends, provide the requisite ransom.

This is the religion so powerful in the combined energies of earth and heaven,—so dextrous in their application,—so gigantic in its past energies,—so enslaving and terrible in its recorded deeds, and yet in its present appearance, so mild, meek, unassuming, and munificent, which is coming in among us, a comparative stranger,—the records of its history denied or forgotten, or covered by a charity that would belt the zones and span the earth,—coming by numbers to outnumber us, by votes to outvote us, and by the competitions of European munificence, to secure an ascendant influence in the education of the young republicans of our nation.

This religion is wielded by a priesthood, educated, for the most part, in the despotic governments of Europe, of recent naturalization, and retaining the ecclesiastical and political partialities of their country and early associations. Were they allied to us by family and ties of blood, like the ministry of all other denominations, there would be less to be feared, and common interests would produce, gradually but certainly, an unreluctant assimilation. But as it is, they stand out from society, a separate, insulated male ecclesiastical association, with property and interests peculiarly their own; with an irresponsible and despotic power over the consciences, and physical and civil action of numbers, quite too great and influential for the safety of republican institutions, where every thing depends on the free and enlightened action of public sentiment.' p. 132—135.

We repeat the question, Will the citizens of this country look with indifference on the efforts of papal emissaries to spread among us a delusion so artful, proclaimed, as it is, by the voice of history, and testified to by so many well qualified to discern and judge?*

* We would especially refer our readers to a work of Blanco White, formerly a Catholic priest in Spain, entitled *Practical and Internal Evidence against Catholicism*. We had intended to notice it more particularly in connection with this article, but we have no room now for what we had prepared. We may hereafter recur to it, in the hope of doing it justice.

Where it prevails, it cannot but affect the political relations of a country. In its books of casuistry it is often decided, that no faith is to be kept with heretics, provided the welfare of the Catholics will not be endangered, even when the violated promise involves the guilt of perjury. Are we unreasonable, then, in distrusting the professions of men, *novi homines* with us, allied to a church which has never, by its head and lawgiver, disclaimed these doctrines, but whose bulls and anathemas are yearly fulminated against free institutions, the liberty of the press, and the diffusion of knowledge? The assertion is indeed sometimes made, that the Catholic church has undergone a reformation, and that it is uncharitable to quote her former history, in days of ignorance and pride, as evidence against her. We answer with Dr. Beecher:

‘ Who is it then that makes the proclamation, that the Catholic church has discovered her mistakes in past ages and is reformed? Has the pope announced it? Has a general council decreed it? Has the Catholic convention at Baltimore placed it upon their records? Has a single Catholic bishop or priest admitted or claimed that the *Catholic church has been, by the proper authorities, revised and corrected in any material point of doctrine, discipline, or practice?* Not one,—and no Catholic will say it who has any character to lose or frowns to fear from superior power. The church cannot be reformed as a church only by the pope and a general council. The question of revision and change is therefore simply a matter of historical fact. When, where, and in what respects, has the pope and a general council changed the claims, maxims, doctrines, or established usages of the church? When and where has it been decreed, that liberty of conscience and civil liberty are the birth-right of man,—that reading the bible is the right of man, and not a privilege to be conferred,—that private interpretation is the duty of man, instead of implicit confidence in the exposition of others,—that persecution for conscience sake is tyranny, and the deeds of the inquisition an abomination in the sight of God? What one of her maxims, avowed centuries ago, has she expunged and does not rather enforce to the present hour at Rome and Vienna? What are the powerful principles of collision which now agitate Europe and South America, but those of civil liberty and despotic power? And on which side, when uncoerced, is his holiness, and his cardinals, and bishops, and priesthood? Every where in Portugal, in Spain, in France, and in Italy, and South America, on the side of monarchical, and in opposition to liberal institutions.’ pp. 152—154.

In conclusion,—for we have dwelt upon this topic longer than we intended, and nothing but its importance and close bearing on our prosperity could justify so full occupancy of our pages with it,—in conclusion, we ask, what shall be done? Shall we fold our hands, and sleep over the evil? or shall we arouse to instant action? Shall we suffer the enemy to go before, and gain possession of all the holds of strength, and bar up to us the avenues to the

minds of generations yet to be instructed? or shall we put forth a moral influence which shall be felt in controlling the destinies of our nation? Shall the birth-right of freemen, the privileges of Protestantism, identified every where with the cause of liberty, be handed down to our posterity? or shall they groan in the shackles of superstition and despotism? If the better alternative is to be the happy lot of this fair land, more must be done than yet seems thought of. A simultaneous effort must be made to diffuse abroad among christians a deeper sense of obligation, a higher standard of practical piety, and a spirit of self-denying benevolence, which will begin with regarding all as God's, and never end, so long as there is a subject in whose favor it ought to be exerted. This benevolence must go forth to repair the waste places of Zion, to sprinkle the broad land of the West with schools, colleges, churches, and means of instruction in morals and religion; it must wake up the supine church to hear the cry of suffering millions; it must gather and send out on the mountain-wave its cargoes of bibles, tracts, and its hosts of missionaries, to tell a lost world that Jesus has died, and that there is redemption from its woes through his blood. Out-running the too active emissaries of corruption, it must make its positive aggressions on the kingdom of darkness, and count every day lost, which does not witness some new province of the empire of Satan brought back in triumph to Christ. Let the church of Christ thus gird herself to the onset, and Pleas for the West, appeals to the sympathies of believers, will be needless. Every form of error will quail and blench before the all-conquering Spirit which is in the midst of her; and the man of sin, the false prophet, and the iron rule of paganism, will all be remembered but in the annals of her triumphs, and in the songs of praise with which she breaks forth in every land, "Alleluia, for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth!"

ART. VIII.—COLONIZATION AND ANTI-COLONIZATION.

An Inquiry into the Character and Tendency of the American Colonization and American Anti-Slavery Societies. By WILLIAM JAY. Second Edition. 1835.

Letters to the Hon. William Jay; being a Reply to his "Inquiry into the American Colonization and American Anti-Slavery Societies." By DAVID REESE, M. D., of New-York.

HERE are two books, of which the first has been greatly lauded as *dispassionate*, the other much commended as *forcible*; yet if both had been universally owned to be at once forcible and passionate, truth would have been the gainer, and the good which there is in each, might have had a fair chance of separation from the evil. But as it is, the many of the one party, and the multitude of the

other, will swallow the whole of their respective draughts,—often relishing the evil, as there is reason to fear, without even having a taste of the good. It should be said, however, at this point, that although both these books are passionate, there is great choice between them; the passion of one being more *dignified* than that of the other: but both are alike in this, that, while written by good men, and embodying, in different degrees, great and valuable truth, they have appeared in succession on the stage, well equipped for performing their respective parts in that great drama of religious war, into which some awful, invisible, and, alas! unsuspected power, is drawing the whole church of God in these United States, with a view to some yet undisclosed consummation.

Look at the drama, and observe how various the scenes which are enacted, and how universal the theater of exhibition which the great spiritual manager has cunningly chosen. In one part, the general assembly of the Presbyterian church opens as regularly with a quarrel, as with prayer. In another, the foundations of great institutions are laid in metaphysical disagreements. In a third and fourth, venerable assemblies of divines, anxious that sinners should be taught, in the right way, the necessity of conversion, are impeaching their fellow-divines as heretics. But wherefore? Has a man of them denied, that there is no other name given under heaven whereby we can be saved, than the name of Jesus? Not one. Has any one denied the necessity of repentance, faith, obedience, love? No, none of these; but one has said, (we quote from common report in the world, and not from the record,) that, considering the relation of cause to effect, as manifest in the visible universe, we are not to gather from the original Greek of Paul, that *entity* forms a part of the work of sanctification; and the other has said, that the reason why men sin, and continue sinners, is, that they have a mind to do so. The first of these, it seems, is a hypocrite, as well as heretic, for he teaches contrary to his own logic, as well as the truth; the next is a heretic simply, for he, like the first, utters a sentiment contrary to the bible, and what is more, contrary to Calvin, and what is most of all, contrary to the STANDARDS OF THE CHURCH!

Never was there such a scramble among misers for gold, as there is among men of holy professions for the ownership of right principles and feelings. That is *my* truth, says one; the society to which I belong found it out. It is, says his antagonist, the truth of all New-England,—the inheritance from our fathers who landed on Plymouth rock. But, rejoins the first, you cannot be sincere; you say it because you must, because it is popular; it is hard, as Mr. Jay says, to believe in your moral integrity. He is a man-stealer, (says a third,) who holds a slave one week. That (says a fourth) is fanaticism and absurdity; you are lighting the

flames of civil war; you are seeking to destroy our happy union;—look before you leap. Oh, that abominable doctrine of expediency! (says the other,) Has not God said, leap and never look in every case of duty? Now we hear an earnest note of remonstrance,—I should not think so good a man could write so many disingenuous, sophistical, and yet dangerous things: then a more serious tone, from some other quarter,—I have no confidence in colonization or the representations of its friends.

Then there is one whose great disqualification for being listened to, is, that he comes from beyond the sea; and when at any arrival of the stage-coach, his name is rumored among the people, straight the sexton runs to see the church-doors well secured, lest mob-moving doctrine should gain entrance. But if, through unexpected lenity, entrance should not be denied, then shall all New-England learn how her clergy are upholding slavery by their influence; and how her churches are thoroughly corrupted, having, it seems, expressed a fear lest it should hurt a prisoner's limbs to knock his fetters off with a pick-axe, instead of taking time to find the key and unlock them gently. Mean time, both great hearts and lesser hearts swell with indignation; and strong passions, hardly bound by necessary *christian* and *civil* forms of speech, struggle for utterance. All the while, there stands one, foremost in every tumult, who, at every pause, lest there should be too much of the gentle in the scene, flings his mad banner on the winds, and screams out, in concert with some half-score of confederate voices, hypocrite! blasphemer! apologist for slavery!

As to TRUTH, she is always well spoken of in the abstract; but the practical idea seems to be at present, in religious and *benevolent* controversy, if an assertion is to your purpose, make it,—make it, and leave the truth to Providence. As to religion, the world has many fears there is such a reality somewhere, but is sure, by the quarrels of her children, that she is any where rather than in her own family. But some, more serious and hopeful, think her not unobservant of the present din, whether she be hidden in the earth, or underneath the sea; and that when she shall disclose her form, all glorious as it was when the heathen used to say,—see how they love one another,—it may again be said of all her saints who shall at once drop their contentions,

——“Them unexpected joy surprised,
When the great ensign of Messiah blazed.”

Colonizationists may disregard it, and their opponents may be reckless of it; but the moral condition of New-England is critical in the extreme. There is just at hand a dissolution of that beautiful and most powerfully beneficent union, which has bound into one system, not of doctrine alone, but of harmonious and simulta-

neous action, in every great and good cause, all her Congregational churches. No power on earth can long keep that harmonious system together, when once there shall have become fixed in the middle ground between them, *one* great exciting subject, on which they shall differ so widely, as that one body shall deem it the cause of Satan, and the other the cause of God. See how slight, compared with this, are the foundations of those distinctions which are deepest, and have kept widest apart the nominal branches of the true church. A question in baptism, as to sprinkling or immersion, or the age at which either may be a christian ordinance; a disputation about the forms of ecclesiastical government,—whether church concerns shall be regulated by no one man, or by one man, or by men ranged above each other respectively, and various like diversities of little importance, when brought and weighed with the great duty of mutual fellowship among christians,—have so set off from one another large bodies of true and humble christians, it has been thought a great discovery of the age, that these different bodies can be made to act in union in the bible cause, and the tract cause, and a few others. But now on that subject which, of all others, needs the most perfect union of action to accomplish any thing, and on which all feel alike, there are such personal divisions as ought at once to make great searchings of heart.

It is vain to think, that this divided feeling can be reunited by the annihilation of either of the two great causes which have been artificially drawn into antagonist positions. The cause of abolition must advance, and new light must and will continually pour in, to show, that some plan of abolishing slavery is a safe and happy refuge from the enormous physical, political and moral evils, which it is gathering with fearful rapidity into a cloud, that must ere long, if not dissipated, sweep over the nation with its hurricane, and give out the voice of its thunder. On the other hand, those who have lately discovered, that colonization is a bubble, and even something worse, ought to be convinced, by what they may remember of the past and observe of the present, that their judgment on that subject is fallible. For, what may be thought of the present attitude of that subject, it is not essential to inquire; but there must be *a* plan of colonizing free people of color, which is capable of sustaining a great system of benevolent thought and action, because for many years it has sustained it. If the idea is now so absurd, that Mr. Jay is right in saying, nothing but hatred to the blacks can make men believe that it will be a blessing to Africa, it was just as absurd twenty years ago. It was absurd in Mills to dream of it,—greatly absurd to pray for it,—indescribable in the degree of its absurdity, to be willing to die for it. Saints, whose bones are now under the ground or in the sea, have mixed

a love for this absurdity with their warmest current of thoughts. The New-England clergy, who are not wont to take an unreasonable practice into favor, out of mere fashion, have for years commended it to their people; and now, when the absurdity, if it be one, is so fully exposed, the great body of New-England's best sons love the cause, and delight in hope of its future glory. There is no question on the subject: a great and noble work is to be performed by colonization. We know it, and half of New-England knows it, by the same perception that leads us to a like confidence in any of her enterprises; and if there are any who do not know it, then they have never perceived what colonization, as undertaken by New-England, was originally meant to be, or they have lost the perception.

But what is it that colonization, as undertaken by the christian public, particularly in New-England, was originally meant to be,—that it has been, so far as *genuine* New-England has striven to promote it,—that it will be, till genuine New-England shall see it consummated? This question is very easy to be put, and easy to be answered. And since we are pursuing this train of ideas, no less for the sake of *peace* than for the sake of truth; and as we therefore desire, of course, to carry with us the confidence of colonization *opponents*, no less than of colonization advocates, we begin with a quotation from Mr. Birney's late letter to the Presbyterian churches of Kentucky.

'Who fears the blacks will, if emancipated, become our school-masters, our college professors, our preachers, our lawyers, or our physicians? No one. Why? Simply because they would, on account of their ignorance and total want of literary or scientific qualification, be totally incompetent; therefore, there would be, on their part, no aspiration to the offices, and on ours there would very justly and very certainly be exclusion from them, if they should aspire while deficient in merit. Now from the superior tenderness and delicacy of the marriage relation, and from the greater care we exercise, lest our friends and connections enter into it unworthily, I entertain the opinion, that alliances of this kind would be far less successfully sought by the colored people, than the public stations a while ago mentioned. Many of us would be well contented with persons as school-masters, preachers, lawyers or physicians, with whom we would have insurmountable objections, (leaving out of view personal likings or dislikings,) to contract the marriage relation. Now when to ignorance, degradation of *caste*, and a great deficiency of those qualities, intellectual, moral, and pecuniary, which secure social equality, is added that *physical repugnance* on the part of the whites, so earnestly alledged, it seems to me, that a stronger barrier of defense in the premises could not be erected.' p. 20.

We do not with certainty take Mr. Birney to be expressing, in the foregoing passage, his own private feelings with respect to

amalgamation, which he says, and we agree with him, is an objection to emancipation, unsuitable altogether to a manly mind ; but it embodies a clear and undisguised statement of that universal and deep-seated fact, attending the existence of the colored race in the United States, upon which the entire necessity of colonization has been supposed to rest ; and we find it in our hearts to bless God, that he has put within our reach language that expresses so forcibly what, for the most part, we must otherwise have ourselves expressed in the outset of our argument ; and what, as coming from us, would have been read by our opposing fellow-citizens with jealousy, but now will be received with confidence, as from a true brother.

Mr. Birney, then, says, and with what emphasis of meaning his *italics* testify, that a degradation of *caste* added to a *physical repugnance* on the part of the whites, together with the less invincible circumstances of present ignorance, poverty, etc., form a barrier so strong, that a stronger could not be erected, to hinder the blacks from becoming relatives of the whites by marriage, or their school-masters, college professors, preachers, lawyers, or physicians. This is not, in any part, too strong a statement of Mr. Birney's views : for, although he has assigned as the reason why emancipated blacks may not become school-masters, college professors, preachers, lawyers or physicians, their "total want of literary or scientific qualification ;" yet, if he had meant to be understood, that this, and not the other circumstances to which he was just going to allude, form, in fact, the effective ground of the exclusion, his amalgamation-fearing readers, he must have seen, would turn upon him at once and say,—Why, in the short period of ten years, this barrier may be done away, in the person of some of the young blacks already born ; who, in that time, if taken in the spring of their childhood, may be made, by education, as fit for those professions, as intellectually and scientifically fit, as the whites *now* are : and thus Mr. Birney's soothing balsam to their fears, would be no soothing balsam at all. Mr. B. is addressing his christian brethren on the ground of an existing state of degradation on the part of the blacks, and of a repugnance on the part of the whites ; and the strength of his appeal is the same as if he had said in brief,—‘ You indeed know certainly, that the blacks, if emancipated, cannot, for a long time to come, be even our school-masters, college professors, preachers, lawyers or physicians,—much less, then, can they become mingled with us by marriage :’ which all proceeds upon the ground, that the physical repugnance and the degradation of caste will only very slowly lose their efficacy to keep the blacks aloof, both from intermarriage and honorable stations ; or, what is to the same purpose, both to Mr. Birney's argument and our own,—that, for some reason known or un-

known, emancipated blacks, as a class, could only with very moderate and difficult advances recover from their totally incompetent state, in respect of literary and scientific qualification. And to such a period of time does Mr. Birney extend the slow progress of the blacks to a social equality with the whites, that he adds, almost immediately upon the close of the passage which has been above quoted, the following sentiment: "It is very certain, that so strong would be the prejudice against amalgamation, by the present generation of adults, and probably for several to come, that even the valor of a Sesostriis, or the charms of a Cleopatra, could not overcome it;" and then goes on with great good humor, nay, somewhat facetiously, to remark: "It seems to my poor judgment scarcely a sufficient reason for continuing a great trespass against our fellow-men, because some hundred years hence, a prince-royal of Jamaica, or the Duke of Barbadoes, the Countess of Porto Rico, or one of the royal maids of Cuba, dressed 'in the livery of the burnished sun,' may overcome it in the person of one of our great-great-great-grand-children."

We do not gather from Mr. Birney's language, (as has been already remarked,) any certainty, that he approves of the existence of that degradation of *caste* and that *physical repugnance* which he so forcibly represents, both in its extent and its inevitable duration; but, wrong or right, the state of things which Mr. B. has made the foundation of his argument, does in fact exist, and does exert upon the class who are the subjects of that inferiority of caste, and the objects of that repugnance, a most lamentably depressing influence. Indeed, that influence is, in its very nature, so withering to all the hopes and motives which form the spring of active and persevering efforts among men, that one ought not to be accused of rashness, who should esteem it to be a moral miracle, if any race of men who are its subjects, should rise to their proper station among mankind, except by the most slow and painful process. To rise from ignorance to intelligence, from poverty to competence, from degradation of caste, to respectability of station, implies a change which, even in the case of a select individual, and under the most favoring encouragements and incitements possible, could only be expected from the exercise of much mental vigor, and much perseverance in manly effort. How great a wonder, then, do we justly esteem it, wherever we observe this change taking place in some single instance, without the aid of those encouragements and incitements! How mighty a wonder would it be, and how visionary to look for it, that a whole race should work out for themselves such a change, when the highest personal motive addressed them as individuals, is the step from one inferior caste to another somewhat less inferior, though still at a far remove from social equality; and when the highest *patriotic* motive addressed

to them as a race, is the expectation of social equality and active respectability for some remote generation of their children's children!

It was precisely in this drooping state of their hopes and motives, that New-England colonization found the free blacks when she first put forth a hand to attempt their effectual revival and invigoration. The plan was, to remove at once so many of this race, as should concur in the removal, from under the blighting and mildew of a state of things which it was vain to deny did in fact exist, and of which hope itself could not distinctly see the termination. It was, to take those who were deemed, and who deemed themselves, inferiors among the whites, and put them where they would be deemed and would be equals among themselves, and superiors among the surrounding tribes; and thus, in relation to society, to make them become, by the mere passage of an ocean in *space*, what otherwise their race could not become, except by the passage of more than an ocean of *time*. The idea was plain, one may almost say, to the mind of childhood itself; and it charmed the benevolent then, as it charms the body of them still, by the magic of its greatness and its simplicity. The only question was, whether a suitable spot could be found, on which to carry the idea into execution. It was not, however, as distinctly kept in mind as perhaps it ought to have been, that "whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth;" so that when the site which was pitched upon for the infant colony was observed to be wonderfully fertile in soil, rich in products that might form the staples of national wealth and importance, and furnished with ports easy of access to navigators; such a current of excited and warm expectations set in the hearts of all the favorers of the plan, as swept away, at first, the salutary fear of those impending calamities and disasters which experience has taught God's people, almost universally, to expect in the outset of every enterprise, having "good will to men" for its motto.

Our business is not, however, just now, with the mistakes that attended the execution of the plan at the outset, or the heresies into which it may sometimes have been seduced at an after period; but with the great plan itself, and the purposes of benevolence of which it was meant to be the instrument. It was expected that the infant settlement planted by colonization on the African coast, would be the seed of a future extended nation; and this expectation was sustained by the analogy of all similar migrations, from the departure of the Israelites for the promised land,—the landing of the Egyptians on the Grecian shores,—of the Greeks in Italy,—of the Romans in more northern Europe,—of the Europeans in the New World,—down to the last and comparatively recent but memorable disembarkation upon Plymouth rock. But, not as in the case of the Egyptian, Grecian and Italian emigrants, who carried civilization and the arts combined with paganism and all hea-

thenish superstitions, it was expected that this should introduce on the shores of West-Africa, agriculture, the arts, commerce, education and civilized life, *in connection with the true religion*; forming a state of society like that of New-England, with its churches, its school-houses, its industrious population, and busy marts of trade. It was *not* at that time known, as well as experience has since taught it, that if missionaries are sent to Africa, they will perish in long succession, until the malignant influence of the climate shall, in some way, have been met and overcome; but it *was* expected, that the colonies should not only be themselves bright spots upon a darkened coast, but form stations for widely extended missionary operations.

It was anticipated, that the existence of a free, enlightened and happy nation of Africans, would give an impulse to the mind and the enterprise of the colored race all over the globe,—that it would prove them unfit to be slaves, and make a continuance of their bondage impossible, by showing them to be as capable of intelligence, refinement and moral worth, as any race among the fairest in Europe or America.

It was said with truth, that when an agricultural nation should arise, and bring into our market cotton, sugar, and other tropical staples, as the products of free labor, and as such, dispose of them on our own wharves, at a less price than the similar product of our slave-labor, *slavery* would be cut up by the root, in consequence of its profitable character being taken away; and it was also reasonably argued, that the slave-trade would find an effective foe in a powerful christian nation, placed upon the very spot where its horrors were perpetrated.

Finally, it was said, (not to enter minutely into all the anticipated influences of the plan,) that this colony would give an impulse to emancipation, by opening a door to the humane, by which their slaves might be made free, without being cast upon society in a condition of hopelessness and misery, and by affording to all slave-owners a method of emancipation, free from the dangers to society, real or imaginary, which an unconditional emancipation on the soil was supposed to create and imply.

This is the original scheme of colonization; and many a man will open his eyes with astonishment, when he reads that this is the scheme which he hears constantly spoken against, in addresses and public prints,—the very scheme which the Anti-Slavery Convention at Philadelphia declared, in the exposition of their *elementary* principles, to be “delusive, cruel and dangerous,” and the destruction of which the managers of the American Anti-Slavery Society, at the last New-York anniversaries, gravely voted to be essential to the success of their holy cause. Since the first proposal of the scheme, light has greatly increased upon all the subjects

on which it was designed to have a bearing, and has considerably modified the views of its friends and supporters. On the subject of slavery, for our part, we are fully satisfied, that colonization will never have opportunity to exert much influence, other than that which it has exerted already, by promoting and extending, and by binding together in *action*, as well as in speculation, in a course of labor, of alms-giving and of prayer, that benevolent feeling towards the blacks, which, before its promulgation, existed in scattered parcels throughout the land; and by thus exciting an interest which must infallibly turn into the channel of any rational and effective scheme for abolishing slavery, that may at any time be proposed. Slavery, we doubt not, will be taken entirely out of the influence of colonization, considered as a *direct* remedy for slavery, by being abolished long before that influence can have opportunity to act; still the influences named above, so far as they go, are all *auxiliary* to the great work, and truly belong to the scheme, as they were at first supposed to do. The light which has come in, has also shown errors in the scheme, as actually conducted, and deviations from the original plan, which must be corrected; but still, the view which we have given, is a fair statement of New-England views of colonization: it is that simple and unexceptionable scheme which genuine New-England, as we have before remarked, has always sustained, and is now sustaining: and let him who will venture to speak words of causeless reproach against it, speak them; let him who hopes for happiness in heaven by abusing it, abuse it; whether it be the Hon. William Jay or Mr. Garrison.

It is time to give our readers who have not perused the works which we have placed at the head of this article, some idea of their contents, so far as they relate to colonization: for on the subject of slavery, we wish it to be understood, that, although we have not joined the American Anti-Slavery Society, we have, in the present article, no contest with Mr. Jay, or any of his fellow-abolitionists. We do not approve, it is true, in some important particulars, their principles or their spirit; but their end is noble; their aims are, on the whole, benevolent and patriotic; the basis of their constitution is essentially truth, and their success, unless they shall hinder it by holding dangerous error and unhallowed fire in union with their benevolence and truth, is certain. All that we are now contending against, is, their strangely and almost unaccountably turning aside from the purpose to which the constitution of their society limits them, to hinder the success of another cause, entirely distinct, although collateral,—their persecuting it and vowing its entire overthrow. It is this unauthorized and unconstitutional enterprise of anti-colonization, which is the root of by far the greater part of the bitterness, misapprehension, disparagement of motives, and occasionally

something like malignity, in which a large part even of the most estimable anti-colonizationists do really appear to indulge ; while they, at the same time, most unceasingly as well as justly complain of the exercise, toward themselves, of the same misapprehension and unhallowed feeling on the part of very many of their opponents.

But we have a complaint to make, in the outset, upon the other side of the question. We complain of the slighting terms which Dr. Reese has applied, in his preface, to the work of Mr. Jay ; not so much because they are slighting, as because they are not founded, as we think, in truth, and are calculated, of course, to injure the cause of truth, instead of promoting it. A few passages will show our meaning, and the ground of our apprehensions :

‘ Such were my impressions when I had finished its perusal ; and a similar estimate of the utter impotency of the book, is, I have since learned, very generally entertained, by those of our fellow-citizens who are well informed in relation to the history and operations of the colonization enterprise. I therefore felt no disposition to attempt a reply. * * * But, as many of our friends, who agree with me in my view of the harmlessness of the assault which Mr. Jay’s book contains, express their apprehensions lest the magic of *his name* upon its title page may mislead the “unlearned and unwary,” and that multitudes of such may be taught to infer from our silence, that we cannot or dare not meet this “giant” in the field of discussion,’ etc. etc. etc. *Reese*, p. v.

Again :

‘ If the reader can excuse or explain such examples as those pointed out in the following Letters, in any milder and more christian language than that which imputes them to *fanaticism*, I shall rejoice, that it may hereafter be adopted. I confess for myself, that this is the only mantle to cover them, which it appears to me is furnished, even from the wardrobe of CHARITY itself.

On the *one page* we read, that the whole of the *slaves* in the United States are “kept in ignorance, and compelled to live without God, and to die without hope.” And on *another* we are told, that “245,000” of these same slaves are “*christians*,” and “*possess a saving knowledge of the religion of Christ* !”

At *one time* the Colonization Society is charged with “*professing* to be a remedy for slavery, and the only one ;” and at *another* it is declared, that its “*professed* constitutional object is exclusively that of colonizing the free blacks and manumitted slaves, and, that it has no more right to *meddle with slavery or emancipation*, than a bible society ?” On *one page*, the Colonization Society is called a “*powerful institution*,” and on *another*, it is called “*utterly impotent*,” a “*weak, broken-winded, good for nothing team* !”

In the one place we are told, first, that “the Colonization Society is in its general influence decidedly ANTI-CHRISTIAN,” and that it can in no sense be termed a religious society ;” and on the same page it is said, that this Colonization Society contains “*multitudes of religious men*.” And again : “The Colonization Society unquestionably com-

prises a *vast number* of as PURE AND DEVOTED CHRISTIANS, as can be found in this or any other country.

But if this be not unsophisticated fanaticism, let me ask the reader to affix a softer name to the attempt here made,' etc. etc. *Reese*, p. vii.

It is not our intention to deny the force of the paragraphs of Dr. Reese's preface which immediately follow those just quoted; nor to vindicate those sentiments of Mr. Jay, that are impugned, in those which we have quoted in full; but to say, that the *inconsistency* which Dr. Reese intends thereby to make out, does not, in fact, exist; and therefore it was unfair to point to them, as exhibitions of fanaticism, in that respect. We ought not, certainly, to object to Dr. Reese calling men *fanatics* on proper grounds,—that is to say, if they are so; for the application of this term becomes abusive only when unjustly made. As to *inconsistency*, we think there is much of it in Mr. Jay's work; but when Mr. Jay said, in the particular passage pointed to by Dr. Reese, that the millions of slaves are compelled to live without God, and die without hope, he evidently meant to speak of them *as a body*, and not, as Dr. Reese declares, of every individual among them; so that it was not inconsistent in him, afterwards to suppose, that even a tenth part are true christians. The first assertion, although perhaps too sweeping in its language, is certainly true in substance; and we trust that the truth of his after *supposition* may be made equally manifest in the final day.

So in the next place, as to the professions of the Colonization Society, although we have no sympathy with Mr. Jay in much of his argument, yet the *inconsistency* of his language is all done away by merely observing, that he spoke in one place of its *constitutional professions* as a society; and in another, of its *practical professions*, in the conversations and speeches of its members. Now whether Mr. Jay has represented the matter truly or not, is one question; but we say, it was unfair to hold him up, upon these grounds, as being inconsistent, even to fanaticism; when in fact there is not, in these particular passages, any inconsistency at all.

So again, Mr. Jay in one place calls the Colonization Society a "powerful institution," and at another, "a weak, broken-winded, good for nothing team." Now this last remark of Mr. Jay's, as nearly as we can make out its true character, is indeed ill-tempered, but not *inconsistent* with his first; for in that first appellation, he called the institution powerful in its patronage, its resources, the multitude of its adherents, etc., while in the last, he meant to describe it as good for nothing in relation to certain benevolent objects, which it professes to have among its aims. We need follow Dr. Reese no farther, only to add, that Mr. Jay's apparent inconsistencies are made such, only by Dr. R. withholding the connections and bearings in which the passages are found; and as this is the very mode of representation under which colonization has suffered much

from its opponents, we are, on that account, as well as from our regard for fair and manly argument, disposed to notice it with sorrow on our own side of the question. Nay, as it is the very mode of representation which Dr. Reese justly complains of in Mr. Jay's work, he ought to have kept far aloof from the same in his rebukes and criticisms. These remarks ought not to be taken as undervaluing the work of Dr. R., to which we shall have occasion to refer in different places, as containing sound argument; but such things are exhibitions of human frailty in pious men, and prompt us to exclaim, "Who can understand his errors? cleanse thou me from secret faults!"

The attitude taken by Mr. Jay, in the preface to his work, is very noble and imposing. He flings aside all extraneous questions, and comes up to the argument with the air of a man strong enough to grapple with the very *elements* of a great subject, and honest enough to disdain all unfair or even questionable advantages, in the argument. But we shall quote the entire preface, and suffer it to make its own impression.

'No allusion has been made in the following pages, to certain popular objections to the Colonization Society; nor have any cases of individual cruelty been cited, to illustrate the evils of slavery. It is proper, that the reasons for this departure from the ordinary mode of discussing these two subjects, should be given, that they may not be misunderstood.

The objections I have omitted to notice, are, the mortality to which the emigrants are exposed, in consequence of the climate of Liberia; the demoralizing traffic which the colonists have carried on with the natives, in rum and military stores; and the improvident application of the funds of the society, which has rendered it bankrupt.

These objections, serious as they are in themselves, are not inseparable from the system of colonization. Another and more salubrious site may be selected; the traffic complained of may be discontinued; and the fiscal affairs of the society may hereafter be managed with prudence and economy. But there are inherent evils in the system, and it is important, that the public attention should not be diverted from these evils, by the contemplation of others, which are only accidental.

So, also, it is important, that the sinfulness of slavery should not be merged in that of its unauthorized abuses. Many contend for the lawfulness of slavery, who readily admit the sinfulness of insulated cases of cruelty. It has, therefore, been my object to show, that, admitting the slaves to be treated as a prudent farmer treats his cattle—that they have enough to eat, are sheltered from the inclemency of the weather, and are not subjected to a greater degree of severity than is necessary to extort from them a due amount of labor,—American slavery is, nevertheless, a heinous sin, and like every other sin, ought to be immediately abandoned." *Jay*, pp. v, vi.

This preface of Mr. Jay's is altogether based upon an idea which we have long and earnestly endeavored to bring to the attention of our opponents on the subject of colonization; that *if the errors of colonization are not inherent in the system, but are such*

as may be thrown off, and still leave standing a system of benevolence and practical value, then they are bound to labor, not for the destruction of the scheme, but for the reform of its errors and abuses. Precisely upon this idea it was, that, in the outset of this review, we presented the scheme of colonization such as it was at first, and always has been, in the minds of the great body of its truly benevolent supporters; in order that every man, taking the scheme in its elementary aspect, and stripped of all contingent and extraneous qualities, might clearly see his duty respecting the subject in this view. And now, with a great part of our candid readers, the work of argument may be, at this point, closed at once, and a permanent and immovable conviction fastened on the mind. For let such as are really looking for the truth, turn back to our account of what New-England friends of colonization have always designed it to be, and let them say if *that* is not a project which is at once noble in its design, and simple in the execution, and free from all mixture of pernicious error,—bearing the traces of its heavenly origin, and impregnable in the truth of its principles. That it is such, a great array of the faithful declare their united belief. If this belief is well-founded, all the errors of colonization, however much they may avail on the question of its reform, avail nothing on the question of its *extirpation*,—all the reproaches that may be justly heaped upon it, reach not the deep foundations of our attachment to it. Let the *errors* be attacked,—hunted down, if you will,—but let the unexceptionable *principles* receive that attachment of the heart which are their due. Even the religion of Christ was once buried up in the abominations of popery; and Luther, when he attacked and overthrew those abominations, became the great reformer; but had he aimed at the *principle*, by reason of the abuses, he would have been Voltaire, and no longer Luther.

And now that Mr. Jay has, to a certain extent, addressed himself to meet the question of colonization in its own relations, and not as embarrassed by any contingent errors or mistakes, it is to be hoped, that the attitude thus taken will be maintained throughout all the work which is to follow.

Mr. Jay has discussed the subject of colonization under the five following heads: "1. Origin, constitution and character of the American Colonization Society. 2. Influence of the Society on the condition of free persons of color. 3. Influence of the Society on Africa,—suppression of the slave-trade. 4. Influence of the Society on Africa,—diffusion of civilization and christianity. 5. Influence of the Society on slavery."

There is no propriety in speaking contemptuously of this plan of Mr. Jay's, nor of its execution. It is by far the best meditated and most well-directed attack upon colonization, which, as far as we know, that cause has had to sustain. He who planned the

attack, has made his dispositions with a view to command every avenue which the society claims to have opened, leading to happy results at home or abroad, for slaves or freemen, for christianity or civil society ; and this, evidently, in the hope of the utter annihilation of the scheme in every department, and with such apparent effect at first, that he now lies in his tent, dreaming, doubtless, of success. We ourselves have not been insensible of the vigor of the effort. Mr. Jay has made his assertions in language so bold, and with so strong a general honesty of purpose ; he has backed them with so many quotations from pamphlets and speeches, old and new, official and unofficial, and has so linked them into one apparent system, by his mode of arrangement and exhibition, that one is almost persuaded, against his own consciousness and the evidence of extended observation, that himself and his fellows have all along been acting from an impulse of hatred to the blacks, instead of a desire for their welfare. And inasmuch as truth has been our object in reading, as it now is in writing, we are free to say, that we have been able to see some things in the colonization scheme, which we have long known to be weak,—to be even more weak than we had supposed, and have opened our eyes upon some injurious influences of colonization, which had before escaped our notice altogether. But it is not in place to make any extended remarks upon them here.

Chapter first of this work, is a kind of "statement of the case" against colonization, to be sustained afterwards in the body of the book. Of course it is impossible here to quote much of the author's own language ; and we shall give the substance of what is said, and what, as we understand it, is meant in this chapter. The substance is, 'that the idea of colonizing free blacks, originated in the legislature of a slave state, (Virginia,) and that the colonization society was organized at the instance and under the management of slave-holders ; that this society has prefaced its constitution by no preamble, setting forth the motives and sentiments of its signers, and recognizes no one principle of duty or policy ; that this omission was probably intended in order that the three classes of those who love the blacks, and those who are weary of the blacks, and those who desire to make slavery secure, might co-operate in harmony ; that, in fact, a heterogeneous multitude has entered and jostled each other,—missionaries, slave-dealers, christians, profligates, friends of human rights, and oppressors of the negro ; that between these characters there has been a set compromise of principle, so that certain fundamental opinions are by consent suppressed, while unimportant ones are freely uttered, and borne with commendable patience on both sides,—the advocate of slavery forbearing to justify it in the *abstract*, and its opponents agreeing to its lawfulness in *present circumstances*, while the actually miserable condition of the slave is

a forbidden topic ; that both the oppressors and the friends of the free negro, dwell on and even aggravate his degradation, to prove the *humanity* of banishing him, and neither make any effort to remove or lessen the oppression ; that any denunciation of slavery as sinful, would be unconstitutional, yet, inasmuch as money is needed, it is permitted to represent the society as an antidote to slavery,—that the society gives an unanimous, vigorous and persevering opposition to present manumission, and this because it is *expedient* to conciliate the slave-holders ; that many supporters of the society are interested in the *American* slave-trade, and to attempt the suppression of this, would be unconstitutional, while the *African* slave-trade is violently denounced, inasmuch as it interferes with the slave-dealer's interests ; that to hold up the free blacks to detestation is constitutional, but to recommend them to the sympathy of christians, and propose measures for their improvement, would be such a departure from the “exclusive” objects of the society, that no member has been rash enough to make the attempt, but that it has been quite constitutional to vindicate the laws which trample them in the dust ; that the constitution forbids the transportation of blacks, without “their consent,” but that it is very constitutional to justify and encourage such oppression of them, as shall compel them to seek a refuge from American cruelty in the wilds of Africa ; and finally, that *expediency* has been adopted as the standard of right and wrong, instead of the revealed will of God.’

This chapter is closed by some satisfactory observations upon the propriety of making use, in substantiating these allegations, of the language of individual members of the Colonization Society, as well as that of the Board of Managers.

Such, then, is the picture which Mr. Jay has drawn of colonization, as it has been, and also, it should be observed, as it *must be* : (for Mr. Jay will not so soon change the attitude he has but just taken in his preface, and attack colonization upon the ground of “objections,” which, “serious as they are in themselves, are not inseparable from the system.”) Some of our readers will think, that we have deepened the lines, to make the picture odious ; but this is not the fact : nothing has been deepened or added, but, on the other hand, many of the less prominent lines and shades have been neglected, for the want of space to introduce them.

But what say we to the picture as it stands ? Why we say, that in the first place, as to Virginia colonization, we know nothing of the motives which led to its proposal ; but almost every one knows, that the actual plan of colonization, which came into effect, and resulted in the formation of the national society at Washington, had its origin in some benevolent and pious minds of the free states. Yet Mr. Jay, having named many circumstances to connect the origin of this society with slave-holders as its patrons, has

not even named the men who were properly its founders, and who were not slave-holders ; and had he named them, he must himself, as it would seem, have felt the incongruity, not to call it, as Mr. Jay would do in a similar case, the *outrage*, of attributing to a deliberative body, of which they formed a part, the design of inviting to a co-operation with themselves the negro-haters of the country, by carefully avoiding an avowal of motives and principles. It is a remark of Dr. Reese, that Mr. Jay has so arranged his paragraphs and worded his expressions, as to carry an impression, that the meeting at Washington, which resulted in the formation of that society, was consequent upon the Virginia resolutions, and of a piece with them ; when, in fact, it had no connection, and took place two days earlier.* The omission of a preamble may possibly have allowed to the supporters of the colonization scheme a wider latitude of character than is usual in our benevolent institutions ; but this character is, almost of course, determined by the feelings with which the avowed purpose of the society is looked upon ; and as the purpose of this particular association is distinctly stated to be the colonization of free people of color, with their own consent, either abroad or at home, very different characters would unite in the scheme, according to their different views of its bearings, however explicit the avowal of motives might have been : so that this does not stand essentially upon a different ground

* Some two or three oft-repeated facts, of which Mr. Jay would seem to be ignorant, may be stated in this place.

1. Granville Sharp founded the colony of Sierra Leone, in 1787, because he found in London and in Nova Scotia considerable bodies of free blacks, in a degraded and suffering condition, whom he [and was he indeed a negro-hater?] knew not how to benefit in any way so well as by colonization.

2. In 1789, the Rev. Samuel Hopkins, D. D., of Newport, R. I., who was neither a slave-holder nor the son of a slave-holder, wrote to Granville Sharp, that the progress of emancipation in the United States was encouraging ; that "the circumstances of the freed blacks are in many respects unhappy, while they live here among the whites ;" and, that "a number of religious blacks, with whom he was acquainted, wished to be formed into a distinct church, and to have a black appointed to be their pastor," "and then to go, with all the blacks who shall be willing to move with them to Africa," "and there maintain the profession and practice of christianity, and spread the knowledge of it among the Africans, as far as they shall have opportunity ; at the same time cultivating their lands, and introducing into that hitherto uncivilized country, the arts of husbandry, building," etc., "and raising tobacco, coffee, cotton, indigo, etc., for exportation, as well for their own use." He added, "This plan I have had in view for some years, and have wished and attempted to promote it."

3. The Rev. Dr. Finley, of New-Jersey, well known for his zeal in behalf of the oppressed and suffering, is believed to have been the first to propose a *society* for this purpose, and was very active in promoting it.

4. Samuel J. Mills, while traversing the United States, on his humble and noiseless, yet most efficient agencies for good, became convinced, that no plan was more important in the great system of efforts for the world's salvation, than the plan of African colonization from America. It was with him, at the north and at the south, a subject of conversation and of prayer ; and when, in the winter of 1816-17, he was informed that a society for that purpose was about to be formed, he hastened to Washington, and arrived there just in time to attend a meeting, which was held at the house of Elias B. Caldwell, the evening before the formation of the society, to implore God's blessing on the enterprise.

from our bible, temperance, or anti-slavery associations, except, as already mentioned, that the latitude allowed by the constitutions of these last is somewhat less extensive.

But, in *fact*, we have always believed, that every *intelligent* supporter of colonization, at the south as well as the north, if he has not taken up the scheme from motives of personal ambition, and a desire of popularity, has done so from a good-will to the colored race. We believe the fact to be so at the *north*, as the result of our own observation ; and we think he must be a hardy asserter of doubtful propositions, who will deny, that the motives of this section have been,—we mean to speak of such as have really *labored* and *given* to the cause,—almost universally benevolent. We have believed the same of the really efficient supporters of the scheme at the *south* ; because they cannot be ignorant of our motives and feelings at the north, and would refuse to co-operate, of course, unless they either harmonize with us, or expect to deceive us. On the subject of slavery, especially, do we believe there is a common desire, though in different degrees, for the welfare of the colored race, among the efficient supporters of the cause, both at the south and the north ; for, not to say any thing respecting the positive assertions which are continually made upon this subject by those who are entitled to credence, we are certain that the sentiments of the north are so well understood, that if a New-England man, of sober and respectable character, should, when passing through a southern state, declare himself, with the utmost sincerity of meaning, to be in principle an advocate of slavery, no southern advocate of slavery would believe him, or give him credit for being any thing superior to a hypocrite. So that, whatever may be said about colonization holding out one face to the north and another to the south, *must* be fabrication ; for the very fact, that the sober and pious population of the free states so extensively support it, is signal enough to all the south, that its influence is at least supposed to be counter to slavery. It is inconceivable then, that, knowing as they do, the fixed hatred of slavery which our northern colonizationists entertain, any southern colonizationists should go hand in hand with them, without partaking, in some remote degree, at least, of the same feeling. We should be surprised, therefore, if that charge of low and detestable cunning, which Mr. Jay so dispassionately prefers against that portion of our countrymen, when he says, “it is permitted to represent the society as an antidote to slavery,” because the free blacks, whom they hate, “cannot be transported without money, and much money cannot be had without the aid of the enemies of slavery,” should turn out to be much better than a calumny.

But the printer warns us to close. Our remarks on Mr. Jay's labors must be left like “the story of Cambuscan bold.” We propose, however, to resume the subject in the next number.